• Burma's Saffron Revolution?: Protest Ferment, Diplomacy Dormant
• Engage Moderate Islamists to Marginalize Radicals
• Adroit Rulers + Fragile Democrats = Frustrated Arab Reform
• Three Paths to Mideast Political Change
• No Anti-democracy Gene in Mideast DNA
• Morocco's "Shadow" Democracy Fosters Apathy, Risks Radicalism
• "Executive Monarchy" Stifles Democracy, Media
• Engaging Islamists, With Reservations
• Labor, Human Rights Targeted in Egypt's Backlash
• SCO - Suppression Coordination Organization?
• Venezuela at "Tipping Point"?
• Chávista Cheerleaders Gloomy as Vital Center Emerges
• Chinese Democracy: Too Much of "a Good Thing"?
• Putin's Russia: "Let Us Steal, We Let You Live"

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Burma's Saffron Revolution?: Protest Ferment, Diplomacy Dormant

Tens of thousands of citizens joined Buddhist monks demonstrating in Yangon, Burma's former capital, this week in the biggest demonstration against the ruling junta since generals repressed student-led protests nearly 20 years ago. But disturbing scenes suggest the regime is preparing to resort to violent repression.

In 1988, monks played a critical role in mobilizing public support for the uprising against military rule, said the National Endowment for Democracy's Brian Joseph. That uprising was crushed by the military, but veterans formed the 88 Generation Students group that has emerged from underground activity to play a leading role in the current protests. Among those arrested following recent protests were 88 Generation veterans Min Ko Naing, Ko Mya Aye, Ko Jimmy and Ko Kyaw Kyaw Htwe. They have all since been admitted to hospital for torture-related injuries following military interrogation.

While the current protests may spark some form of democratic transition, there are also contrary signs that the regime is preparing a violent crackdown, including reports that, as in '88, hospital beds have been cleared of all but emergency cases. "People today are more aware of politics, and the current political situation, thanks to the media abroad," said a leader of the '88 Generation. "The general discontent in the public is high. In '88 we wore masks while protesting so we could not be identified. The protesters today wore nothing though they knew they would be arrested later."

"In the past the regime has arrested people and then released them after a few months," a Western diplomat told the London Independent newspaper. "The regime is preparing to throw the book at [the activists it has arrested]. I think they are very sophisticated at spotting leaders who people will rally around." The diplomat continued: "If the monks join in, that could make a huge difference. They could get people out. That is what happened in '88."

The scale of the protests surprised Burma watchers. "The chances are that small demonstrations may continue for a bit, but major ones are unlikely," claimed David Steinberg, a Burma expert at Georgetown University in Washington, before tens of thousands took to the streets. "Although the public probably is behind the relatively few demonstrators in the streets, I do not think that now the people as a whole are ready in any major way to risk their lives," he said.

The military junta has mobilized its Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), an ancillary movement which purports to be a social welfare organization. The USDA, like Russian President Vladimir Putin's Nashi movement, was reportedly involved in suppressing protests and has followed the regime's cue in blaming unrest on foreign agents. Auxiliary thugs known as the Swan-ar Shin, or Masters of Force, have taken the place of police and military enforcers.

"We, Myanmar people, are going to punish those Myanmar traitors who rely on foreign countries," USDA leaflets read. The junta has accused the National Endowment for Democracy - a "world-famous organization of a powerful state" - of fomenting unrest through $2.9 million in grant aid operations in Burma. The junta blamed "internal and external pessimist and opposition groups [who] are striving to create riots and disturbances" similar to the pro-democracy movement of 1988.

Cyber-dissidents have bypassed the regime's inconsistent filtering system to bring images and news of the protests. This is another "big difference" from 1988, said human rights specialist Dave Mathieson. "The technology is completely different. Even though the military's power may be the same, the ability of the protesters to get their message around the country has grown."

But the scope for international pressure on the junta is limited. Indeed, some states have been conspicuously reluctant to criticize the regime for fear of jeopardizing economic and military interests. Russia recently agreed to establish a 10MW nuclear reactor and associated research center for the junta while China is reportedly upgrading naval facilities which would permit Chinese submarines to berth. Beijing is also establishing a Signals Intelligence facility on Coco Island that would allow Beijing to spy on Indian missile tests.

India, the world's largest democracy, is also turning a blind eye to Burma's turmoil, as it competes with China for strategic and economic influence. Dozens of pro-democracy activists in Burma protested an Indian minister's visit, urging New Delhi not to put energy and economic interests ahead of democracy and human rights.

"What amazes me about Burma is that the leadership seems completely insensitive to and impervious of the views of the outside world," Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said earlier this year. "I hate to say this, but it seems to me nothing is working," he said. "There have been sanctions, there has been so-called constructive engagement, human rights dialogues, there have been visits, there have been representations, there have been threats but nothing moves the leadership of Burma."

But democracy activists dispute this interpretation. "The perception is that sanctions have been tried and failed – well, it's absolutely the opposite," said the Burma Campaign's Mark Farmaner, citing the billions of dollars of investment in the regime since 1990. While China and Russia seem set to veto meaningful action against the junta, world opinion seems to reflect former South African archbishop Desmond Tutu view that when "the courageous people of Burma, in spite of the viciousness of the military junta," are ready to march in the thousands, "we in the free world cannot stand by."

Engage Moderate Islamists to Marginalize Radicals

Working with moderate Islamists has been most effective in countries where democratic reform is most entrenched and regimes have initiated genuine political opening, according to a new report from the US Institute for Peace. The report supports recent academic analysis concluding that political inclusion moderates Islamists.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy examines the experience of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) working with Islamists, concluding that meaningful Arab democracy necessitates engagement and that participation has a moderating influence on such parties. Experience in Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen suggests that successful engagement correlates with Islamist parties' political sophistication, credibility, and openness to working with U.S. organizations.

Engagement is also a vital factor in the Arab world's current "ideological battle" to define the political role of Islam. "Moderate Islamist parties that reject violence and practice democratic ideals are an important counterweight to [violent extremist] forces and could be crucial to developing an indigenous, forward-looking counter-ideology," the USIP report concludes.

Islamists are moderated and radicals marginalized through political inclusion, argues academic analyst Jillian Schwedler, defining inclusion as electoral participation, cooperation with ideological rivals and adoption of moderate norms, including pluralism and tolerance. The democratic paradox – or Islamist dilemma – is that democratic processes may empower anti-democratic actors who then use their mandate to close political space.

The empirical record shows that Islamists initially win significant but not majority representation in legislatures but then "fairly consistently" lose seats when they fail to convert Islamists rhetoric into policy or service delivery. "Structural openings and constraints provide incentives for previously excluded groups to enter the system and 'play by the rules of the game'", Schwedler argues.

Radical Islamist and secular Arab nationalist elements, encouraged by last year's Hizbollah attack on Israel, US problems in Iraq and Iran's challenge to the West, are promoting a strategy of "resistance" rather than reform. But, one observer notes, "voices in the Arab world are being heard against the 'resistance' school, the culture of death and the cult of hatred," not least because "liberal circles in the Arab countries understand very well that radical elements must not be allowed to dictate the agenda and the values of Arab society."

Adroit Rulers + Fragile Democrats = Frustrated Arab Reform

The targeting of human rights defenders and democracy advocates has contributed to the "serious deterioration, verging on collapse, in the performance of forces advocating reform from within Arab societies," writes a leading Egyptian activist. Reformers remain "limited in number, fragile and fissured" as a result of continued repression, argues Bahey Eldin Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.

While some observers have placed the onus on the US or the West for abandoning the democracy agenda, Hassan credits the "outstanding adroitness" with which ruling regimes managed demands for change by adopting reformists discourse; claimed Arab "cultural specificity" to defuse external pressures, and exploited the Islamist threat "as a scarecrow to dampen enthusiasm for reform" on the part of the international community and local elites. In any case, he claims, "democratic reform has never been a solid priority" for the region's leftist, secular and liberal elites who have come to fear the consequences of democracy more than despotism.

Democratization prospects have been undermined by international factors, including the "waning of the EU's political will" in promoting its Neighbourhood Policy in the Arab world (influenced by demographic and energy concerns); the G8's Forum for the Future's failure to generate dialogue between Arab governments and civil society; and the emergence of anti-democratic actors (Russia, China and Iran) with influence in the region. The Middle East's downward spiral can only be arrested, Hassan believes, by a "comprehensive and resolute reform initiative" on the part of the international community, incorporating democratic transformation and respect of human rights.

That may be easier said than done when the backlash against democracy is in full swing. Some Arab regimes have tolerated party aid organizations like the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, notes Dina Bishara, assistant editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin, "in order to burnish democratization credentials at what the governments perceived to be a relatively low cost to their control of domestic politics." But, she notes, "toleration turned into rejection when the party institutes became too effective in empowering opposition parties, too annoying to regime stalwarts, or too much in the way of government plans to control approaching elections." While NDI and IRI activities continue in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Yemen, they have been blocked and harassed in Algeria, Bahrain and Egypt through such measures as funding impediments, overly complicated registration procedures or denying visas and residence permits to staff.

Western organizations' activities political party assistance is secondary to the need for basic solidarity, argues Osama Al-Ghazali Harb, founder of Egypt's new Democratic Front party. Regimes must be forced to face the cost of beating demonstrators, banning meetings or impeding the emergence of genuine democratic parties and actors. "Westerners must understand that at this stage they are dealing with peaceful opposition movements," he argues, "But should these movements be repressed once again, there is nothing to guarantee that the next wave of opposition will remain actually committed to that peaceful path." The West should resist short-term calculations that prioritize a tenuous stability over supporting democratic reform. "Continuing to support the regimes, taking a hesitant, politically opportunist approach defined by narrow interests will convince the peoples in the region that the West is not serious about democracy," Harb insists.

Solidarity with democratic activists is, of course, imperative. Even the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's leader Mahdi Akef admitted that US Administration pressure on the Mubarak regime had a positive effect in promoting reform. Similarly, Egyptian publisher and human rights activist Hisham Kassem argues that US pressure helped create openings in Egypt and the wider Middle East. "All those arguments about how you can't bring democracy in on the wings of a B-52 are garbage," he says. "Egyptian brutality will not change and neither will the apathy of the people. Change in the Middle East will be slow, but we needed the air cover," he says of US regional interventions. "There was no way we could have done this on our own."

But a successful approach must be multifaceted, with diplomatic and political support complemented by a commitment to persevere over the long term and democracy assistance organizations that, as NED's Carl Gershman notes, "flexibly adapt to local conditions and connect in a discreet but transparent way with indigenous democratic forces".

Three Paths to Mideast Political Change

The downturn in prospects for reform since the much-vaunted Arab Spring and the distinctive challenges of promoting democracy in the Middle East demand a new blend of policies and approaches, according to a recent analysis. "The standard democracy-promotion tool kit—involving activities like parliamentary strengthening, support for the judiciary, civil-society training and electoral assistance—does little harm and in some Arab states actually has some accomplishments to claim," argue Nathan Brown and Amr Hamzawy, but "it is unlikely to lead to systemic change."

The region's political scene "looks far more lively and much less predictable when compared to the political stasis and stagnation of the 1990s," Brown and Hamzawy suggest, distinguishing between weak, failing or incomplete states like Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine; the region's minority of strict authoritarian systems – like Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia - largely impervious to liberalization; and semi-authoritarian regimes in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain which oppose genuine democratization but nevertheless allow some political space.

In this latter category, three paths to political reform remain: continued incremental change within the "red lines" of current political arrangements; democratization precipitated by a shock to the political system, such as economic crisis or military defeat, which, requires that opposition movements have the "time and inclination to develop democratic ideologies and practices before they were faced with the prospect of gaining power"; and negotiated power-sharing between government and opposition based on the recognition that "there simply is no way to democratize by crushing the region's most popular groups—in almost all of these countries, Islamists."

No Anti-democracy Gene in Mideast DNA

"Sometimes I have a feeling that we are watching the last episode in the tragedy of the Arab nation," a columnist in the Saudi-owned Al Hayat newspaper recently despaired. "The general solution consists of giving up putting the blame on the others and holding them responsible for our failure, regression and lagging behind progress. We, before the United States, Israel and every real or fictitious enemy, are responsible. The responsibility for building democratic states and societies is ours," he continued. "The same applies to the absence of … the rule of law, basic freedoms, women's rights, transparency, and accountability."

Culturalist arguments against promoting democracy in the Middle East remain popular, at least in the West. In 2003, President Bush "held naive beliefs about the inevitability and imminence of a regional democratic tsunami," argues Ted Galen Carpenter of the libertarian Cato Institute. In line with other democratization skeptics, he advocates a more prudent and realistic policy that recognizes the cultural impediments to democracy in the region. While conceding that "there is no anti-democracy gene in human DNA" and liberal democratic systems might eventually emerge in the Middle East, Carpenter believes "that crucial spirit of tolerance is tragically underdeveloped" in Arab societies.

Other observers reject the notion that certain regions or peoples are ill-suited or impervious to democratic sentiment. "Many politicians and institutions that should be promoting democracy and freedom are cynically reluctant to do it, because Bush raised the agenda," veteran dissident Natan Sharansky suggests. "That's why I give Bush an 'A' for raising the idea, a 'C' for implementation and I give his opponents, who abandoned the idea, an 'F', because they are attacking Bush not for inconsistency in implementing the agenda but for raising it."

The 60-year Arab obsession with Israel is the principal factor impeding the political development of Arab states, claims another observer. "Democratization has occurred where people have poured their energies into fighting for democracy, often at great personal risk and sacrifice," argues Joshua Muravchik, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, invoking the likes of Walesa, Havel, and Mandela. He complains that political energies "have been siphoned into the endless quest for redress of the great humiliation of Jewish sovereignty in the heart of the Arab region."

Morocco's "Shadow" Democracy Fosters Apathy, Risks Radicalism

Frustration with the political process could propel disillusioned Moroccans toward radical Islam if the monarchy fails to match recent social reforms with genuine democratization. That was a view analysts expressed after the record low 37 percent turnout in parliamentary polls earlier this month. "If there is no political willingness to reform our current institutions Morocco will remain in a vicious circle and risk serious dangers in the future," said writer Ahmed Ouyahmane, whose recent book, "Political Apathy in Morocco", details widespread sympathy for al Qaeda.

The participation rate represents "a scathing failure of the institutions", said Ali Ammar, editor of Le Journal, an independent weekly. The complex electoral system is designed to deny any of the 33 parties the chance to win a majority. In the event, the conservative Istiqlal party will head the new government, after coming first with 52 seats, slightly ahead of the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) with 46 seats. The principal loser was the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Istiqlal's partner in the outgoing ruling coalition which lost 12 seats, although one of winning candidates was Latifa Jbabdi, a board member of NED grantee UAF (Union de L'Action Feminine) and a member of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission.

Post-election analysis attributed the low turnout less to voter apathy than disappointment with government failure to deliver jobs and services. Voters also took note of a recent speech by King Mohammed VI (see below) which dismissed the election's significance in determining government policy.

PJD leader Saad Eddine El-Othmani said that the party had taken "social justice and economic and social development as our priorities", basing PJD strategy on the experience of the Turkish AK party which recently returned to power in Ankara. The PJD was expected to perform better since "through its mosque network and door-to-door grassroots campaigning (often deploying friends or relatives to reach out to specific target audiences such as poor neighborhoods)," one analyst notes, "the PJD has been more successful than other parties at mobilizing voters."

The elections were deemed orderly and professional by a multinational observer team organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). But their "strict transparency and professionalism" was compromised by cases of vote-buying and multiple voting. The low turnout and high incidence of protest votes, said NDI, confirmed the need for the Moroccan authorities "to undertake further political reforms in order to encourage widespread engagement in the political process."

The Network of Election Monitoring Organizations deployed some 3,000 observers while NDI and Germany's Friedrich Naumann Foundation were among the international organizations, providing pre-election training. The Moroccan Centre for Electoral Democracy complained that the judiciary failed to respond to complaints. The centre lodged a complaint at the Casablanca Court of Appeal over statements made by leaders of the [moderate Islamist] Renaissance and Virtue Party casting aspersions on the Islamic status and, therefore, legitimacy of other parties.

Morocco has been held up as an example of gradual modernization but the glacial pace and cosmetic nature of political reform leads some observers to suggest that genuine change is unlikely. "In essence, the plurality of Islamist tendencies within Morocco, the PJD's opposition to secularism and inability to gain a majority in parliament and the country's political system will allow Islamist radicalism and jihadism to proliferate for the foreseeable future," argued the Stratfor strategy group. "But since Morocco's jihadist insurgency is within tolerable parameters and the Islamists are divided, the monarchy will continue to rule unencumbered."

"Moroccan democracy remains a shadow game: democratic institutions have little substantive authority, and citizens' preferences, as expressed at the ballot box, rarely have much impact on government policy," said Tamara Cofman Wittes, of the Washington-based Saban Center for Middle East Policy. "The citizen alienation that results threatens to undermine the credibility of the nascent democratic process."

"Executive Monarchy" Stifles Democracy, Media

Despite the country's institutional stasis, Morocco has witnessed a flourishing of civil society, in part due to recent social reforms, including a significant new family law which extended women's rights. "Thousands of associations and nongovernmental organizations have been created," noted Ahmed Charai, chairman of Casablanca's Observateur e-newspaper.

Moroccan NGOS, including 2007Daba ("2007Now"), ran an intensive voter awareness drive, building on a 2002 campaign pioneered by the National Democratic Institute. NGOs have arguably been more vocal and aggressive than the country's political parties in pressing for change. "It is civil society groups that called loudest for constitutional reform," claimed Moroccan law professor Amina el-Messaoudi. "Then the political parties came along and said: 'It's we who should be doing that'."

The NGOs' efficiency, flexibility and openness also make a refreshing contrast with the bureaucratic, elitist approaches of the parties and state institutions. "NGOs are not just filling the gaps but are managing state-funded projects," said Abdelhai Moudden, a political science professor, "even running state schools more efficiently than the system."

Islamist groups have also been successful in building civic associations. The PJD is generally seen as more transparent, accessible and rooted than the mainstream parties, in part because of its connections to the Tawhid wal Islah (Unity and Reform), network of grass-roots Islamic civic associations which serve as a source of activists, officials and voters.

But the executive character of the monarchy diminishes the importance of other governmental institutions in the eyes of the electorate. The Moroccan elite must now augment hitherto cautious liberalization with genuine democratization and institutional development. "If he (the king) wants to give greater substance to Moroccan democracy and attract the interest and participation of citizens, he will have to yield greater authority to parliament, constraining his own power in the process," said the Saban Center's Wittes, who participated in an advance NDI delegation before the polls. (NDI has launched Morocco Democracy Online - in English and Arabic – an excellent on-line resource, including updates on NDI programs, a resource library and relevant links.)

Recent attacks on the media have highlighted the monarchy's sensitivity and the limits to pluralism within a frail democratic culture. "There is complete inconsistency between the official line, which boasts about the progress in democracy, and the regular attacks suffered by the independent newspapers," according to Hajar Smouni, Maghreb representative for Reporters San Frontieres.

Following an editorial criticizing the recent speech by the king, two liberal magazines – the Arabic-language Nichane and the French-language Tel Quel - were seized and their editor Ahmed Benchemsi interrogated by security forces. In language which likely had Montesquieu turning in his grave, the king had repudiated any separation of powers: "I want to reiterate that the system we chose is the active monarchy, which cannot be represented in a concept of separate executive, legislative, or judicial branches." The monarch, in effect, dismissed the significance of the forthcoming elections, stating that "the essence of ballots is not competing over the nation's biggest choices, which are the object of national consensus". For noting that this effectively reduced elections to competitions to implement the king's predetermined policies, Benchemsi faces a trial for "insolence" towards the monarch, a charge which carries a prison sentence of up to five years.

Engaging Islamists, With Reservations

The PJD has largely transcended the ideological rigidity and Islamic radicalism of its social movement origins and base in the Movement of Unity and Reform. Yet it comes under attack both from radical Islamists for its non-violent political strategy and from secular democrats who believe that, despite its incremental approach, elements in the party remain committed to ultimately implementing sharia law.

Party leader Saad Eddine El-Othmani provided a theoretical justification for the PJD's incrementalist strategy, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reports, in a treatise posted on his website addressing "Political Participation in the Jurisprudence of Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya." He refutes radical Islamists who oppose electoral participation, citing the works of Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval Islamic scholar revered by Wahhabi and salafist activists. Othmani's case for incrementalism is based on a definition of Moroccan society as a mujtama muslim maftun – a Muslim society seduced from the right path - a lesser concern than outright heresy. It is not, as the takfiri radicals claim heretical, or kafir, a definition which legitimizes violence.

But there are still "hard questions to be asked about the sincerity of the PJD's commitment to pluralism", Brookings' Wittes has argued. Othmani's defense of the PJD's incrementalist strategy, for example, prompted concern when he expressed respect for Ibn Taymiyya who, he said, is "rightly considered the standard-bearer of the salafiyya, the renewer of the Islamic sciences, and the reviver of jihad, in scholarship and in practice...", even though he is alien to Morocco's own Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, MEMRI notes, Othmani's interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya differs from the radical jihadist factions, inferring that they misunderstand shari'a principles and, by adopting heretical positions, need to be fought.

The PJD's secular critics often point to pronouncements by PJD parliamentarians and officials, generally less urbane and sophisticated than Othmani, to suggest that the PJD's commitment to democracy, pluralism and tolerance is superficial. Bilal Al-Talidi, a prominent journalist linked to the PJD, recently stated that it is not a normal political party, but a da'wa, a missionary movement for which politics is but one dimension of a moral-religious project to transform society. Sharia remains the objective but cannot be achieved by Islamist parties, Al-Talidi suggested, "until they have already made strides in convincing people of this new value and until it becomes accepted by all of the people, or the majority." Minority rights – a "grey zone" for other Islamist groups in the region too – are not mentioned. "Whenever, thanks to the harvest of da'wa, a value comes to enjoy social legitimacy," Al-Talidi continued, "it becomes incumbent on politics to fortify it by enacting clear policies and laws around which the people will rally."

The PJD is not Morocco's only Islamist group of consequence. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the Justice and Charity movement, is more radical than the PJD, socially conservative, openly hostile to the monarchy, and refuses to participate in what it considers a deeply flawed electoral process. Banned, but tolerated, Justice and Charity nevertheless represents a constituency that must be incorporated into politics and weaned away from the seductions of violent Salafist groups. "The Americans regularly come to see us: they are more intelligent than the French, who often put pressure on their people here to cancel meetings," said Abdelwahed Moutawakil, head of its political section. "The Americans know what we can do to combat the spread of terrorism in Morocco." Despite legitimate reservations about the depth and extent of moderate Islamist commitment to democratic norms, a policy of critical engagement would appear more likely to accelerate and deepen the Islamists' moderation than one of estrangement and alienation.

Labor, Human Rights Targeted in Egypt's Backlash

Egypt's authoritarian backlash, reversing recent political openings, continues apace. A government decree recently dissolved the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid, a leading human rights organization, which monitors human rights violations and provides legal assistance to victims.

The decree cites article 17 of the Law on Associations (84/2002), which bans NGOs from receiving foreign funding without prior government permission. The state has previously exploited the issue of foreign funding in order to target political dissidents.

"Although Egypt is a member of the UN Human Rights Council, it is preventing its citizens from maintaining an association that combats human rights violations," said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director for Human Rights Watch. "The government can reasonably require a local civil society organization to comply with customs and foreign exchange regulations when it accepts funds from abroad," he said. "But the Egyptian authorities have set up obstacles that unnecessarily infringe freedom of association."

AHRLA's donors include the Canadian International Development Agency, the Swiss Embassy in Cairo, and the National Endowment for Democracy. AHRLA chairperson Tarek Khater told Human Rights First that the association has not received foreign funding since 2005 when it secured a NED grant. AHRLA submitted over a dozen requests to obtain permission from the Ministry of Social Solidarity to accept the grants, as legally required, and only started to employ the funds after ministry officials repeatedly postponed approval. AHRLA has appealed the decree before the Administrative Court and a hearing has been set for October 21.

This latest move follows the closure of the Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS), which offers legal aid to Egyptian workers and monitors labor-rights abuses. The regime accused the center of being behind an upsurge in labor militancy earlier this year. A question mark also hangs over the future of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies which, founder Saad Eddin Ibrahim says, the ruling National Democratic Party seems determined to close. "They want to see me and other staff members prosecuted," he says, "alleging that we have tarnished the country's image abroad, shown contempt for religion, undermined the national interest and committed high treason."

SCO - Suppression Coordination Organization?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization presents cause for concern, less as a military bloc rivaling NATO than as an authoritarian bulwark against democracy and rule of law. This at least was the consensus of observers following last month's SCO summit in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, which provided the venue for anti-Western and anti-American tirades from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Previously "dismissed as a talking shop," the SCO is now "becoming a force to be reckoned with." The SCO "explicitly rejects both European ("Western") and global norms of human rights, political liberties, good governance in general," a European analysis recently noted. "It thereby helps to shore up authoritarian Central Asian regimes, and panders to the more negative aspects of Russian political culture."

The SCO's upside, minimizing prospects for Sino-Russian conflict and reinforcing Beijing's multilateral tendencies, for example, should be welcomed, argues SCO analyst Alyson Bailes. But the SCO's declared priority of combating the "three evils" of terrorism, extremism and separatism has "too often acted as cover for suppression of what Europeans would see as legitimate oppositional groups and the cutting-off of trans-regional ties between them."

One observer has gone so far as to claim that the SCO's formation in 2001 was "an equally important, if less spectacular, development" as the attacks of 9/11. "It took another five years for Western foreign policy experts to realize that this emerging SCO was, for all practical purposes, an OPEC with nukes, which had the potential to develop, over time, into a full-fledged 'NATO of the East.'"

But, while the SCO recently organized its largest-ever military exercises, it would be a mistake to see it as an emerging "anti-NATO," suggested Sean Roberts, a Central Asian specialist at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. The United States "does not yet have a coherent stance towards the SCO" he said. But the West "should be concerned about the role of the SCO as a counterbalance for the international ideals of democratic governance in the region."

The SCO's military exercises, code-named "Peace Mission 2007", were held in Russia's Volga-Ural military district and in China's Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. The scale of the exercises suggested that they were "aimed at controlling local populations and not just combating terrorism," said the Uyghur American Association.

Democracy and human rights groups are concerned that the SCO serves as a conduit for the exchange of information on dissidents and other political activists, and for their subsequent incarceration and deportation. Uyghur-Canadian Huseyin Celil, for example, was detained by Uzbek authorities in March 2006 when he tried to renew his visa while visiting his wife's parents (he became a Canadian citizen in 2005). Celil was repatriated to China in June 2006 to face charges arising from political activities he engaged in before he left Xinjiang, known to Uyghurs as East Turkestan. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of engaging in "terrorist activities" and "plotting to split the country."

None of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries share the West's enthusiasm for democracy and reform which, a US official recently conceded, are "often seen as a direct threat to existing structures and political interests." Yet reform is not an alien imposition but consistent with the region's own development plans, said Evan Feigenbaum, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs. Promoting the rule of law, for example, is not a solely 'American' agenda to "assure better governance and democratic development [but] a fundamental part of building the more attractive economic and investment climate that all six SCO members hope to create."

SCO member states have agreed mutual assistance agreements which could be invoked "if you had an uprising against the government", said Stephen Blank a professor U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. "What galvanizes this on the part of China and Russia is that they were not able to do anything on behalf of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 [when President Askar Akaev was ousted] and they've resolved never to be caught short again."

Yet the SCO is unlikely to emerge as a coherent anti-Western bloc, largely because of SCO members' incompatible interests. Russia, an energy supplier, needs high energy prices, while China, a consumer, needs them to be lower. China is becoming a status-quo power, while Russia is getting more aggressive internationally. "Ultimately, the two cannot form a functional alliance because of a fundamental difference in mindset: Russia feels it is destined for a conflict with the United States, while China wants to avoid one at all costs," one analysis concludes.

The SCO is a tool of regional policy that strengthens China's influence and control over Central Asia's natural resources at Russia's expense, argues Andrei Piontkovsky. "Russia has an important place in Chinese geopolitical calculations, as a supplier of both modern weaponry and energy resources needed to continue its modernization," he contends. Moscow is fearful of China's economic and military growth and worries that Russia's resource-rich Far East could become a zone of intense Sino-Russian competition. "Over the long term, China is poised for strategic competition with Russia -- the traditional overlord, which resents US and Chinese presence in its old 'backyard' of Central Asia -- once Islamist terrorism subsides," according to a China security expert at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies.

Venezuela at "Tipping Point"?

Venezuela is no longer a democracy, notes a leading specialist, as President Hugo Chávez inches the country towards "competitive authoritarianism". Such hybrid regimes are formally constitutionally democratic, with a degree of collective competition, but in which "the playing field is stacked in favor of the incumbents," argues Harvard professor Steven Levitsky.

Left populists like Chávez came to power in some Latin America states in part because long standing structural problems have generated "unbelievable levels of social and racial inequality" but also, argues Levitsky, because of democracy. "It's the consolidation of democracy that is allowing the left to come to power peacefully in Latin America," he observes, "not a response to repression." Contemporary populists differ from the earlier movements of the 1930s and 1940s which, Levitsky notes, were based on organized labor. Hugo Chávez, by contrast, has "attacked labor organizations" in Venezuela.

Since his re-election last December to a six-year term, Chávez has created a Leninist-style party, silenced a critical television station, and now aims to revise the Constitution. Chávistas currently control the Supreme Court, the federal bureaucracy, the National Assembly and every state-owned company but also want to eject their opponents from the few municipal and state administrations they control.

The new vanguard party, provisionally named the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), got off to a poor start. Initial plans required 19,000 Cuban-style "socialist battalions" to have been set up by September 11 but only 14,000 exist. Even regime supporters concede that "in private, activists say attendance at public meetings has fallen well short of expectations," suggesting that the target of 5.72 million party members is way beyond reach.

Chávez has declared his ambition to govern indefinitely and establish new regional governing entities run by vice presidents appointed by his office. "The president wants to carry out a 'constitutional' coup to perpetuate himself in power," said Teodoro Petkoff, editor of Tal Cual and "a former guerrilla with impeccable leftist credentials".

But Chávez is reaching "a tipping point in his consolidation of power", argues the Stratfor analysis group, as an increasingly energetic student movement and a more assertive Roman Catholic Church threaten to re-energize the opposition. "People voted for a populist president but he is giving them a strong dose of socialism and that is causing a serious backlash," said Michael Penfold, a Caracas-based political scientist. "It's hardly the end for Chávez but it does mean the beginning of a new political movement in the opposition, and society's awareness of his true political agenda, which is now being revealed."

Chávista Cheerleaders Gloomy as Vital Center Emerges

As a result of recent student-led protests against the closure of the RCTV television station, a new middle ground is opening up, according to Miguel Angel Contreras, a sociologist at Venezuela's Central University. "We are at a point where new leaders, new debates are emerging. Things are ripe for change and it's the students that have triggered this." Since he is "no longer able to proceed without developing an antagonistic relationship toward interest groups that stand for something other than the 'bourgeois elite'", notes Stratfor, Chávez will "increasingly resort to authoritarian measures to punish and discredit opposition groups, further darkening his reputation abroad."

The regime's growing authoritarianism is also a reaction to growing popular dissatisfaction with the government's poor performance. Economic turbulence is adding to Chávez's unpopularity. Venezuela's earnings from oil proceeds, which account for 90% of exports, reached record highs this year, but inflation rose by 16%. "This has been the worst-managed oil boom in Venezuela's history," said Ricardo Hausmann, a former government planning minister.

Even leftist commentators, normally reliable cheerleaders, are dismayed at the government's performance. Chávez "committed a grave error" in closing down the opposition RCTV station, according a commentary in The Nation. "This was not a frontal attack on the economic elite but rather a blow to the cultural identity of millions of Venezuelans--and it will have severe consequences for the government," not least because Chávez's move "revitalized a demoralized opposition".

"Venezuelans are debating whether Chávez is putting this windfall [oil] revenue to good use or squandering it through disorganization, corruption and misplaced priorities," notes another Chávista sympathizer. With "greater handouts aggravating both dependence on the state and a climate of paternalism," the Bolivarian socialist experiment has also been hit by the failure of many state financed cooperatives which has "resulted in the loss of tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars."

The government's growing links with unsavory regimes are also raising concern, one reason why Chávez is "widely recognized - and widely mistrusted - throughout Latin America", according to the latest Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Large majorities in Chile (75%), Brazil (74%), Peru (70%), Mexico (66%), and Bolivia (59%) have little or no confidence in Chávez "to do the right thing regarding world affairs."

Chinese Democracy: Too Much of "a Good Thing"?

China's communist authorities have frozen prices of state-controlled commodities until the end of the year in an effort to control runaway inflation. The regime is reportedly concerned that labor unrest may generate protests during next month's Communist Party Congress. Market stability must be maintained to ensure the "smooth opening of the 17th Party Congress," said a government decree.

"Communist leaders view labor unrest as the most threatening form of protest," argues a leading analyst. Their ideological training leads them to dismiss peasants' capacity for collective organization as equivalent to Marx's famous sack of potatoes but, notes Susan L Shirk, they "expect workers to be, if not the vanguard, at least a part of any future insurgency."

Jittery at the prospect of color revolutions, the authorities have also "clamped down on nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups", notes China specialist Bruce Dickson in a symposia on the future of China's party-state. Yet the integration of political power and economic wealth has boosted the CCP's legitimacy by boosting economic growth and national pride. Indeed, notes Bruce Gilley, in a study of perceived state legitimacy, China ranks 13th of 72 countries, ahead of France and Australia, reflecting the regime's success in delivering stability, growth and mobility.

Party leaders realize that China's citizens will eventually aspire to dignity, participation and self-expression, says Gilly. "All democratic transitions depend on the loss in belief in dictatorship inside the ruling party itself," he argues, a process "now well under way" within the CCP.

"Democracy is a Good Thing", wrote party theorist Yu Keping earlier this year while an article in the party-backed Yanhuang Chunqiu journal asserted that "only constitutional democracy can fundamentally solve the ruling party's problems of corruption and graft." Yet a healthy degree of skepticism is justifiable so long as the party continues its monopoly on power and repressive rule.

One reason why the CCP has stressed "political order and technocratic governance rather than popular participation and regime transformation," says Dali Yang, is that China remains one of the world's most unequal societies, according to World Bank data. While the party's third generation of leaders opened up political space in the late 1990s, notes Merle Goldman, the fourth generation has "arrested defense lawyers, freelance intellectuals, editors, journalists and cyber-dissidents… [and] reinforced the authoritarian party-state."

Gilley, a proponent of actively promoting democracy in China, believes a majority of the party will accept democratization when its Yeltsin moment arrives and that "a reformed CCP could enjoy electoral success in a democratic China." But the country's transition will not be determined by the party elite alone. The process will be negotiated and contested by diverse interests, notes Yang. China's leaders will need to "learn to lead and even to accommodate an increasingly educated and well-informed populace, with its rising expectations in matters of liberty, political participation, and democratic governance."

Putin's Russia: "Let Us Steal, We Let You Live"

The new-found assertiveness of Russia's neo-Soviet kleptocracy is based on a regime of fractious internal alliances and questionable popular support for President Vladimir Putin. So says Garry Kasparov, former chess maestro and democracy activist. "The support for Putin is a kind of passive resistance to change," he said. "You cannot talk about polls and popularity when all of the media are under state control."

Kasparov suggests that Putin's succession could prompt a crisis within a ruling elite motivated primarily by material greed and lacking any political vision beyond a crude anti-Westernism. "The Cold War was based on ideas, like them or not," he said. "Putin's only idea can be concentrated into the motto 'Let's steal together.' " His view is echoed by Vladimir Milov, an economist who worked for Putin until 2002. "The authorities here let you exist so long as you don't call them into question. In other words, the deal they offer is: You let us steal and we let you live."

The siloviki - former Soviet security agents – dominate the country's political and economic élites, occupying up to sixty per cent of "high" and "upper middle" positions in the state. "Putin has skillfully balanced these clans, not allowing any single one of them to take too powerful a lead," says human rights' activist Yuri Dzhibladze. "When he leaves the Presidency, the problem will be that these groups do not get along."

News In Brief

European Soft Power – for Democracy?

Europeans are generally skeptical of the role and effectiveness of external agencies in promoting democracy, according to a recent analysis. While others, especially in the Global South, would prefer a more active assertion of the European Union's soft power, the EU tends to act cautiously and incrementally, limiting itself to "techno-institutional" governance interventions and electoral assistance. It is questionable whether the EU is united enough to effectively promote democracy outside its borders, but it at least needs clarify why and how it can do so, especially given the democratic commitments and aspirations of new and aspiring member states.

Unions: Democratic Laboratories - and Architects
Independent trade unions have been key protagonists in democratic transitions, according to Phil Fishman, a leading labor activist, writing in The American Interest. The recent expulsion of a labor rights activist by Russian authorities is a further reminder that unions remain at the forefront of current struggles. Unions also function as laboratories of democracy, Fishman argues, educating and engaging members in debates, votes and procedures, particularly in societies that "lack developed democratic habits of the heart."

Yet unions' diminishing influence, generational leadership changes and political partisanship have combined to undermine unions' ability to maintain their historic commitment to internationalism and salient role in democracy assistance. A further factor in unions' diminishing role in democratization is the suppression of elementary human rights, including freedom of association, as documented in the latest annual report from the International Trade Union Confederation. At a time when unions' capacities to transcend ethnic and sectarian divisions have rarely been so important, it is imperative that unions re-commit to a positive foreign policy role – and get the resources to do the job.

Somali Journalists' Persecution Condemned
Somali media outlets suspended programming in protest at the targeted assassination of Ali Iman Sharmarke, the director of Horn Afrik radio. He was killed by a remote-controlled mine, detonated during the funeral procession for his colleague Mahad Ahmed Elmi, director of Radio Capital Voice, who had been shot only a few hours earlier by unidentified gunmen. Democracy and human rights advocates condemned the persecution of Somali journalists that has claimed six lives this year and called on the transitional government to affirm the principles of press freedom enshrined in the Somali Transitional Federal Charter by taking action to ensure the protection of all journalists and media outlets.

Community of Democracies Downgrades Authoritarians
Venezuela is not welcome in the Community of Democracies and Russia has been downgraded to observer status for the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers scheduled for November in Bamako, Mali. The list of 126 participating and 20 observer states largely reflects the recommendations of an independent panel of high-level experts. The Community of Democracies was launched in Warsaw in 2000 as a means of strengthening international cooperation for democracy and human rights.

The 16 governments that comprise the Community of Democracies Convening Group decided against inviting Thailand, Fiji, Singapore, Qatar, Venezuela, Bangladesh and Tunisia, all of whom been at the last COD meeting in Chile in 2005. Their exclusion, and the downgrading of Russia and Nigeria, underscores the group's determination to exclude states which fail to uphold democracy and human rights standards.

But democracy advocates were disappointed with the Convening Group's leniency towards Bahrain, Jordan, Malaysia and Yemen, which remain full participants despite deteriorations in democratic standards and human rights. Similarly, several states with dubious democratic credentials - Egypt, Oman, Burkina Faso and Azerbaijan – retained observer status despite the recommendations of the expert panel.

Opportunities

Senior Program Officer, Middle East & North Africa/Program Officer for the Middle East, National Endowment for Democracy
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a Congressionally funded, private, non-profit grant-making organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through non-governmental efforts. The NED is seeking a Senior Program Officer and a Program Officer for the Middle East, to be based in Washington DC. Applicants should email a resume, a brief writing sample and names of three references to jobs@ned.org. Place SPO-MENA in your email subject line.

Assistant Project Manager, World Movement for Democracy
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) seeks an Assistant Project Manager, World Movement for Democracy. The World Movement for Democracy is a global network of democracy and human rights activists, practitioners, scholars, and others engaged in democracy promotion, for which NED serves as the Secretariat. The position is based in Washington, DC. Reporting to the Director, the Assistant Project Manager will be responsible primarily for overseeing administrative and logistical preparations of the World Movement's biennial global assemblies, most immediately the Fifth Assembly, to be held in Kyiv, Ukraine, in April 2008. Full details available here.

National Endowment for Democracy: Program Assistants (Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Europe and Eurasia); Program Officers (Europe and Eurasia, West Africa, Iraq)
The National Endowment for Democracy has vacancies for the above plus various other full-time positions. Full details available here.

Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) invites applications to its Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program for fellowships in 2008–2009. Named in honor of the two principal founders of NED, former president Ronald Reagan and the late Democratic congressman Dante Fascell, the program enables democracy activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to promote democratic change.

Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows maintain full-time residence at the International Forum for Democratic Studies (the Forum), the research arm of the Endowment, located in Washington, D.C. The Forum hosts 12 to 15 Reagan-Fascell fellows per year for periods ranging from three to ten months. The program offers two tracks, a practitioner track and a scholarly track. The Practitioner Track: the Reagan-Fascell program was established primarily to support democratic activists, human rights advocates, journalists, and others who work on the front lines of democracy promotion in emerging and aspiring democracies. The program seeks to provide experienced activists with an opportunity to reflect on their work, learn from counterparts in the United States, and reevaluate techniques for building democracy in their country of origin. Fellowships on the practitioner track tend to be short-term (3 to 5 months), typically culminating in a strategy memorandum, short article or op-ed and a presentation of the fellow's analysis and ideas. The Scholarly Track: recognizing the importance of intellectual contributions to the theory and practice of democracy, the Reagan-Fascell program offers a scholarly track principally for professors and researchers from emerging and aspiring democracies. Accomplished scholars from established democracies are also eligible to apply. Applicants are expected to possess a Ph.D., or academic equivalent, at the time of application, and to have developed a rigorous research outline. During their stay at the Forum, which can range from 3 to 10 months, scholars make at least one presentation and complete a substantial piece of writing (a monograph or book) for publication. Full details here.

International Republican Institute, Resident Country Directors (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe), Resident Program Officers (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Iraq) and Resident Program Director (West Bank/Gaza)
IRI has vacancies for the above various other full-time positions: If you are interested in employment opportunities, please click on the links above to read the job description for available positions. Please e-mail your resume to personnel@iri.org and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in. IRI does not accept unsolicited resumes.

National Democratic Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Senior Resident Director
NDI has vacancies for the above and various other full-time positions: If you are interested in employment opportunities, click here to access details of available positions. Please e-mail your resume to and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in.

Center for International Enterprise, Program Assistant, Latin America and the Caribbean; Program Assistants, Middle East & North Africa.
The Center for International Enterprise has the above vacancies. To apply, please send a resume or CV, cover letter, writing sample and salary history to jobs@cipe.org subject MENA-PA2. No phone calls. Full details here.

Africa Country Director, IFES Democracy at Large
IFES is an international, nonprofit organization that supports the building of democratic societies. IFES provides targeted technical assistance to strengthen transitional democracies. IFES is currently soliciting applications for potential Country Director positions on the Africa continent. This solicitation is in anticipation of new funding. Actual country locations are still to be determined. The Country Director will manage the IFES program. Primary responsibilities will include program management and implementation, and management of the IFES field office. The Country Director is also responsible for identifying new opportunities for IFES within the existing program and beyond. The ideal candidate will have previously managed projects to promote democratic development, and will have had extensive experience in at least one of the following areas: supporting good governance, strengthening election administration or enhancing civil society development.

Applying: Applications will be accepted online only, through the IFES website. To apply visit our careers website. Then follow the instructions on how to upload your resume and answer prescreening questions. A cover letter is welcome and can be placed in the applicant notes section.

Advisor on Sharia, Women's Rights Division, Human Rights Watch
The Advisor on Sharia is a newly created position intended to complement existing staff expertise and ongoing HRW work on the intersection between human rights and religious and customary laws. The Advisor will provide Human Rights Watch with advice on the application of sharia as a legal system, the variations in its employment by states and other agents in different regions of the world, and how it is used to advance or restrict women's human rights, in areas including civil and political rights, family law, and sexuality. The ideal candidate will have (1) deep expertise in Islamic jurisprudence and history, including the diverse doctrines and history in the major sharia schools of thought, and (2) a history of involvement with women's organizations and human rights organizations in Muslim communities. She or he should have no less than five years of directly related post-graduate experience. Fluency in English is required, as well as ability to read advanced Arabic. Fluency in one or more of the languages of countries in Asia, Africa, or the Middle East with substantial Muslim populations will be beneficial. She or he must be able to travel internationally. Further details available here.

Long-Term Election Observers- Pakistan: International Republican Institute
The International Republican Institute (IRI), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization committed to advancing freedom and democracy worldwide, seeks Long-Term Election Observers (LTOs) to monitor the pre-election, election-day, and post-election situation in Pakistan for upcoming national elections. LTOs will arrive in Pakistan in late-October or early-November and will remain in the country for approximately 2 months. LTOs will receive a daily rate of $150 in addition to meals and lodging. Further details here.

Deputy Project Director, Baghdad, Iraq.
IFES, is an international, nonprofit organization that supports the building of democratic societies. IFES is undertaking a two-year project to support and build upon current conflict mediation initiatives in Iraq. With technical assistance, IFES' nationwide network of trained Iraqi staff and civil society organization (CSO) partners will lead efforts to address specific electoral, political and social conflicts. Applying: Applications will be accepted online only, through the IFES website. To apply visit our careers website. Then follow the instructions on how to upload your resume and answer prescreening questions. A cover letter is welcome and can be placed in the applicant notes section.

Oxford Internet Institute, Civil Society Practitioners Programme
The Oxford Internet Institute is looking for civil society activists from the developing world to participate in their new Civil Society Practitioners Programme intended for civil society practitioners of distinction or outstanding promise who wish to visit the Institute for a period of six weeks between February and December 2008, to undertake research concerning the social impact of the Internet and related ICTs. Visitors are expected to reside in Oxford during their stay, and to participate fully in the intellectual life of the Institute. Program participants receive a subsistence allowance of 3800 GBP (US$7500 to cover research expenses and living costs during their stay in Oxford and a travel grant of up to 1000 GBP (US$2000) for travel to and from the UK. Applications should be submitted by "Civil Society Practitioners in or from the global South," active in the areas of freedom of expression, media reform, media justice, and communications and information policy. More info here.

Center for Asian Democracy: Visiting Fellows in Asian Studies
The Center for Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville invites applications for its new Visiting Fellows program for the 2008-2009 academic year. Fellows are expected to be in residence with the Center from approximately August 1, 2008 through May 31, 2009, and will receive a stipend of $40,000. Applicants need to demonstrate their competency in Asian studies with a solid record of publications. The fellowship will be ideal for recent Ph.Ds whose work is related to democratization in Asia, and senior scholars on sabbatical leave. Some teaching experience is a plus. Fellows are expected to teach one course per year in their area of expertise and present their research in a public forum. Created in 2006 with a substantial endowment, the Center is in the process of hiring an endowed chair, publishes a book series with the University Press of Kentucky, runs a speakers' series, and will hold conferences and workshops on a regular basis. Applicants should send a research proposal of approximately 1,000 words, curriculum vita, one writing sample, and three letters of recommendation by November 15, 2007 to Dr. Shiping Hua, Director, Center for Asian Democracy, Ford Hall 205, the University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, the United States of America. Phone: 502-852-2667, Fax: 502-852-7923. Email inquiries are welcome: shiping.hua@louisville.edu

EVENTS

Burma Inside Out: Htein Lin
Htein Lin is a Burmese artist, accused by the Burmese military government of planning opposition protests and imprisoned from 1998-2004. A show of the work he produced in prison, "Burma Inside Out", is at Asia House, London W1, until 13 October.

October 1. 12pm-2pm. Conservative Party Conference Fringe Meeting: After Afghanistan and Iraq, What Future an Interventionist Foreign Policy? Panelists: Ambassador John Bolton - Former US Ambassador to the United Nations; Lord Hurd of Westwell - Former Foreign Secretary; Lord Lamont of Lerwick - Former Chancellor of the Exchequer; Dr Alan Mendoza - Executive Director of the Henry Jackson Society; Dominic Dyer (chair) - Executive Director of the American European Institute. Venue: The Savoy Hotel, Queen's Promenade, Blackpool, FY2 9SJ, UK. To attend, please RSVP to Alan Mendoza at alan.mendoza@henryjacksonsociety.org or 07974 812 782.

October 1. 12:00-2:00pm. Russia and its Impact on the Transatlantic Dialogue with Dr. Jörg Himmelreich, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund; Dr. Lilia Shevtsova, Carnegie Endowment; Dr. Angela Stent, Georgetown University. RGL Conference Room, AICGS, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036. Following an off-the-record conference on "German-Russian Relations and the Impact on the Transatlantic Agenda", this policy briefing will make the findings of the AICGS project concerning the German-American-Russian dialogue available to the policy and think-tank communities. As the Russian elections approach, all of these topics will become even more prevalent on the political and economic agenda of Germany, the United States, and Russia.. A light luncheon will be provided. Please contact Jessica Riester at jriester@aicgs.org or 202-332-9312 Extension 125 if you would like to attend this briefing.

October 24, National Democratic Institute Democracy Luncheon, Washington, DC. Madeleine K. Albright invites you to join NDI in celebrating women blazing new trails in their countries despite tremendous odds. Honoring President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf with the W. Averell Harriman Democracy Award and the 50/50 Group from Sierra Leone with the Madeleine K. Albright Grant. For more information, or to secure your sponsorship, please contact Siobhán Alfonso at 202.728.5599.

October 2, 2007. 12:00 p.m. - 2:00 p.m. Is a Strong Europe Really in America's Interests? The Hon. Dr. Werner Langen, Chairman, German CDU/CSU Group in the European Parliament; The Hon. Hartmut Nassauer, Vice Chairman, Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament; The Hon. Markus Ferber, Co-Chairman, German CDU/CSU Group in the European Parliament Comments: Dr. Norbert Wagner, Director, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Daniel Hamilton, Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, JHU-SAIS. The Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, EU Center of Excellence, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung invite you to a discussion for the book launch of The United States of America and the European Union. Participants will be given complimentary copies of the book and lunch will be served. Venue: Room 500, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington D.C. RSVP to Gretchen Losee at transatlanticRSVP@jhu.edu.