• Arab Reform – or Status Quo Ante?
• Revive Arab Social Contract - Onus on Local Actors
• Extreme Ideologies Trump Secular Forces
• Democracy, War of Ideas Still on UK Agenda
• Change in Rhetoric, Continuity in Strategy
• "Anti-totalitarian" Kouchner Brings Morality in French Realpolitik
• Russia: They Run It, They Own It
• Reversing Democracy, Rewriting History
• West Must Nurture Democratic Sentiment, Partners
• Ersatz NGOs Undermine Civil Society
• …as Anti-Extremism Law Threatens Free Speech, Independent Media
• "Democracy with Chinese Characteristics" Consolidates Party Rule…
• …But Still Social Unrest, Political Restiveness
• Growing Middle Class, NGOs, Generate Demand for Pluralism
• Western Unions "Engage" Unreformed Counterpart
• Iran: TV "Confessions" Reveal Elite Factionalism?
• Repression Reveals Regime Anxiety – and Opposition Need for Strategy
• Emerging Resistance to Creeping "White Coup"?

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Arab Reform – or Status Quo Ante?

The momentum for democratic reform in the Arab world has undoubtedly stalled, suffering from setbacks in Iraq, incumbent regimes' resilience, and distrust of external actors. Some local reformers fear the West is regressing to the pre-9/11 "realist" stance of supporting incumbent, authoritarian regimes.

But such "realism" reflects "a moral bankruptcy the West cannot afford," argues Emanuele Ottolenghi, director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Institute. Western civilization rests on the universality of human rights and to deny that these principles apply to the Arab world is to indulge in the "racism of low expectations", he writes. To capitulate would be to "concede that culture, somehow, can deny or defy rights we deem innate to all humankind."

The United States and European Union boycott of the Hamas government after March 2006 was "the hair in the soup in terms of the democracy agenda," according to Beirut Daily Star columnist Michael Young. Some Arab reformers fear that regimes will follow Egypt's example and use Hamas's violent coup to justify further repressive measures like the Mubarak regime's constitutional amendments designed to thwart Islamist electoral advances. "Gaza has convinced the authorities here that they are doing the right thing and it has also helped convince the west" of the government's view, said Hafez Abu Saada, head of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights.

"The international community has to decide: are we going to barter reforms and democracy for pro-Western (governments)?" asked Khalil Gebara, of the Lebanese Transparency Association. Grounds for such fears may be found in a terror-sponsoring authoritarian regime like Syria benefiting from the European Union's civil society-building largesse and in increasingly prevalent arguments for maintaining the status quo in the interests of security and stability.

Regional analyst Martin Kramer, for example, argues that the reason democracy is losing out in the region is that "consensual authoritarianism produces security for its peoples, and exports security to its neighbors" while the net exporters of insecurity are "states that have multi-polar or pluralistic systems: Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and what some call Palestine." To gain a purchase in the region, pro-democracy forces must demonstrate "how they'll make their peoples not only freer, but more secure--and how they'll make the rest of us safer", he believes. Others counter that support for consensual authoritarians like Yasir Arafat produced neither democracy nor security.

The West's strategic choices, mistakes and limitations should not disguise the responsibility and culpability of local actors, according to an analysis of Arab civil society. The "bulk of blame" for the region's democracy deficit, argues Ibrahim Saleh, "rightly falls on governments, motivated by suspiciousness with a dimension of xenophobia, which have oppressed their citizens, stoked a culture of fear, and shirked the duties of transparency."

Arab democrats envisage the awakening of civil society, notes Saleh, as "a sphere in which civic leaders could pool and direct their resources to defy the state". But the region's civil society groups remain single-issue oriented, fail to mobilize a critical mass of supporters and suffer from apathy among their own members. "Part of the blame must fall on Arabs themselves," he writes. "Publics in different parts of the Arab world are confused and illiterate. The challenge is to educate them to seek their rights civilly and to face their obligations responsibly." A revival of the "Arab social contract" requires not only legal change but a shift in societal perceptions, including an end to cultural stereotypes and biases that oppress women, and a fundamentally new conception of state-citizen relations.

"Washington's recipe for democracy promotion—whipping up some civil society, mixing in some economic reform, and adding elections, as well as a dash of external pressure," is out of touch with reality, argues Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. Politico-technocratic approaches ignore critical cultural variables, he asserts. Even if civil society and economic reform take off, "the power of informal institutions will make the job of even the most ardent Middle East democracy-promoters more uncertain and difficult."

But the Arab world is often presented in a misleading way, according to Yigal Carmon, founder of the Middle East Media Research Institute. MEMRI aims to "amplify the voice of reformists and liberal-democrats by exposing them to the Western political public, and to help dissidents," Carmon says. To counter a "tendency of stereotyping and over-generalizing, which can only lead to Islamophobia," he insists it is important to "focus on the reformist and liberal voices to show the complexity and the thriving debate in the region."

Arab societies are in a true crisis and prospects for democratic transformation severely retarded, argues political scientist Amr Hamzawy, due to an "extreme culture of violence and the complete absence of value for the individual citizen." Instead of democracy's pluralism and rotation of power based on principles of accountability, rule of law and citizen participation, Arab politics reflects a "constant striving for political spaces that are forcefully seized and monopolized", he notes. The militarization of society and the power of the security-intelligence agencies has entrenched inertia, in marked contrast to the genius of democracy as a dynamic system for "preventing incapacity or stagnation from becoming permanent" though the constant negotiation and reconciliation of competing interests in the search for better laws, practices and policies.

The absence of accountability and a penchant for painting catastrophic defeats as glorious victories underscore the similarly pessimistic views of Khairi Abaza of the Center for Liberty in the Middle East. With the Arab media such apologists for the ruling elites, he argues, it falls to independent intellectuals to establish independent commissions as a first step "to improve transparency and accountability."

But regional political dynamics do not currently augur well for fostering democracy. The Arab world is witnessing a dangerous confrontation between Islamist groups and incumbent governments, says Lebanese commentator Nizar Abdel-Kader, a conflict in which secular parties struggle for relevance or even survival. "These parties have lost their attraction for voters and have become secondary actors in the political process," he argues. "They feel victimized by authoritarian regimes and governments and lack the resources and means to check the Islamist activists." This crisis of the secular movement is emerging as a major obstacle to the democratization of Arab societies as the rise of Islamists has forced secular forces "to seek protection through alliances with ruling parties or dictators."

Secular parties are aware of their weaknesses and "inability to compete with better organized Islamist movements", says Maghreb specialist Anouar Boukhars, but "unwilling to move beyond their comfort zone", despite the reputational damage of their association with the status quo. Secular groups are not only weak and divided but "will only become weaker," argues Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian academic. Social and economic development is a prerequisite for reversing this process since "backward societies are more likely to follow extreme and isolationist ideologies and tendencies."

"Don't expose true Arab – or Iranian – democrats to government abuse by too openly embracing and funding them," advises Yossi Alpher, a former senior adviser to Israeli premier Ehud Barak, in a 10-point plan for fostering Arab democracy. He proposes giving "priority to building civil society institutions rather than holding hasty elections", banning armed groups from contesting elections, allowing non-violent into the political process, and building on local traditions and practices – "even if they are less than democratic" – rather than importing alien models.

Britain's new Prime Minister has dispelled suggestions that his government will ditch Tony Blair's foreign policy legacy and distance the UK from the US. This is a "partnership of purpose founded on values", said Gordon Brown on his first visit to the US as premier. Reflecting a deeply-grounded commitment to the moral purpose of political power, he has also stressed the importance of winning the battle of ideas. Both Brown and his closest advisor Ed Balls have invoked the cultural Cold War against communism in calling for a comparable ideological response to the challenge of global terrorism.

Brown invoked the united front against Soviet communism that involved not only military deterrence but a huge cultural effort, deploying what Roosevelt called the "arsenal of democracy." "Foundations, trusts, civil society and civic organizations -- links and exchanges between schools, universities, museums, institutes, churches, trade unions, sports clubs, societies -- were all engaged," Brown recalled. "Those in newspapers, journals, cultural institutions, the arts and literature sought to expose the difference between moderation and violent extremism."

Brown's comments follow similar assurances from the UK's new foreign secretary. "Our commitment to work with the Americans in general and the Bush Administration in particular is resolute," David Miliband insisted, in a rebuke to junior Foreign Office minister Lord Malloch Brown, a former UN official, who said that the UK and US would not be "joined at the hip".

Miliband outlined a renewed focus on democracy and the war of ideas. "If we are to continue to be a force for good, we need to be smart about how and when we combine the soft power of ideas and influence and the hard power of economic and military incentives and interventions," he told the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

"A new distribution of power changes the way we need to analyze threats and exploit opportunities," he said. Miliband finds a recent insight of Zbigniew Brzezinski to be "deeply profound": namely, that throughout human history the power to control has been greater than the power to destroy; now the power to destroy is greater than the power to control.

But just as there are new sources of insecurity, there are also new resources for prosperity, said the foreign secretary. "Our security is threatened by terrorist networks using the freedom of an open society, but can be enhanced by the spread of democracy and good governance." As one editorial notes, "the principle of promoting democracy as a solution to unstable regions of the world and rogue states is apparently safe", albeit with a preference for a multilateral dimension.

"Better than any Western leader, Blair articulated the moral and strategic stakes involved in the confrontation with radical Islam," Democratic strategist Will Marshall recently argued. Reflecting on his decade in office, Blair expressed the fear that "the world, and especially a large part of Western opinion, has become dangerously misguided" about the threat of global terrorism, specifying the dangers of "a resurgent isolationism that crosses right and left."

"Revolutionary communism took many forms. It chose unlikely bedfellows. But we still spent decades confronting it," Blair noted. Such struggles are fought "as much through propaganda, ideas and values as through conventional means, military or diplomatic." "This new terrorism has an ideology" and if there was a mistake made in the aftermath of 9/11, he wrote, it was "not to realise that the roots of this terrorism were deep and pervasive".

This ideological dimension is unlikely to fade. Ed Balls, Gordon Brown's closest confidante, explicitly compared the current challenge with that multifaceted struggle, conducted through labor unions, broadcasting and journals, to promote liberal democracy against totalitarian temptations. "Probably one of the [post-9/11] lessons is that we should have done more at an earlier stage to fight the cultural war".

British foreign policy "will reflect the truth that to isolate and defeat terrorist extremism now involves more than military force", Brown recently insisted. "[I]t is also a struggle of ideas and ideals that in the coming years will be waged and won for hearts and minds here at home and round the world." In last week's national security statement to the House of Commons, he announced a new national security council to "coordinate military, policing, intelligence and diplomatic action and also to win hearts and minds in this country and round the world." He committed an extra £70 million ($143m/€104m) for programs to combat "violent extremism, wherever we confront it and whatever its source" through debate, discussion, dialogue and education.

Things may also be looking up on the European continent, despite concerns that Europe's acute demographic decline or birth-dearth presages "genteel stagnation" and diminishing global influence. Europe's "predominant role in world affairs is a thing of the past," argues leading historian Walter Laqueur. He suggests Panglossian predictions "of the emergence of Europe as a moral superpower are bound to remain an engaging fantasy."

Leading German journalist Henryk M. Broder has warned of a "new European appeasement policy towards a new kind of totalitarianism." He is not alone in fearing that European elites may have lost sight of the vulnerability of a civilization based on liberty. Europe uniquely represents a certain freedom of awareness, Nobel Prize winner Imre Kertesz recently argued. "It mustn't betray that", said the former Auschwitz inmate.

But French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy finds grounds for optimism in the elevation of Bernard Kouchner – a "fighter of 40 years of anti-totalitarian battles" - to the French foreign ministry. Kouchner may even succeed in "injecting more morality, more homage to human rights and more respect for victims' rights--into the world of international politics" in a departure with the "cold marble" of traditional French realpolitik.

Kouchner recently criticized his Italian counterpart who advocated engaging Hamas for fear of pushing them towards Al-Qaeda. "Hamas has carried out terror attacks, but it is also a grass roots movement," said Massimo D'Alema. "Not recognizing the government elected democratically is not exactly a lesson in democracy, and pushing such a group into the hands of Al-Qaeda is not in the international community's interest." But Hamas already has contacts with Al-Qaeda, said Kouchner. "Hamas did not wait for this extreme situation - the current terrible situation in Gaza - to have contacts with Al-Qaeda. And it would perhaps be too simple to think that we, the international community, are responsible."

The West must "avoid both a civilizational confrontation and a civilizational Yalta," argues Pierre Hassner, an associate of Kouchner's. To "isolate the enemies of peaceful change within each, and encourage positive transnational solidarities", he advocates the "strategies of 'peaceful engagement' and 'offensive détente' that were successful toward the end of the Cold War."

Russia's ruling oligarchy appears indifferent to a modern state's need for good governance which, as Francis Fukuyama recently told President Vladimir Putin, "ultimately has to be based on accountability mechanisms that ensure that the rulers are truly serving the interests of the ruled, and not just their own, or those of their friends and families."

While the Russian state has assumed greater prerogatives and its energy reserves provided greater resources, it is far from evident that it has become more effective in providing basic public goods. Indeed, the country's energy wealth undermines its political institutions as "large and unexpected profits from the export of raw materials erode the institutional barriers that separate government and the producers of primary resources," notes Federico Varese, an Oxford University expert on the Russian mafia. "The executive has strong incentives to appropriate the profits and weaken the institutional structure that regulates the use of public funds."

Indeed, as Russia expert David Satter highlights, under Putin, "the handful of people who run Russia also own it." Government officials sit on the board of the largest state-run companies. "First Deputy Premier Dmitri Medvedev is chairman of the board of Gazprom, Igor Sechin, deputy head of the Kremlin administration, is chairman of the Rosneft oil company, and Igor Shuvalov, an assistant to the president, is chairman of Russian Railroads, Satter observes. He estimates that Putin's associates control companies accounting for 80% of the capitalization of Russia's stock market.

As Varese notes, Russia is one of the few countries in the world where life expectancy is declining - 15-28 year-olds have the highest mortality rate in Europe, while the Russian male lives on average sixteen years less than his U.S. counterpart. Other social indicators are equally dramatic: "the suicide rate has increased by about 50 percent since the nineties; alcohol and drug consumption have soared; the AIDS epidemic is the worst in Europe; there are 120,000 new cases of tuberculosis every year; and access to hospitals under the corrupt and inadequate health system depends on bribing doctors and nurses." No wonder opposition figures like Garry Kasparov believe that the Kremlin's failure to invest the country's new-found wealth in infrastructure and basic services will ultimately undermine the current regime.

"The history of other nations is the history of their emancipation. The history of Russia goes the opposite way, to serfdom and obscurantism." said Aleksandr Herzen (at least as portrayed in Tom Stoppard's Coast of Utopia).

Not content with the current political regression, the Kremlin also seems set on pressing the rewind button on Russian history. President Vladimir Putin recently insisted that there was nothing of which Russians should be ashamed in the country's 20th-century history. That's not so surprising. Putin is "a Soviet politician with a Soviet mind-set," said Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a leading sociologist at Russia's Academy of Sciences. In a 2005 speech, he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."

Kremlin ideologists like Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the Putin's administration, and Gleb Pavlovsky, of the Effective Policy Foundation, are now trying to impose a teacher's manual pushing a "tendentious and shallow view of history." The Moscow Times reports that the manual's introduction refers to the need "to create a strong civic outlook in each graduate" and admits that the manual is concerned "not so much about the facts, but about their logic and consequences."

The manual's final chapter highlights the glories of Sovereign Democracy, itself a Surkov conception, explaining that it is common practice to qualify democracy with different adjectives and that Russia should refuse to be "dictated to from outside." The chapter's author, Pavel Danilin, who works for Pavlovsky's foundation, dismissed teachers' complaints about Soviet-style rewriting of history. "You can vent your spleen as much as you like," he wrote. "But you will teach children in line with the books you are given and in the way Russia needs."

Ironically, this attempt to massage history coincides with the anticipated release of declassified archives documenting millions of victims of Soviet repression from 1920 to 1950. Historians and human rights activists greeted the announcement cautiously. "The problem is that it is up to the federal security service [the FSB] to decide what gets released and what stays secret, said Arseny Roginsky, of Memorial. "There is no independent historical committee allowed to evaluate this material. And the biggest problem is that there is no catalogue: finding stuff is very difficult." The FSB may be improving access to improve its image, said Lyudmila Alexeyeva, a veteran human rights activist, who expressed the regret that a "small window is being opened again" but only to victim's relatives.

Such episodes tend to confirm the widely-held fear, voiced recently by the Heinrich Böll Foundation's Ralf Fücks, that Russia, is heading backwards to "nationalism, autocracy and old-new imperial ambitions". Yet despite Russia's ominous drift to neo-Soviet authoritarianism, another Cold War is unlikely, according to Dimitri Trenin of Carnegie's Moscow Center. "There is no ideological antagonism since today's Russia lacks a state ideology," he says.

"Russia is not a democracy - not even a failed one - but it is a rough, capitalist reality powered by private interest which sometimes poses as the state interest," says Trenin. Contemporary Russia, he asserts, is "reminiscent of Germany in the 1920s, with its vibrancy and intense feeling of unfair treatment by others; France in the 1940s when it was trying to heal its traumas; or Italy in the 1960s, as far as the nexus between power, money and crime is concerned."

While many Russians may be wary of democracy in general, over 70% of 1,600 respondents to a recent poll by the All-Russian Public Opinion Center (Izvestia, June 18) believe that free elections, a multi-party system, and independent media are entirely appropriate for the country. Eliminating poverty was deemed the most important requirement for nurturing democracy, but developing civil society (parties, unions, NGOs) was considered least important, reflecting the country's centralized statist tradition.

The Kremlin is, however, able to play on public ambivalence towards democracy, which many associate with the economic hardships, uncertainties and corruption of the Yeltsin years, exploiting what Stanford University's Michael McFaul calls the erroneous assumption that Putin's anti-democratic moves were a necessary response to the anarchy of the 1990s." The regime has also stoked ethnic tensions to such a degree, writes Charles King, that "the peoples of the Caucasus – especially Muslims – are routinely denigrated as thievish and inherently rebellious, blanketed with collective responsibility for everything from organized crime to terrorism, and portrayed as the chief threat to Russia's internal security and stability." That fear, King argues, "has played no small role in Putin's consolidation of power, and the growing chauvinism of Russian society."

The West's response to Russia's democratic backsliding has too often been timid, inconsistent and divided, prompted in part by European dependence on Russian energy supplies and, more specifically, the Russo-German Baltic seabed pipeline project for Russian gas. Estonian President Toomas Ilves recently cautioned the European Union that over-reliance on Russian gas "involves high levels of risk." Russia's economic attacks on its neighbors - agricultural and wine embargoes against Moldova and Georgia, limiting meat imports from Poland, cutting crude oil supplies to Lithuania, and a cyber-war against Estonia – all "cast heavy doubt on Russia's reliability as an economic partner," said analyst Vladimir Socor.

But while states may be constrained by diplomatic or energy security concerns, the least political leaders and policymakers can do, argues Stanford's McFaul, is to maintain democracy assistance programs in Russia and speak the truth about the country's democratic erosion. Policymakers should engage both the Russian state and civil society, he recently told the US House Committee on Foreign Relations, by pursuing "a more ambitious bilateral relationship and in parallel a more long-term strategy for strengthening Russian civil, political, and economic societies, which ultimately will be critical forces that push Russia back onto a democratizing path." His recommendations find an echo in other analyses which propose appealing to the Russian people directly through more energetic public diplomacy, scholarships and similar exchanges.

"Russia today remains much freer and more democratic than the Soviet Union," McFaul conceded, "yet the actual democratic content of the formal institutions of Russian democracy has eroded considerably." Russian president Vladimir Putin has "systematically weakened or destroyed every check on his power, while at the same time strengthening the state's ability to violate the constitutional rights of citizens," McFaul testified, listing the Kremlin's success in taming independent media (including, most recently, web-based media), undermining federalism, diluting parliament's powers, and marginalizing political opposition.

British journalist John Lloyd recently observed that it was through Anna Politkovskaya's journalism that her readers came "to grasp something of the dangers of Russian power - its brutalities to its enemies within, its savage discrimination towards the many Caucasians and Muslims within its vast territory and its inability to create, indeed its aversion to the institutions of civil society." The regime has most recently demonstrated its commitment to undermining civil society, through restrictive measures like the NGO Law but also through proactive initiatives, including government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) and Nashi, the Kremlin's Komsomol-style youth movement.

Nashi reportedly distributed cell-phone Sim cards to 10,000 Muscovites in April so that they could report signs of a pro-Western revolution. "Nashi's enemies are those who want to undermine the independence of Russia," Kremlin consultant Sergei Markov, an architect of the movement, said this week. "During the elections, the goal of Nashi will be to support those who are supported by President Putin."

GONGOs were, until recently, "a relatively minor component of the government's strategy in dealing with civil society," according to John Squier, senior program officer for Russia and Ukraine with the National Endowment for Democracy. But the Kremlin has recently devoted "massive resources to the creation of state-sponsored and state-controlled NGOs" notes Stanford's McFaul, part of a concerted effort to marginalize independent NGOs evidenced by the expulsion, closure or harassment of several groups, including the Peace Corps; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Chechnya; the Solidarity Center representative, Irene Stevenson; the National Democratic Institute (NDI); and Internews.

Putin signed off on 1.245 billion rubles (approx. US$39.2 million/€28.4 million) in the 2007 federal budget for state-supported NGOs on 4 July, specifying six NGOs that will receive approximately half of this sum, including the Social Planning Institute and the State Club, whose boards of trustees include the pro-Kremlin United Russia party. The six NGOs are supposed to issue open tenders for the distribution of funds, and tender juries should include representatives of the Public Chamber (purportedly a "channel of influence of civil society") independent experts, and state officials. In addition, some 14 regional NGOs received a share of the allocation directly from the treasury, without a tender.

One of the regime-friendly NGOs – In Support of Civic Society - will distribute funds addressing issues of human rights and freedom. Independent groups and activists have few illusions about their funding prospects. The new procedure simply entails "shuffling money from one pocket to the other," said Maria Gaidar, of the opposition youth group Yes!, which was denied a grant in 2006. "Obviously, from the ideological point of view, everything will be stricter than before." The chosen organizations "are known for their names, not their actions," said Yury Dzhibladze, president of the Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights.

Noted author and analyst Andrei Piontkovsky recently returned to Russia, knowing that he faced charges under Russia's 'anti-extremist' law for writing fierce critiques of the Putin regime. The law is quite blatantly designed to curtail independent journalists and campaigners, according to Maria Yulikova, writing for the UK-based Index on Censorship. Only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan currently use this type of legislation, said the Moscow-based Media Law and Policy Institute.

A couple of months ago, Ekho Moskvy radio, one of the few remaining independent media outlets, started receiving missives from prosecutors and security services after it broadcast interviews with Garry Kasparov and Eduard Limonov, leaders of the Other Russia pro-democracy coalition. "They've tightened [the law] to such an extent that it is now almost impossible to differentiate between extremist statements and ordinary controversy, political argument or criticism of the state," a retired security service colonel told Ekho Moskvy on 5 July. 'It's all left up to the official, the judge or the prosecutor."

Putin and his advisers frequently insist that their concentration of power simply entails strengthening the vertical axis of his administration's "power pyramid." This geometrical terminology requires enforcing a conformist ideology "intended to align all sectors of Russia's 'managed democracy … into tidy, clearly demarcated, easily controlled zones of activity and influence," argues one analyst. "The messy disarray normally associated with functioning democracy—the irritating criticism, noisy opposition, and inconvenient news uncovered by investigative reporters….has been summarily and sometimes harshly dealt with," Jamey Gambrell notes.

Techniques ranging from bureaucratic harassment of news organizations to physical attacks on individual reporters - no one has been convicted of the thirteen murders since Putin came to power – make Russia one of the most difficult and the third most deadly country in the world for journalists. But murdering reporters is only the most visible manifestation of the campaign against independent media. "Far more effective are the economic, judicial, and administrative measures being used systematically to quash human rights and information-gathering organizations and other genuinely independent members of civil society," Gambrell says, citing frequent tax audits and costly, time-consuming re-registration procedures as the Kremlin's "weapons of choice."

China and Russia "may represent a viable alternative path to modernity," according to a recent analysis, which in turn suggests that there is "nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ultimate victory—or future dominance." Alternatively, another commentator argues, China may develop a distinctive Confucian hybrid of meritocracy and democracy.

With the Communist Party's 17th Congress approaching this autumn, the party's internal discourse has discovered the "D" word. "Inner-party democracy," "electoral democracy," and "consultative democracy" are in vogue, prompted in part by party general secretary Hu Jintao's speech in June to the Central Party School in which he sanctioned "socialistic democracy" or "democracy with Chinese characteristics".

Some party intellectuals have openly argued that democracy is a prerequisite for the liberation of ideology, one of Hu Jintao's Four Steadfasts, alongside reform and opening, scientific development and the harmonious society. Party researchers have even suggested converting the Communist Party to Swedish-style social democracy and encouraging NGOs although, as The Economist notes, "in practice officials fear they might turn into opposition groups."

This shift in discourse reflects Chinese analysis of the Soviet Union's collapse, argues George Washington University's David Shambaugh, which partly attributes its downfall to the Soviet party's bureaucratic sclerosis. Hu's aim is to foster a degree of internal party pluralism and "create a dynamic party apparatus, rather than an ossified and inflexible one." But "electoral democracy" simply means that electoral slates of candidates for party congresses will include more candidates than can be elected, Shambaugh concedes. There will also be some experimenting with multiple candidates and contested campaigns for village level party committees.

"Consultative democracy" will allow party members and the public to comment on party cadres' qualifications for appointment - in effect a measure aimed at reducing corruption and improving governance by strengthening procedures for evaluation, training, and promotion of China's 45 million party and state cadres. The party recently boasted that some 15,000 members assumed party positions through open elections from 2003 to 2006. It showcased the party's efforts to build permanent in-house democracy mechanism, said the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee.

Far from suggesting embryonic democratization, such discourse and incremental measures are designed to consolidate party authority. "I see them delaying democracy as much as promoting it," said Boston University analyst Joseph Fewsmith. Indeed, as in Russia, economic growth may allow authoritarian capitalism to postpone or dilute political reform, one reason why political scientist Francis Fukuyama believes the time frame for China's eventual democratization may be a lot longer than generally anticipated since over the next few decades, suggesting that "[T]he authoritarian system will keep getting stronger and stronger."

Recent trends and events seem to suggest that China's communist authorities remain edgy and uncertain in their attempts to frustrate emerging demands for greater openness and freedom. China Development Brief, the influential Beijing-based publication, one of the few alternative sources of information about the country's civil society and increasingly assertive NGOs, was recently shut down despite its declared mission, in the words of founding editor Nick Young, "to enhance constructive engagement between China and the world."

The government also recently closed Minjian, a Chinese-language quarterly that highlighted civil society and social issues. Further reports suggest that eight critical journalists at the Chinese-language Democracy and Law legal journal have been peremptorily dismissed.

"I am one of the best friends China could have," Young insisted. "I have bent over backwards to be the Communist party's best friend." The publication survived for over 12 years, in part by being extremely cautious in its reporting. "I have spent the last decade telling foreigners that China is not as repressive and totalitarian as Western media often portray it to be." But police instructed Young to fold the operation on July 4 on the grounds that he violated laws governing social surveys.

These developments reflect what Human Rights in China recently called a "culture of secrecy that has a chilling effect on efforts to develop the rule of law and independent civil society." It also highlights the limits to the communist authorities' repressive tolerance and their anxiety in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics. Beijing's recent tightening of internet controls, requiring people to use their real names in registering online, appears to be a reaction to a surge in activism.

"The jailing of journalists, the closing of newspapers, and the censoring of websites reveal the CCP's determination to limit information and the independent organizing that it may spur," notes Henry S. Rowen, writing in the latest Journal of Democracy. He is nonetheless confident that economic development and concomitant imperatives for openness and pluralism will bring democracy to China by 2025. Writing in the same issue, Minxin Pei is less optimistic, noting that the CCP's plutocratic elite has successfully pursued a strategy of deferring reform through "illiberal adaptation" and retains various options in defending its political monopoly and material privileges, including a crony capitalist political economy, a disturbingly common regional model.

Growing Middle Class, NGOs, Generate Demand for Pluralism

China's citizens are already organizing themselves into a "bewildering range of pressure groups and action committees," says one observer, "despite restrictions on civic organization." In the ten years up to 2004, the annual number of protests rose from 10,000 to 74,000 while contested statistics suggest as many as 87,000 protests in 2005. This pronounced increase in the number of social protests confirms that ordinary people are "learning how to take action and pressure officials to obey the law of the land", often with the support of a growing army of trial lawyers, while "in a growing number of articles, writers and intellectuals are challenging the proposition that the party has a divine right to the monopoly of political power."

The Communist Party is concerned that "domestic NGOs could create a bridge for social issues to transcend provincial borders, serving as a communications and coordination link that could foster mass movements." Beijing currently allows some foreign and independent NGOs to operate, albeit under strict legal and monitoring constraints, especially where they provide social services or functions, like environmental monitoring, for which the state lacks capacity.

The party recognizes that with increasing social agitation and the emergence of an increasingly affluent middle class, demands for a more open society will increase. By 2011, McKinsey research indicates, there will be a lower middle class of 290 million people and, by 2025, a 520 million-strong upper middle class, with "staggering disposable wealth". China will avoid the "barbell economy" seen in much of the developing world – a large pool of poor, a very wealthy elite, and only a few in the middle – as "working consumers, once the country's poorest, will steadily climb the income ladder, creating a new and massive middle class." One school of thought on China's political evolution has long held that over time "this population could be expected to press its government for greater political pluralism and democracy."

In the absence of free media and expression, Chinese mainland political attitudes remain opaque, but attitudes in Hong Kong indicate latent aspirations. The Hong Kong Transition Project has revealed consistently high support for democracy while tracking public opinion over the past 12 years. A recent survey by Hong Kong's Baptist University and the US-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs found 76 per cent supported or strongly supported direct elections. The idea that Chinese people are only interested in the "rice bowl" of material security is a myth, says one analyst. The issue is not whether Chinese people "believe in democracy or know what democracy is, the question is … whether they can have it or not."

The specter of Tiananmen still haunts China's communist authorities, said a leading democracy activist. "The reason the memory of 4 June still haunts officialdom is that it was about something that high-speed growth and giddy consumerism have not altered," said Chaohua Wang, a member of the Beijing students' movement in the spring of 1989. That the universal human aspiration for democracy and liberty was the principal underlying force and the "real meaning of the social movement of 1989 can be seen from the government's lasting fear of it."

Nowhere is the discrepancy between ideological orthodoxy and discordant reality more pronounced than in the Chinese workplace. While the regime remains nominally committed to workers' welfare, the high incidence of appalling abuses of worker rights, industrial accidents and labor protests highlights the discrepancy between ideology and practice.

Labor and democracy activists broadly welcomed China's new labor law while recognizing that enforcement would be the real test. The reform follows recent reports that hundreds of children and adults had been abducted and forced to work as slaves in brick kilns and mines across China's central provinces, the latest of a number of abuses of labor rights. The scandal prompted a clause to be added to draft labor laws mandating punishment for officials who turned a blind eye to worker rights violations. The law, which comes into effect on January 1, sets standards for labor contracts, lay-offs and severance payments, but also gives more power to the state-sanctioned All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Pressure has been building on lower-level union officials to deal with flagrant abuses while the emergence of a market economy has forced the ACFTU to assume at least some functions of genuinely independent unions while maintaining its traditional Leninist role as a party "transmission belt" to the workers. "Before, all enterprises were state-owned, and it was easy to ensure they joined the union," an ACFTU official concedes. While the union appears willing to countenance cooperation with other international unions in confronting multinational corporations within China, it remains opposed to any notion of trade union pluralism. "Other countries have more than one union," the ACFTU functionary notes. "But we will always have just one union here in China."

Some western unions have welcomed US retail giant Wal Mart's decision to allow the ACFTU into its Chinese operations, while left-wing groups advocate engaging the ACFTU in an anti-corporate, anti-globalization alliance. Andy Stern, head of the Service Employees International Union, the second-largest union in the US, is collaborating with the ACFTU and the Los Angeles labor federation has formed a partnership with its Shanghai counterpart.

Such initiatives have rekindled fierce debates and drawn criticism, not least from authentic unions which view the ACFTU as a communist front. "The ACFTU is a very much an arm of government, not a partner trade union organization," said AFL-CIO international affairs officer Barbara Shailor. Stern's move is "a leap of faith," she said, undertaken "without any strong signs" that the Chinese union is reforming. Han Dongfang, a labor activist jailed by Beijing for his union activities, describes the ACFTU in Wal-Mart as "an instant-noodle union" that "gives people false hope."

Independent labor activists insist that the Wal-Mart-ACFTU rapprochement benefits both parties – but not the workers. "Wal-Mart now benefits from having the ACFTU in-house," notes the Hong-Kong based China Labour Bulletin, "because the ACFTU, unlike a genuinely representative union, is more interested in collecting its legally mandated two percent of monthly payroll, than actually representing the fundamental rights and interests of its members." Western firms feel that they are treating workers well, notes a CLB researcher, but then get "really caught out by the strength of feeling from below because these feelings have never had any forum for discussion."

The union debate is analogous to the issue of NGO operations in China. By permitting select foreign NGOs to operate, notes one analyst, the communist authorities can "demonstrate concern for and action on many of the problems facing China during its rapid economic expansion." Similarly, a recent Change to Win delegation to the ACFTU "served as a way for China to begin to deflect criticism of labor practices."

There is a case to be made for engagement if it entails more than top-heavy diplomatic engagement with ACFTU leadership – i.e. if it was conditional on developing genuine organizing initiatives with rank-and-file workers, perhaps by nurturing technical skills and organizational capacity through programs on technical issues like occupational health and safety. Some recent initiatives, gaining some protection under a "corporate social responsibility" rubric, show such promise. But CSR initiatives find it hard to evade the official union's close political supervision, undermining the potential for genuine worker empowerment. The country's employment relations and political evolution would benefit from more radical change, as the CLB notes: "if workers could organize genuine democratic unions, such confrontational and disruptive disputes could mostly be solved through negotiation and mutual compromise."

The recent televised "confessions" of civil society activists and scholars in Iran could well have backfired on the hard-line elements around Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and triggered a factional fight within the regime. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the programs, which contained information about Karl Popper's open society and detailed the role of youth and civil society organizations in the color revolutions, have been counterproductive for the regime, engendering audience sympathy for the prisoners and renewed interest in civic activism.

The Stalinesque broadcasts, featuring coerced testimonies from Haleh Esfandiari, Kian Tajbakhsh and Ramin Jahanbegloo, even drew criticism from the Baztab website published by Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and founder of the Revolutionary Guards. The July 16 article such episodes are not only of dubious legality but dare to suggest that Iran is itself vulnerable to the contagion of the color revolutions. "Our revolution that has witnessed the blood of hundreds of thousands of martyrs is being compared to weak societies with no clear identity which are susceptible to a couple of hours of demonstrations and a few colored windbreakers," Baztab complained.

In a sign of the volatile state of Iran's notoriously factional elite politics, Rezai subsequently moderated his criticism, conceding that there are covert operations to undermine the regime, while insisting that there are "thousands of scholars, intellectuals and intelligent and skillful analysts who could easily defuse the new plots of the enemy." Competition for the allegiance of the Revolutionary Guards is intensifying, because of their paramilitary force, perceived legitimacy as custodians of the Islamic revolution, and economic muscle as "Iran's nomenklatura—a new social class formed by domination of the economy".

Recent clampdowns are more damaging than previous episodes, activists say, because there are now no reformist voices in government to represent them or to moderate repressive police actions. "Back then people would get arrested, but [former President] Khatami would use his influence to get them released," said Abdullah Momeni, leader of Tahkim Vahdat, Iran's largest student grouping. "Now those who are arrested are not even getting released."

Commentators differ in their analysis of factors driving recent development. Some suggest the ruling conservative faction is consolidating its position. "Their argument is that no matter what happens in Iran, no matter how many social disturbances exist, we are in control, and our position will not change," said US-based Iran expert Farideh Farhi.

Others suggest recent repressive actions betray regime fragility and awareness of its decaying legitimacy. The regime has always claimed to represent the people who, nevertheless, persist in going unveiled, watching foreign satellite TV, and wearing Western dress. Consequently, analyst Mehdi Khalaji argues, "control over every aspect of personal life -- the hallmark of totalitarianism -- becomes necessary to preserve the legitimacy and authority of the Shiite jurists." Similarly, said Iranian journalist and blogger Omid Memarian, recent trends confirm the Islamic Republic's greatest fear is .. of its own people, who are earnestly seeking a democratic and open society."

Some observers claim the confessions and recent clampdowns on indigenous reformers were prompted by naive externally-driven efforts to promote regime change by crudely transferring to Iran the purported lessons of the color revolutions and other non-violent conflicts. Iranian activists have reported being lured under misleading pretenses to Dubai workshops that resembled "a James Bond camp for revolutionaries", featuring computer simulations of regime change. But organizers of the workshops appear unrepentant and indifferent to arguments that political strategy must be locally-owned "The question is not whether you will interfere, it is how will you interfere," one organizer said. "They need the help now . . . but they can't possibly publicly say it. They have to say, Leave us alone. You have to not listen."

Yet others insist that local actors and agencies must determine the political agenda. Iranian activists must "delineate a clear ideology and strategic plan for change… [and] acquire the necessary power to mobilize the masses," said analyst Mehdi Khalaji. External opposition groups are largely unable to influence constituencies within the country but can help in collecting information about Iranian public opinion and soliciting advice to help shape policy. In any case, support for opposition groups could "actually sabotage the democratization process", Khalaji if the United States "sides with discredited groups", or other illegitimate forces.

External groups of dubious credibility have attracted interest and resources partly because of the relative fragility and weakness of indigenous reformist forces. Ahmadinejad was openly jeered at Amir Kabir university recently and the regime is clearly nervous about potential campus agitation, but the student movement is not in a healthy state. Pro-regime forces, like the paramilitary basij are also active in the universities. The students also lack a coherent political platform and strategy for change. "The problem we have now is that we don't have an alternative,'" one activist complains.

Yet the regime is facing growing popular discontent for failing to deliver more egalitarian prosperity, as evidenced by recent riots over gas rationing. "If rationing is not a sign of failure of management, what is it?," asked reformist daily E'temad, noting that current annual revenue of US$100bn is more than the total income enjoyed during the preceding eight years of Khatami's presidency. While some observers contend that sanctions only strengthen the state at the private sector's expense, the regime's anticipation of future financial restrictions clearly prompted the unpopular move.

The former Revolutionary Guards' leader Mohsen Rezai's Baztab website is openly critical of the ruling clique behind the creeping "white coup" that is centralizing power and eroding Iran's few remaining liberties. Baztab recently ran a poll asking users if they would vote for Ahmadinejad, with each computer restricted to only one vote, and 20,177 voters participating. Of those who voted for Ahmadinejad in 2005, only 37.5% would vote for him again, while a mere 5.3% of those who did not vote for him would do so next time.

Divisions within the ruling "Principle-ist" coalition recently led the hard-line conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Ahmadinejad's ideological mentor and a senior member of the Militant Clergy Association, to issue a warning that if the ruling clique remained "busied with internal disputes, … a third party will appear and will win the Majlis," the reformist daily Sharq reported. Ahmadinejad also appears concerned to prop us his base. Addressing members of the Basij on July 28, he attributed the country's "constant factionalism [and] constant quarrelling" within the elite to "the evil hands of foreigners," the official IRI News Network reported.

By contrast, it is expected that the forthcoming parliamentary elections, set for March 2008, will prompt a re-alignment of reformist and centrist actors. The principal reformist and centrist parties have reportedly agreed to "field sufficiently large slates of candidates to counteract the possibility of wholesale disqualifications by the Guardian Council." It is this scenario that most likely drives the recent clampdown, notes Iranian scholar Vali Nasr. "Having to face a single pragmatic conservative and reform block is extremely threatening."

Fractures within Iran's ruling elite are likely to be widened by the death yesterday of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Meshkini, chairman of Iran's Assembly of Experts, a powerful body of elected mullahs which selects and supervises the Supreme Leader. Meshkini is likely to be replaced, at least temporarily, by the influential former president, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a "pragmatist" rival to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Although Rafsanjani lost to Ahmadinejad in the presidential election, he led the Tehran section of the last assembly's election with over 1.5m votes. The "longer-term" effect of Rafsanjani’s succession would be to "further weaken" the influence of Mesbah-Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s fundamentalist confidante, former vice-president Mohammad Ali Abtahi told the Financial Times.

Egyptian Democrats Under Siege
Leading dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim has been advised not to return home after a trip to Europe and Arab countries. The independent Cairo daily Al-Doustour stated that "something big" - possibly a national security prosecution - was being prepared against him. President Hosni Mubarak apparently holds him responsible for recent moves by the US Congress to freeze $200 million (€154 million) from a total of US$1.3 billion (€940 million) Egypt is due to receive in military aid in 2008. At the recent Democracy and Security conference in Prague, Ibrahim reportedly "implored" the US president to tie aid to political reforms and the release of political prisoners.

The Ibn Khaldoun Centre for Development Studies, with which Ibrahim is associated, faces legal action by members of the ruling National Democratic Party over allegations that it violated the law and constitution by receiving foreign funding. The government has jailed democracy activists associated with the centre, including Abdellatif Muhammad Said and Amr Tharwat. Tharwat was due to oversee the centre's poll monitoring for the June 18 election for the upper house of Parliament. The NDP won 69 of the 71 seats up for grabs although monitors reported that ballot boxes seemed full as polling stations opened. Government agents have interfered with the centre's email and fax communications. Activists believe the ICDS has been targeted for participating in the recent Doha forum on Democracy and Reform in the Arab World which established a new Arab Foundation for Democracy.

Labour, Democracy Activists Mourn Loss of Michael Lescault
Not even a life-threatening and debilitating illness, contracted while working as an union organizer in southern Africa could deter Michael Lescault. He defied expectations (and medical opinion) by returning to work with the AFL-CIO in Paris as the union's European liaison and, after returning to Washington in 1998, he eventually became deputy executive director of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity. "To say that Mike was well-liked would be an understatement," said Ellie Larson, the Solidarity Center's executive director. "He was well-loved."

Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?
A global "right to help" doctrine, equivalent to the "responsibility to protect", is required to safeguard democracy assistance, argue two leading political scientists. An international code of conduct could affirm the legitimacy of nonpartisan assistance to foreign NGOs while curbing direct financial contributions to political parties, Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul suggest in a recent paper, Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?

Democracy promotion is both a moral and a strategic imperative, they argue. But they are concerned that "Americans are starting to view this goal as no longer desirable or attainable", a trend they view as the "tragic result" of a misleading conflation of democracy promotion with Iraq and military forms of regime change, and the performance gap between the Administration's rhetoric and achievements. Applauding the US Administration for "highlighting the moral and strategic imperatives for promoting democracy" while castigating it for lack of a realistic and comprehensive strategy, they also deny that democracy promotion necessarily compromises traditional national security objectives. While McFaul and Fukuyama consider the Bush Administration's record to be "mixed, if not disappointing", their reaction is "not to downgrade or remove democracy promotion from US foreign policy priorities, [but to]…. suggest new strategies and better modalities for pursuing this objective."

The European Union also needs new approaches to democracy assistance, said Edward McMillan Scott, vice-president of the European Parliament. The EU's Democracy Initiative is "too bureaucratic and safe" but its £100m budget can still make a difference. "The EU should now take over the mantle of democracy promotion from the US and establish a free-standing European Foundation for Democracy, similar to the Washington model," he argues, "which is capable of engaging with political and civil society in third countries but with a flexible grant-making facility." Such a foundation would augment the EU's repertoire, especially with "difficult" countries like Belarus or Iran, "provided that it was deniable, expert and very flexible."

Will the US turn away from a values-oriented foreign policy of promoting democracy to a narrow realist view of its interests?" Harvard professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. recently asked "It is unlikely," he concludes, "that American foreign policy will return to an old-fashioned narrow realism and drop all emphasis on democracy and human rights." Even a self-styled realists, like former Jimmy Carter advisor and George Washington University professor Amitai Etzioni, concedes in his new book that "'values' broader than short-range national self-interest do matter in international relations." The task, Nye argues, is to develop "a liberal-realist synthesis".

Union Leader Osanloo - "Iran's Lech Walesa" - Held in Evin Prison
The abduction of Iranian leader Mansour Osanloo has provoked worldwide protests by trade unions and democracy activists. Osanloo was badly beaten by unidentified assailants and, two days after the assault, his family learned that he was being held in the notorious Evin prison.

Osanloo emerged as a union leader in 2004 when he helped establish one of the first independent trade unions in Iran since the Islamic revolution in 1979. After leading two successful strikes by transport workers, he became known as "Iran's Lech Walesa", after the leader of Poland's Solidarnosc union that helped topple the communist regime. Other workers followed suit. Over 400 independent unions with an estimated membership of 1.5 million have emerged and recently convened a Workers' Organizations and Activists Coordinating Council (WOACC) to foster joint activity. On May 1 this year, International Workers Day, the council held the first independent labour march in Tehran and 11 other major cities since 1979.

In a recent interview, Osanloo called on trade unionists around the world to support Iranian unions financially and with technical equipment. (To listen to the interview in MP3 format, click here.)

Please take action here by signing a petition or sending a letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad demanding that Osanloo be released unharmed immediately.

Canada to Join Family of Democracy Foundations?
Canada is "punching below its weight" in the field of international democratic development and should establish an "arms-length" foundation, said an important new report from the House of Commons. While accountable to Parliament, the foundation would enjoy political autonomy, including representatives of the country's major democratic institutions and parties, and even representatives from countries in which Canada has major democracy assistance programs.

The report, "Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development", from the Foreign Affairs and International Development committee, also calls for the creation of a centre for policy in democratic development; that the Government commission an independent evaluation of all public funding of international democratic development; and proposed enhancing political party development work through a centre for multi-party and parliamentary democracy, explicitly citing the experience of the Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy. It also recommends expanded support for developing civil society, education, and free and independent media.

The committee's recommendations are made on the back of an empirically rich, well-researched analysis of the democracy assistance and development field, drawing on developments in the European Union and the USA's "democracy bureaucracy", while stressing the importance of local leadership and governance, democratic development "as a global, not Western-imposed endeavour", and takes into account the backlash against external democracy assistance.

Community of Democracies: Who Can Join?
World politics demonstrates the need for multitasking in global democratic leadership, argues Timothy Garton Ash. To bring that about, he says, "we need a broader community of democracies, in which countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa take their place alongside the established democracies of the old West, acting in coalitions of the willing in those areas where they have something to contribute." Former neo-conservative Michael Lind begs to differ, suggesting that such an initiative would violate national sovereignties and serve largely to provide ethical cover for the pursuit of the West's strategic interests.

But others are more concerned to safeguard the credibility of the existing Community of Democracies. Tom Melia of Freedom House and the Democracy Coalition Project's Ted Piccone highlight efforts to invite less-than-democratic states to the COD's gathering in Mali later this year. "If Russia, Egypt and other authoritarian governments are invited to the gathering in Bamako this year," they fear, "the world will know that the Community of Democracies remains a good idea whose time has not yet come.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is confronting a similar "test for the defense of basic democratic standards" as nondemocratic Kazakhstan pushes, with Russia's backing, to be OSCE chair in 2009. Because of the election calendar and the structure of the OSCE chairmanship, notes Chris Walker, director of studies at Freedom House, Kazakhstan would play a key OSCE role from 2008-2010, including monitoring of elections, at a time when polls are due in Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Yet some western democracies seem prepared to countenance the prospect. But, Walker cautions, the outcome will "signal whether the democratic states within the OSCE membership will defend or surrender its democratic standards."

Dissidents, Policy-Makers Agree Core Values at Prague Conference
Dissidents of the world united at a major Democracy and Security in Prague in early June, attended by a host of democracy activists, dissidents and political leaders, including US President George W. Bush. The conference, organized by the Israeli Shalem Center and Madrid-based Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies in Madrid, agreed upon the Prague Charter. The charter committed participants to, amongst other things, seek "national and international initiatives, in the spirit of the Helsinki Accords, that link bilateral and international relations to the question of human rights" and promote "best human rights and governance practices that have been found effective and beneficial in other countries, in particular in new and recent democracies." The conference also drew on a discussion paper prepared by Journal of Democracy editor Marc Plattner.

Journal of Democracy
The July issue of the Journal of Democracy features the debate on "sequencing", with contributions from Francis Fukuyama, Thomas Carothers, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, and Sheri Berman. A second cluster of articles analyzes democracy barometers, assessing public opinion on democracy in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and postcommunist Europe. The issue also addresses prospects for China's democratization (as featured above). Free downloadable articles include When Will the Chinese People Be Free? by Henry S. Rowen, Minxin Pei, and Dali L. Yang and The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa by Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young.

Safeguarding Civil Society
The latest issue of ICNL's International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law includes valuable articles on Safeguarding Civil Society in Politically Complex Environments by David Moore and A Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: Arab Civil Society by Ibrahim Saleh.

Egypt—Don't Give Up Democracy Promotion
Egypt still represents the best chance for promoting Arab democracy in the near future, according to a Policy Brief by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. As a country with a history of political participation undergoing a leadership transition, Egypt offers a unique opportunity for liberalization and transition to democracy. "If the U.S. supports indigenous demands for gradual and responsible political change, it can help Egypt break out of years of political and economic stagnation and human rights abuses," the report.

Funding Opportunities: European Neighbourhood (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Russia, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine).

The European Union provides financial support to its eastern neighbours and those along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean through the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument launched in January 2007. The promotes cooperation and integration between the EU and partner countries. Detailed information on open tenders in the ENPI partner countries can be found in the EuropeAid tender database here.

Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) invites applications to its Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program for fellowships in 2008–2009. Named in honor of the two principal founders of NED, former president Ronald Reagan and the late Democratic congressman Dante Fascell, the program enables democracy activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to promote democratic change.

Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows maintain full-time residence at the International Forum for Democratic Studies (the Forum), the research arm of the Endowment, located in Washington, D.C. The Forum hosts 12 to 15 Reagan-Fascell fellows per year for periods ranging from three to ten months. The program offers two tracks, a practitioner track and a scholarly track. The Practitioner Track: the Reagan-Fascell program was established primarily to support democratic activists, human rights advocates, journalists, and others who work on the front lines of democracy promotion in emerging and aspiring democracies. The program seeks to provide experienced activists with an opportunity to reflect on their work, learn from counterparts in the United States, and reevaluate techniques for building democracy in their country of origin. Fellowships on the practitioner track tend to be short-term (3 to 5 months), typically culminating in a strategy memorandum, short article or op-ed and a presentation of the fellow's analysis and ideas. The Scholarly Track: recognizing the importance of intellectual contributions to the theory and practice of democracy, the Reagan-Fascell program offers a scholarly track principally for professors and researchers from emerging and aspiring democracies. Accomplished scholars from established democracies are also eligible to apply. Applicants are expected to possess a Ph.D., or academic equivalent, at the time of application, and to have developed a rigorous research outline. During their stay at the Forum, which can range from 3 to 10 months, scholars make at least one presentation and complete a substantial piece of writing (a monograph or book) for publication. Full details here.

Research Associate, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC
The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) seeks three Research Associates to work closely with Reagan-Fascell Fellows in residence at NED's International Forum for Democratic Studies for the 2007–2008 fellowship year (October 1, 2007–July 31, 2008). This is an ideal opportunity for recent college graduates and graduate students to develop their research skills and gain insight into the operation of a fellowship program. In 2007–2008, the Endowment expects to welcome fellows from Azerbaijan, China, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Liberia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, each of whom will pursue a project on democratization and human rights in his or her region of interest. Applications should be submitted electronically to fellowships@ned.org. Please put "Reagan-Fascell Research Associate Position" and your full name in the subject line. Applications may also be submitted by regular mail to: Reagan-Fascell Research Associates Search National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20004. Full details here.

Internship, Middle East & North Africa Program, National Endowment for Democracy
The NED seeks an intern in its Middle East and North Africa Program section. The position is based in Washington, D.C. Responsibilities include updating NED's Arabic webpage 'Al- Nafitha' or its Farsi web page 'Panjereh'; assisting the administration team in daily responsibilities; conducting research and background information; monitoring developments in the MENA region; maintaining MENA filing system. Qualifications: Arabic or Farsi; research, writing, and computer skills; interest in the Middle East and North Africa region, international affairs, U.S. foreign policy, and democracy; ability to work a minimum of 20 hours per week. To Apply: please e-mail a letter of interest and resume, including contact information for two references, to mandanaa@ned.org. Please use "Internship with MENA" for the subject line of your email. Deadline for acceptance is July 31, 2007.

Resident Country Director – Zimbabwe, International Republican Institute, South Africa
The International Republican Institute (IRI) advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, good governance and the rule of law. The Africa Region is currently recruiting for a Resident Country Director based in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Resident Country Director (RCD) is responsible for designing and implementing a strategy for IRI programs. S/he develops long range and annual plans for the country program, identifies key players and partners in IRI programs, develops strategies for political party capacity-building, coalition-building, political polling, and voter education activities and oversees individual project implementation. For full details and to apply, go here.

The International Republican Institute
Vacancies for various full-time positions: If you are interested in employment opportunities, please click on the links above to read the job description for available positions. Please e-mail your resume to personnel@iri.org and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in. IRI does not accept unsolicited resumes.

Resident Program Director, Governance Program, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) Baghdad, Iraq
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) seeks a legislator or senior political staff member with significant experience at the state/province or national level who also possesses international experience and broad knowledge of legislative organization and operations to implement the legislative component of its Department of State funded program in Iraq. The Resident Program Director for the Governance Program will report to NDI's Resident Director and will oversee the program of assistance provided by NDI to the Council of Representatives and other government bodies. The position is based in Baghdad inside the International Zone. Full details here.

National Democratic Institute
Vacancies for various full-time positions: If you are interested in employment opportunities, please click here to access details of available positions. Please e-mail your resume to and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in.

Strengthening Dialogue and Democratic Discourse through Freedom of Association in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Club of Madrid
The Club of Madrid seeks a Senior Project Officer for a 2-year project (February 1, 2007-January 31, 2009) which will build on reform efforts in Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco. The initiative will assist stakeholders to forge cooperative, participatory relationships for strengthening democratization and good governance, building a consensus on freedom of association, an issue critical for democratic consolidation and pluralist political participation. The project is supported by the European Commission's Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF).

Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco have been selected as initial countries, given their reform efforts in this area, which will later be shared with other countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. In the first year, the project will implement four dialogue missions each to Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco, led by former Heads of State and Government of the Club of Madrid, who will share their leadership experience as the basis for initial discussions. Efforts will be made to ensure that dialogue is locally owned through inclusion of a variety of official and civil society interlocutors, supported by national partner organizations in Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco and national dialogue facilitators. Discussions will be enriched by analysis conducted by the Madrid-based think tank FRIDE. Interested candidates should submit an expression of interest and CV to clubmadrid@clubmadrid.org. Only short-listed candidates will be contacted. For full details, including detailed job description and candidate requirements, click here.

Program Officer – Middle East & North Africa, IFES, Washington, DC
IFES is an international, nonprofit organization that supports the building of democratic societies. Currently, IFES manages and implements programs in seven countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region. Initiatives include, but are not limited to, technical electoral assistance, women and youth participation, and rule of law. Programs require close coordination and partnerships with local electoral authorities, local NGOs, international organizations, and regional advocacy groups. This Program Officer position will manage IFES projects based in Lebanon and West Bank/Gaza as well as development initiatives for activities in other countries throughout the region. Applications accepted online only, through the IFES website. To apply visit the IFES careers website here.

Senior Civil Society Development Officer, IREX, Washington, DC
IREX is an international nonprofit organization providing leadership and innovative programs to improve the quality of education, strengthen independent media, and foster pluralistic civil society development. The Senior Civil Society Development Officer works with the Civil Society Division Director to set and achieve funding goals and implements the organization's development strategies. Senior Civil Society Development Officer Send cover letter and resume to IREX/DEV/DC/PA via fax at (202) 628-8189 or send an e-mail message with the subject IREX/DEV/DC/PA to resumes@irex.org. Full details here.

Senior Program Manager - Central Asia, Freedom House, Washington, DC
Freedom House, founded in 1941, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that promotes an engaged U.S. foreign policy, evaluates human rights conditions, sponsors public education campaigns, facilitates training and other assistance to promote democracy and free market reforms, and provides support for the rule of law, free media and effective local governance. The Senior Program Manager for Central Asia will report to the Deputy Director and Director of Programs, and will supervise and provide home office support to all programs in Central Asia. Applications will be accepted until the position is filled. Further details here.

Senior Program Manager, Global Human Rights Defender Emergency Fund, Freedom House Washington, DC
Freedom House seeks a Senior Program Manager for the Global Human Rights Defender Emergency Fund at its Washington DC office. This is a newly created position which will report to the Director of Rule of Law and Human Rights Programs. The Global Human Rights Defender Emergency Fund will provide assistance, including emergency funds and services, to human rights defenders who are under threat, attack, detention, prosecution, or otherwise at immediate risk due to government repression. Further details here.

Senior Program Manager (Iran), Freedom House, Washington DC
Freedom House seeks a Senior Program Manager for its Iran Programs. These programs aim to support Iran's pro-democracy movement and human rights defenders by providing an information conduit linking them to resources and counterparts in the Middle East and Europe. Freedom House sponsors a monthly bi-lingual web magazine called Gozaar.org, which offers an interactive, inclusive space for discussion of democracy and human rights in Iran, which the Senior Program Manager is tasked with overseeing. Please send cover letter and resume by email or fax to: Jeffrey Mosser Human Resources Director humanresources@freedomhouse.org Fax: (202) 822-3893 Further details here.

Research Associate, Europe and Central Asia Program Committee to Protect Journalists New York, NY
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)—an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to the defense of press freedom around the world—is seeking a Research Associate for the Europe and Central Asia program to work in its New York office. Expertise in the former Soviet republics and Russian-language fluency is required. Additional regional language proficiency is desirable. Please send a resume, cover letter, contact information for three references, and two recent writing samples to: Nina Ognianova, Europe & Central Asia Program, Committee to Protect Journalists, 330 Seventh Avenue, 11th floor, New York, NY 10001. Fax: 212-465-9568. E-mail: nognianova@cpj.org. No phone calls, please. Further details here.

July 31, 5:30 p.m. - Latin America and Press Freedom: A Perilous Time." International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) and the International Correspondents Committee of the National Press Club (NPC). Speakers: Eduardo Bertoni, executive director of Due Process of Law and former rapporteur for Freedom of the Press at the Organization of American States; Tamoa Calzadilla, investigative journalist for Venezuela's El Mundo and winner of the 2006 Transparency International/Instituto Prensa y Sociedad Investigative Journalism Award; Luis Gonzales, reporter at El Imparcial; Roger Atwood, director of communications at the Washington Office on Latin America; Joyce Barnathan, president of ICFJ; and Myron Belkind, NPC international correspondents committee chairman. Venue: National Press Club, 14th and F Streets NW, Washington, D.C. Contact: 202-737-3700, editor@icfj.org RSVP to events@icfj.org or online: http://www.icfj.org/events]

August 2, 9 a.m. - Discussion on Pakistan with Owais Ahmed Ghani, governor of Pakistan's Baluchistan Providence. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 2nd Floor Root Room, Washington, D.C. Contact: 202-785-5336; http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org RSVP to rsvp@mideasti.org