Inside this Issue:

• Egypt's Brotherhood: Hard Line Platform Belies Reformist Veneer
• Regression Prompts Debate on Brotherhood's Trajectory
• Islamist Pragmatists Ripe for Engagement?
• Potemkin Election for Russia's Virtual Democracy
• Russia's Accelerating Transition to Autocracy…
• …or to Genuine Fascism?
• Kremlin's Hard-Edged Soft Power
• Venezuela: "Democratatorship" Foiled
• Chávez: International Criticism, Domestic Incompetence
• Indonesia's Civil Islam Nurtures Democracy

See Also:

• News in Brief
• Resources
• Opportunities
• Events

Egypt's Brotherhood: Hard Line Platform Belies Reformist Veneer

A controversial draft platform from Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood is prompting a rethink amongst advocates of engaging the Islamist movement. Women and non-Muslims would be barred from becoming president and a Majlis Ulama, akin to Iran's Council of Guardians, would have the final say on legislation, according to the draft. The platform proposes that "every article" of Egypt's constitution be revised to replace civil law with sharia in "material, spiritual, financial, economic, psychological, and societal matters."

The statement – a "huge leap backwards" - shocked and undermined advocates for engaging the Brotherhood. Pro-engagement voices based their recommendations on the conviction that the group had over recent years "experienced a remarkable change in its orientation, discourse and strategies", including acceptance of "the civic nature of authority; citizenship as the basis of equal rights and responsibilities; democratic principles and practices; and transfer of power, pluralism and legal means for bringing about change."

Hopes that the final program would omit the controversial clauses have foundered, Al-Hayat reported last week. The independent Saudi-owned newspaper cited "knowledgeable sources" revealing that the only anticipated change concerns the council of clerics tasked with reviewing laws' compliance with sharia. But the change appears largely editorial rather than political, with discussion of the council merged with sections addressing the role of religious institutions.

The program explains that because Egypt's presidency and premiership entail Islamic religious duties, "non-Muslims are excused from holding this mission." Nor can a woman assume the presidency because the post's religious and military duties "conflict with her nature, social and other humanitarian roles." The draft cautions against "burdening women with duties against their nature or role in the family".

The program's positions principles violate basic principles of universal citizenship and represent a pronounced retreat from the group's apparent embrace of the civil state. But even Brotherhood reformers are at best ambivalent on the rights of non- Muslims to be elected to high office.

The platform calls for a Council of Islamic Scholars to advise and ultimately veto parliament and the president at least on issues covered by "proven texts" of sharia law. "This undemocratically selected body, not the Supreme Constitutional Court, would have the right to veto legislation passed by the Egyptian parliament and approved by the president that is not compatible with Islamic sharia law," notes analyst Mohamed Elmenshawy. Brotherhood spokesmen responded defensively to the resulting furor by claiming parliament would remain sovereign and clerics would play a consultative role.

Iran's Council of Experts has veto power over all laws considered potentially inimical to Islam, notes Iranian expert Abbas Milani. "Initially of uncertain significance, it turned out to be a key factor in the clergy's control of the county," he says. During the reformist Khatami presidency (1997-2005), the council rejected more than 200 laws passed by parliament in a two-year term.

The Brotherhood's deputy leader Muhammad Habib confirmed that there should be "another independent" body of senior clerics consulted on state matters but insisted it "will not overrule parliament, nor will its views be mandatory". But he was unrepentant on the issue of wilaya (delegation by God), insisting on "a consensus among jurisprudents that neither a non-Muslim nor a woman should rule Muslims."

Regression Prompts Debate on Brotherhood's Trajectory

The disputes over the platform highlight the limits to the movement's political evolution and the dominant influence of conservative salafist forces. Key figures in the Brotherhood have recently portrayed it as a reformist movement, adopting a more democratic discourse, while advocates for engagement highlighted the positions of relatively moderate "Second Generation" pragmatists, like Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh, a member of the Maktab al-Irshad, or Guidance Bureau, and Essam al-Erian, head of the Brotherhood's Political Committee, who have both argued for revising Islamist orthodoxy and pushed for the movement to become a political party.

The Brotherhood is "a moderate, mainstream movement that is capable of overshadowing radical ideologies," claims spokesman Aziz Fahmy. "Yet we are only able to do so effectively in an atmosphere of freedom." He complains that the regime has tried to prevent dialogue and engagement "by keeping the moderate leaders of the Brotherhood, such as Deputy Chairman Khayrat El Shater, behind bars."

Such claims are echoed by advocates of engagement with the Brotherhood for whom the draft platform needs to be understood in the context of a repressive state imposing constraints on the Islamists' political participation. "In such an uncertain environment", claims Carnegie's Amr Hamzawy, "it is highly unlikely that nonviolent religious opposition movements open up to fully embrace democratic norms and principles."

But many observers find this unconvincing, arguing that the Brotherhood has long been the principal "incubator of jihadist ideology". The Brotherhood's affiliates in the democratic West betray similar "ambiguities" in their approach to democratic values and institutions. Furthermore, as one recent analysis notes, adopting democratic positions "would not make the group any more prone to the arbitrary crackdowns it currently endures."

Reformists like Futuh and Gamal Hishmet publicly dissented from the contentious draft program, while Erian, Kheirat al-Shater, and several other leading pragmatists were in prison at the time the conservative faction drafted the platform. But it is increasingly evident that the Second Generation represents a small minority of relatively moderate reformists "battling with the dominant conservatives", namely the Salafists, orthodox traditionalists, and Qutbists, disciples of Sayed Qutb, the radical Islamists' inspiration. The new program confirms the dominance of the hard-line "Da'awa" tendency which is hostile to diluting the movement's commitment to sharia and other fundamentalist tenets.

Furthermore, the group's Supreme Guide (and what does that title tell you?), has shown little sign of revisionism or adherence to democratic values. "Islam preceded doctrines and ideologies devised by men," Muhammed Akef insisted earlier this year. "Islam and its values antedated the West by founding true democracy, exemplified by the Shura [the Caliphate's advisory body]."

Internal debates and divisions over the platform have confirmed the strength of radical Salafist elements within the Brotherhood, particularly in the provinces. The reformists so often cited by western experts comprise only about 15 percent of the youth, according to one Brotherhood activist. "Reformists punch above their weight because they are intellectually engaged, take-charge personalities who have gained the confidence of the leadership, but the balance of the youth, mostly from the provinces, are salafis," notes an observer.

"Conservatives are the majority inside the group in general," confirmed a Brotherhood reformist blogger. He is skeptical that reformers will mobilize against the conservative turn. Internal critics will "follow whatever the supreme leader says, since the group's membership is based upon listening and obedience" because of the organization's Leninist-like party discipline.

Islamist Pragmatists Ripe for Engagement?

Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futuh, "one of the most dynamic and articulate spokesmen of the second-generation reformist faction", was among those pragmatists who stayed when the old guard's traditionalism forced many second-generation reformers to leave the Brotherhood and form the al-Wasat or Center Party in 1995. Although the reformers are a distinct minority in the leadership and the base membership, Futuh and his allies have secured important positions from which they articulate some distinctly revisionist views.

In a radical departure from the Brotherhood's traditional vision, argues a recent Hudson Institute analysis, Futuh and his allies "advocate true political pluralism, equal citizenship for all the country's nationals, regardless of religion, and rotation of power on the basis of the people's choice." Futuh wants to radically reform the Brotherhood, end all covert and external activities, including its participation the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, and convert the group into a bona fide political party. Islamic discourse is not sacred, Futuh asserts, but rooted in human judgment (ijtihad) and therefore subject to revision. He rejects the standard Islamist critique of democracy: democracy is not simply a means of reaching power but has intrinsic value.

Pragmatists have tried to assuage concern that democratic reform will sweep the Islamists to power. "This myth about Islamists capitalizing on calls for reform to leap to power has long been used, by both the regime and by liberal intellectuals, to hinder any process of change," says Futuh. "It is generally accepted that in a free and fair election we would gain between 20 to 25 per cent of seats in parliament."

The Brotherhood's more pragmatic representatives consistently portray the movement not only as sincerely democratic but as a safety valve for discontented activists who might otherwise turn to more violent alternatives. "The Muslim Brotherhood is not al Qaeda, and the political discourses of Khayrat El Shater, the deputy chief of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ayman Al Zawahry, a leading ideologue of Al Qaeda, have hardly anything in common," argues the Brotherhood's Ibrahim El Houdaiby. "This diversity within political Islam should encourage Western policymakers to deal with moderate groups, whose empowerment could significantly undermine the radicals' contention that the doors for peaceful reform are closed."

Houdaiby cites Islamists' record in syndicate elections in Egypt and parliamentary elections in Turkey and Morocco as confirming their respect for competitive political processes. He cautions that "by shunning dialogue with the moderate voices of political Islam, Western governments are gradually handing victory to the radicals both they and moderate Islamic politicians are keen to undermine."

Many Egyptian liberal democrats, unlike some Western observers, remain unconvinced by the rhetorical changes. The draft platform demonstrates that the Brotherhood has added "vocabularies of democracy and human rights (to their rhetoric)," says Bahy Eldin Hassan, head of Cairo Center for Human Rights. "But the content remains the same as the old generations". What's more, he says, the reformists have "no weight" inside the main decision-making bodies.

The benign, reformist image promoted by some is belied by the Brotherhood's own actions and words. The movement's March 2004 platform, like the current draft, constitutes a call for an Islamist state, notes Middle East analyst Barry Rubin, while Egyptian commentator Magdi Khalil suggests the evidence confirms that there have been no substantial shifts in the Brotherhood's radical Islamist orientation; that its deputies in parliament have focused on pushing cultural controls and censorship rather than addressing issues of economic and social reform; and that the Brotherhood has "abused, disregarded or tried to take over" potential allies like the Wafd and Wassat parties, suggesting a superficial commitment to political pluralism.

The Brotherhood's reformers consistently point out that resistance to internal reform and heterodox arguments comes from both the old guard and the regime itself. Moderates claim that in disproportionately targeting potential reformers, "the regime is colluding with MB hardliners to block the movement's evolution in a more democratic direction."

A Foreign Office functionary recently proposed that Britain should not only cultivate but actively assist the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian offshoot, Hamas. "Given that Islamist groups are often less corrupt than the generality of the societies in which they operate, consideration might be given to channeling aid resources through them, so long as sufficient transparency is achievable," he argued.

There is a case for dialogue with pragmatic or revisionist elements of the Brotherhood. But the notion that the group should be politically embraced or actively supported is, at best, premature and inappropriate. To the contrary, while the Islamists benefit from Saudi and related funding sources and enjoy the sanctuary afforded by the mosque, energies and resources would be best focused on the genuine liberals and democrats denied both political space and material aid.

Potemkin Election for Russia's Virtual Democracy

Russia's parliamentary elections confirmed and accentuated disturbing trends in the country's recent political evolution. Most observers viewed the elections as a further stride towards authoritarian consolidation. There were exceptions, of course. "Far from indicating a retreat from democracy, the Russian electorate's rejection of the current opposition may be a sign of the country's progress toward a mature democracy," argued a former State Department analyst, suggesting the Russians had more to fear from the Another Russia [sic] opposition group.

The election is unlikely to end the debates over the strategic significance of Russia's political trends. President Vladimir Putin clearly interprets the result as a mandate for remaining in power, although the precise form his rule will take remains unclear. "The paradox is that Putin has weakened all nonpresidential institutions at precisely the time when he needs them to use the mandate he just won,'' notes Stanford University's Michael McFaul. "State governors, the Duma and the Federation Council (the lower and upper houses of the Russian parliament), the prime minister and his cabinet, the Supreme Court, the media, political parties, and civil society are all much weaker and less independent today than they were eight years ago," as a result of this strategy of deinstitutionalization.

Political stasis and conformity is likely to impact negatively on Putin's declared intention to transform the Russian economy from energy dependence to a hi-tech, information age "e-conomy". Indeed, the economy remains a key point of vulnerability, especially the prevailing re-nationalization through extortion, argues Russia-watcher Anders Aslund, for whom Putin's regime is best described as a group of clans, comprising state-dominated corporations, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, together with the security agencies. Putin's KGB cronies control these institutions, pocketing huge kickbacks, he says, while "Putin has made sure that they all hate one another, so that they need him as arbitrator or godfather." Shortly before the election, a KGB manager explained how the siloviki security agents use extortion against private enterprises to accomplish "velvet re-privatization". The regime makes no effort to justify re-nationalization ideologically: the purpose is to generate revenues for senior Kremlin officials.

Russian dissident Andrei Amalrik's observation about the Soviet bureaucracy seems to apply to United Russia, Putin's party: a negative selection process occurred in the bureaucratic elite as "the brave and the independent were forced out, to the benefit of the weak and indecisive." Something is seriously wrong with the quality of democracy when United Russia's Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of the State Duma - a personification of that trend - can insist, with a straight face, that the parliament is no place to debate.

The impotence of the assembly is also evident from the comment of a senior member of United Russia, the chairman of an important Duma committee. "A very senior politician told me he was exhausted, and wanted to quit politics," he said. "So he has decided to run for the Duma instead."

Russia's Accelerating Transition to Autocracy…

He's no Kremlinologist, Pierre Hassner admits. But he believes a childhood in the shadow of totalitarianism and a lifelong interest in political irrationality together provide valuable insights in analyzing Putin's Russia. "My essential preoccupation since childhood during World War II and facing the century's two great totalitarianisms, was to understand totalitarianism and war in order to help defend liberty and peace," said Hassner, one of Europe's most influential foreign policy intellectuals.

Similarly, a training in the classics and philosophy fed his fascination with the politics of the irrational. A nation's wounded pride and the manipulation of fear are not normally key concepts for the political scientist but are vital in understanding contemporary Russia. Yet despite disturbing signs of Stalinist nostalgia, Russia is not regressing to its Soviet past, Hassner suggested in delivering the 4th annual Seymour Martin Lipset memorial lecture.

"I come neither to bury Putin nor to praise him," Hassner told his audience, noting that trends to autocracy "started before him." But, he is "reminded of fascism" by the prevailing hostility to ethnic minorities, the disturbing activities of Nashi, and the speed with which Russia has accelerated from Boris Yeltsin's soft authoritarianism to Putin's hard version. Such impressions are hardened by the Putin cult, projecting him as "leader of the nation", coupled with the cynical manipulations of the Kremlin's "virtual democracy".

…or to Genuine Fascism?

Russia is, in fact, "best termed an unconsolidated fascist state", says political scientist Alexander Motyl, in a robust analysis worth quoting at length. The country's "democratic institutions are at best moribund, …; civil society and the press have been severely circumscribed, in a manner that approximates Hitler's Gleichschaltung (or coordination) of society; representatives of the military and secret police the –siloviki–dominate all ruling elites and suffuse them with their antidemocratic ethos; the state promotes capitalism while making sure to control its strategic heights …; the Russian state is unabashedly glorified …; Vladimir Putin is the undisputed leader, and his image exudes vigor, youth, and manliness; a variety of rabidly pro-Putin youth groups act as the vanguard of the state; the population overwhelmingly supports Putin, …; hypernationalism, a growing mistrust of both internal and external foreigners, and a corresponding glorification of Russia's past (including its criminal Stalinist period) and present are the official worldview; Russia has taken to asserting its 'rightful' place in the sun by engaging in energy blackmail vis-a-vis Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, cyber-wars against Estonia, provocations against Georgia, Polar land grabs, and other forms of aggressive behavior."

Indeed Russia's "dangerous attitudes" towards its neighbors like Georgia and Estonia reflect a nexus between the regime's hardening towards domestic opponents and its aggressive postures internationally, Hassner believes. He observes that the collapse of Soviet communism entailed the loss of an empire, acute dislocation and impoverishment, and a sense of national humiliation subsequently compounded by NATO enlargement, the color revolutions and the post-9/11 US military presence in post-Soviet Central Asia.

Russia's new-found confidence and assertiveness represents an understandable reaction to those ignominious years. Just as de Gaulle tried to restore la gloire et la grandeur of France after the disgrace of Vichy, defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the loss of Algeria, Putin is exploiting the current good fortune of high oil prices and soaring revenues to punch above Russia's weight. But, unlike de Gaulle, Hassner notes, Putin has failed to invest in a crumbling infrastructure, to reform and diversify the economy or to modernize a military whose top brass seem content with the "symbolic satisfactions" that Putin occasionally bestows.

Hassner rejects the economic determinism that argues that Russia's economic development will eventually generate a middle class that will come to demand genuine rule of law, property rights and, in time, democracy. "Democracy is not a deus ex machina that emerges irrespective of culture," he insists. Nor, contrary to one recent suggestion that authoritarianism is built into the Russian DNA, is a predisposition to democracy genetically determined.

Yet Russians cannot escape the legacy of history. Orlando Figes recounts how his interviews with hundreds of survivors of Stalin's Terror for his book The Whisperers (compiled with the assistance of NED grantee Memorial), surfaced many legacies of the period that still affect the way Russians think and act. "One of the most striking," Figes argues, "is a strong political conformity, a silent acceptance and lack of questioning of authority, which was born of fear in the Stalin period but then passed down the generations to become part of what one might call the post-Soviet personality."

Kremlin's Hard-Edged Soft Power

Moscow is openly contemptuous of the West, Pierre Hassner says, based on the conviction that "Russia is up because of oil, the US is down because of Iraq, and Europe, despite its much-vaunted soft power, is simply out dependent on Russian gas and disunited on foreign policy." His view is sustained by the European Council on Foreign Relations whose new report concludes that the west's post-cold war strategy of promoting democracy and liberalization "is now in tatters." It is now "Moscow that sets the pace for EU-Russia relations," the report asserts. "Russia (is) more powerful, less cooperative, and more intransigent."

The Kremlin is even threatening to project its own soft power in Western Europe. In a move that debases the political lexicon, recalls the Cold War days of Soviet "peace" fronts, Putin recently announced plans to set up an institute for freedom and democracy in Brussels with the declared aim of countering Western NGOs' activities in Russia. "With the aid of grants, the EU helps develop such institutes in Russia," he said after the EU-Russia summit in Mafra, Portugal.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, co-president of the European Parliament's Greens group, welcomed such an office so long as an equivalent European office could be set up in Moscow. "Let them both have totally free access to prisons and let us set up annual joint meetings to discuss the situation," highlighting Russia's refusal to allow human rights groups with access to dissidents like former Yukos executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Politically, Moscow is increasingly focused on the "World Without the West" although, economically, it needs Western markets. In promoting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the authoritarian axis that groups Russia with China and the Central Asian 'stans, Hassner argues, the Kremlin is taking the "turn towards Asia" advocated by Yevgeny Primakov. Russia and China "are once again occupying similar ideological terrain", one analyst argues. "They no longer espouse communism," notes the FT's Gideon Rachman. But both have arrived at similar political doctrines. "At home, the formula is authoritarianism, combined with rapid economic growth and nationalism. Internationally, both see their rising economic power as the basis for righting past humiliations."

Venezuela: "Democratatorship" Foiled

"Por qué no te callas?" the "shut up!" heard around the world has now been echoed at home. The Venezuelan electorate followed up King Juan Carlos's rebuke to President Hugo Chávez by rejecting a proposed constitution that could have made him president for life. The defeat means the aspring "democratator" cannot legally run again for the presidency although he has threatened to submit the proposals again.

Reports suggest that senior military figures had to press a reluctant Chávez to concede defeat. The regime was caught off-guard by the opposition's strategic decision to vote late in the day, pre-empting the Chávistas' "recovery plan" to massage the results if they appeared ominous. Chávez canvassed his ministers and leading advisers and Vice President Jorge Rodriguez reportedly advocated stealing the election, an option the president actively considered. Senior military figures counseled that the wishes of the people should be respected and that they were not prepared to put down the inevitable demonstrations. Their view prevailed.

But his decision to accept the opposition victory is also explained by the paradox of democratic authoritarianism. "He needs at least the semblance of popular support and democratic elections in order to push forward with the largely undemocratic revolution," notes academic analyst Russell Crandall. "Any lasting allegations that he had disavowed the "people's voice" (in this case, a vote against him) would have been devastating for his populist image and therefore his legitimacy."

The caudillo reacted petulantly to the defeat, using a four-letter expletive to deride the opposition. But post-referendum analysis suggests he should look closer to home to explain his defeat since the regime's core constituencies played a decisive role in vetoing the authoritarian shift. The relatively high abstention rate demonstrated that "Chávez's base of support -- the poor and the working class -- are not willing to accept his vision wholesale," according to one analysis. The result was "more one of discontent in the internal base of Chávismo than a victory for the opposition."

"Chávez was out of step with the wishes of the poorer sectors of the population that support him," according to Edgardo Lander, a leftwing political scientist. "He had interpreted his election victory in 2006 as a kind of carte blanche to do whatever he wanted." Lander believes the result could reduce polarization and help foster a more stable consensus. "The most democratic sectors on both sides have come out strengthened. This is really healthy," he says. "The marginalization of the more sectarian tendencies of the left and putschist positions on the right paves the way towards a less conflictive situation."

Former allies of Chávez lined up with the opposition, alienated by the president's egocentric and bombastic approach. Members of small leftist parties were shocked when Chávez declared he would merge them into a single revolutionary vanguard. "I noticed a personality cult developing. He started to behave much more like a caudillo [strongman], said socialist deputy Ricardo Gutiérrez.

The students who led the "No" campaign taught a lesson to the fractured and ineffectual anti- Chávista parties. But the traditional opposition will need to provide a programmatic alternative and form a coherent opposition if they are to exploit emerging divisions within the regime and its supporters. "Fattened on a diet of electoral victories, the component parts of Chávismo have grown restive," notes Ivan Briscoe of the Madrid-based FRIDE think tank. "Schisms and splits have always characterized the movement," he notes. "Somewhere within Chávez's movement, however, there is bound to emerge over the next five to ten years a challenge, be it through established party or state interests, a military coup, or popular discontent from below."

The referendum result has halted, at least for now, what leftist editor Teodoro Petkoff calls Venezuela's "crawling toward a totalitarian society", characterized by "the state's domination of sport, of culture, using the educational system to ideologize primary and high-school students, the elimination of universities' autonomy, communications hegemony, and the transformation of the armed forces into an armed party."

Chávez: International Criticism, Domestic Incompetence

While the regime continues to attract support from celebrity "useful idiots", his blend of domestic authoritarianism and distasteful foreign policy has alienated much international left-of-center opinion. A recent edition of Libération, the French left daily, featured an open letter criticizing Chávez from some sixty largely Latin American writers, journalists and activists, warning that the proposed constitution would "abolish all controls on the powers of the state and the actions of the executive."

"Chávez has embraced Robert Mugabe and told Belarus' dictator, Lukashenko, that he is right to put down the democratic opposition in Minsk," notes British Labour MP Denis MacShane. "He has made five high profile visits to Teheran and calls Iran's Jew-hating, gay-hanging, nuke obsessed president Ahmadinejad 'my brother'."

The 20 November edition of Le Monde also cautioned against Chávez. "The concentration of power in his hands, the absence of dialogue with the opposition, the denunciation of the student movement as 'fascist', the green light given to armed gangs, in short the militarization of political life is matched by unparalleled corruption," the paper editorialized.

The regime continues to enjoy the benefits of unprecedented oil revenues and Chávez remains popular. But reckless spending, technical incompetence and endemic corruption have contributed to a failure to invest revenues and diversify the economy. The government's draft 2008 budget includes more than $250 million for funding pro-Chávista parties and "anti-imperialist" movements in the United States, Central and South America. Meanwhile, it is failing to address the basic needs of its core base, including refuse collection and crime in poor barrios. "With all their lofty ideals the Chávistas are maybe paying less attention to these tangible and specific things," says Steve Ellner, a political scientist at Oriente University in Venezuela.

"It won't take $30 per barrel oil to drain Chávez's government of capital, leaving him at the mercy of a people who've been led to expect growing prosperity," notes one analyst. "If oil profits begin to evaporate - because of a fall in price or PDVSA's inability to maintain production levels - Chávez will be in real trouble."

Indonesia's Civil Islam Nurtures Democracy

Indonesia has been recognized for proving that Islam and democracy can co-exist. "The heart and soul of Indonesia remains moderate and progressive", said President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, accepting the Democracy Medal from the International Association of Political Consultants. "In Indonesia democracy, Islam and modernity go hand in hand.

"Democracy in Indonesia has reached a point of no return," according to the nation's first directly elected president. The "pyramid of power" had been "turned upside down" by bringing democracy to the people, said Yudhoyono. "Indonesia has proved that no matter the size of the population, the difficult geography, ethnic diversity political complexity or historical background, democracy can come and grow."

There is a causal connection between Indonesian democracy, its pluralistic and tolerant society and the moderate Civil Islam that dominates its Muslim mainstream, argues academic analyst Giora Eliraz. Indonesia's transition to democracy is starting to "catch some interest among emerging circles of civil society" in the Arab world, he notes, but "much less among political elites."

The Islamist PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), which resembles Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in ideology and organisation, is the "only Indonesian party which relies on policies and programs rather than charismatic leadership and patrimonialism," says researcher Louay Abdulbaki. The PKS will facilitate gradual democratic consolidation and more institutionalised democratic practices, he argues. The party has fostered an image as a "clean and visionary party and develop[ed] coherent policy-oriented political program." Consequently, it was the only party to significantly increase its share of the vote in the 2004 parliamentary elections, increasing its representation from seven (in 1999) to 45 seats.

• The dynamics of the war on terror are "not healthy for the development of democracy" in Pakistan, Carl Gershman, head of the National Endowment for Democracy, told the Centre for Civic Education. But there are "strong prospects" for democracy taking root given the country's vibrant civil society and the struggle by lawyers, students, journalists and teachers for the rule of law and constitutionalism.



• The Committee to Protect Journalists has demanded that Vietnamese authorities to unconditionally release French activist and journalist Nguyen Thi Thanh Van, arrested on 17 November in Ho Chi Minh City with a group of five political activists of the pro-democracy Viet Tan party. Thanh Van, who lives in Paris, is associated with the exile-managed monthly Viet Nam Dan Chu (Vietnam Democracy) and a contributor to the Chan Troi Moi radio program, broadcast on shortwave radio to Vietnam. She was arrested by security officials at a private residence in Ho Chi Minh City. Thanh Van's arrest is the latest in a government offensive against Vietnam's merging democracy movement. This year, dozens of activists were arrested and charged with anti-state crimes. The crackdown started in March, shortly after Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization.



• Democracy assistance does have a significant impact in facilitating and promoting democratization, according to a new academic analysis. Democracy promotion has long been an explicit tenet of U.S. foreign policy and resources for democracy programs increased by over 500 percent between 1990 and 2003. The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990-2003, distinguishes between direct and indirect causal mechanisms and employs statistical models that allow the authors to control for distinctive democratization trends in each country.



• Democracy assistance "needs rehabilitation," says Harvard's Samantha Power. A more holistic conception of democracy, based on notions of human security and addressing the social and economic dimension of democratic development would help "thicken" and revitalize democracy promotion.



• The recently-launched European Council on Foreign Relations is planning to undertake an in-depth survey of the European Union's current methods of democracy and human rights and promotion.

• The Centre for Euroepan Policy Studies has produced an excellent (and freely downloadable) report on Political Islam and European Foreign Policy, including country case studies of Egypt (Emad El-Din Shahin) , Tunisia (Salah Eddine Jorshi), and other Mediterranean states The report concludes that European Union institutions and member states should review the current policy of 'benign neglect' towards 'Muslim democrat' parties which. a group of experts attests, tends to reinforce both anti-democratic regimes and radical Islamism. They propose a broad inclusion of Muslim democrats in EU initiatives aiming to reform governance and the development of civil society, without extending any singular, exclusive or unsolicited privileges.



• The latest issue of Democratiya, the excellent quarterly ejournal, is now out and freely available. Featured articles include an extended interview with Joshua Muravchik on The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy; Anja Havedal on Afghan Women; Rob Jenkins ON Barriers to Democracy and Social Capital in the Arab World; Fred Siegel on Radical Islamism; Tony Blair's Speech to the Al Smith; Eugenia Kemble on Richard Kahlenberg's Tough Liberal: Albert Shanker and the Battles Over Schools, Unions, Race and Democracy; Rachelle Horowitz on Tom Kahn and Tom Kahn on Max Shachtman. The London-based Foreign Policy Centre will publish 'Global Politics After 9/11: The Democratiya Interviews', edited and introduced by Alan Johnson, Democratiya editor, with a preface by Michael Walzer. The interviewees include Jean Bethke Elshtain, Martin Shaw, Paul Berman, Kanan Makiya, David Held, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Ladan Boroumand, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Joshua Muravchik, and Mary Kaldor.



• As key institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute work to assist democratic advocates and activists. In this program, IRI's Lorne Craner and NDI's Ken Wollack explore the challenges of the democracy backlash, weak institutions, and building a constituency for reform.



• The Council for a Community of Democracies has published a report of "The Brussels Roundtable on European Approaches to Democracy Assistance and the Community of Democracies," which was held under the auspices of the CCD on behalf of the International Steering Committee (nongovernmental) of the Community of Democracies, and co-sponsored by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) and the International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT).



• Arab civil society continues to promote a transparency agenda despite legal obstacles and government attacks, according to a book recently published by the Jordan-based Arab Archives Institute. "Against Corruption - The role of Arab Civil Society in Fighting Corruption", analyses the civil society organizations' activities in the Arab world, focusing on Jordan, Bahrain and Morocco. The book details how Arab states, with the exception of Lebanon, can dissolve an association, often without providing justification; legally determine who can and who cannot establish an association; and who is eligible to join. Most regimes prohibit CSOs from receiving local or foreign funds without executive authority approval. The government has the right in many laws to inspect the society's records and dissolve the society or its board of directors or suspend its activities.



• 144 trade unionists were murdered for defending workers' rights in 2006, while more than 800 suffered beatings or torture, according to the Annual Survey of Trade Union Rights Violations, published by the 168-million member International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). The report details nearly 5,000 arrests and more than 8,000 punitive dismissals of workers engaged in union activities.



• The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy has awarded its 2007 Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award and a grant of US$100,000 to Cynthia Maung, founder of the Mae Tao Clinic located near the Thai-Burmese border, for her long-term dedication to supporting Burmese refugees. Other finalists included Sima Samar, chairwoman of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission; People in Need, the Czech NGO; exiled Chinese democracy activist Wang Dan; and Human Rights Without Frontiers, the Brussels-based non-profit. Maung was chosen by a TFD review board comprising Robert Menard, founder of Reporters Sans Frontieres; Asma Jahangir, chairwoman of Human Rights of Pakistan; Nisuke Ando, a member of UN Human Rights Committee; Alexander Boraine, chairman of the International Center for Transitional Justice; and Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy.



• Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile, addressed the New York Democracy Forum, an event co-sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association and the National Endowment for Democracy.

Program Officer for Central Africa
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a congressionally funded, private, nonprofit grant making organization, seeks a Program Officer for its Africa section, specializing in Central Africa. The position is based in Washington, DC. The Program Officer will work with the senior director and NED staff to develop and manage the NED's Central Africa grants program, develop the Endowment's strategy for Central Africa, set priorities, and monitor and evaluate projects in the sub-region. Applicants submit a resume, cover letter to jobs@ned.org. Place the number 7005 in the subject line.

Assistant Program Officer
The NED seeks an Assistant Program Officer (APO) to work with its Africa team. The Assistant Program Officer will provide significant programmatic support to the Endowment's small grants activities in Nigeria, and will provide administrative support to other country programs as required. The position is based in Washington, D.C. but will entail travel to Nigeria approximately twice per year. NED offers competitive salaries and excellent benefits and is an equal opportunity employer. For more information, go here.

Stanford Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development
The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University, California, has announced the fourth annual Stanford Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program for mid-career policy makers and civic activists.

The program brings together a group of approximately 30 civic, political, and economic leaders from transition countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, and Russia. Stanford Summer Fellows are former prime ministers and presidential advisers, senators and attorney generals, journalists and civic activists, academics and members of the international development community.

Applicants should go here for more detailed information.

Legal and Political Environment for Civil Society
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development (Cordaid) announce a $25,000 prize competition to encourage scholarship on the legal and political environment for civil society, with a focus on civil liberties. Manuscripts should contain between 5,000 and 25,000 words. One person will be chosen for the ICNL-Cordaid Civil Liberties Prize of US $15,000. Two other participants will receive Distinguished Research Awards of US $5,000 each. In addition, selected manuscripts will be published in ICNL's online journal. Scholarship from all regions is welcome. Deadline January 31, 2008. Full details here.

Support Democracy in Middle East
The Project on Middle East Democracy is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to examining the impact of US foreign policy on political reform and democratization in the Middle East. To maintain its excellent blog and weekly newsletter, POMED is running its first annual Year-End Fund Raising Drive. Donations are tax deductible. Donate here.

Democracy and Governance M.A.
Georgetown University is inviting applications for its innovative two-year Georgetown University M.A. program in Democracy and Governance, designed for those seeking to develop or enhance careers working on behalf of democratic change, governance reform, and human rights. Most students supplement their coursework with internships designed to provide valuable hands-on experience. Current students have worked at the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, the U.S. Department of State, and Democracy International, among others. For details email Jennifer Counts, Program Coordinator, at democracystudies@georgetown.edu

Resident Director, Moscow, Russia - National Democratic Institute
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs seeks a Resident Director to oversee democracy development programs and implement party building trainings and parliamentary assistance in Russia. This position will be based in Moscow, but travel will frequently be required throughout Russia. Under a multi-year program in support of democratic development in Russia, NDI is providing training in political party building, civic organizing, and parliamentary development. The Director will be responsible for managing and coordinating all of these programs, in cooperation with the NDI/Moscow civic trainer and local staff, and implementing those programs related to parties and parliament. Areas of assistance might include organizational development, communications, planning, election preparations, membership recruitment, party-faction relations, faction organization, legislative development, and outreach to citizens. Full details here.

NDI has vacancies for the above and various other full-time positions: If you are interested in employment opportunities, click here to access details of available positions. Please e-mail your resumé to and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in.

Program Officer, Asia International Republican Institute
A nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, the International Republican Institute (IRI) advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, good governance and the rule of law. IRI is active in more than 65 counties with offices in 44 countries. The Asia Division is currently recruiting for a Program Officer in the Asia Region.

The Program Officer (PO) is responsible for designing and implementing a strategy for selected IRI programs in Asia. The Program Officer closely monitors political and economic developments in the country and develops and maintains relationships with the diplomatic and donor community, country partners and grantees. The Program Officer is responsible for developing and meeting country program funding goals, including preparing grant proposals, budgets, quarterly reports and program evaluations. The Program Officer conducts research related to project proposals and conferences and represents IRI at various public functions. For a full description and to apply, please go here.

Resident Program Officer, Political Parties and Research Iraq (Erbil)
A nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, the International Republican Institute (IRI) advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, good governance and the rule of law. Stationed in Erbil, Iraq, the Resident Program Officer (RPO) for Political Parties & Research is responsible for designing and implementing a strategy for IRI programs in Iraq. S/he develops long-range and annual plans for the country program, identifies potential partner organizations, develops training strategies and oversees project implementation. The Program Officer is responsible for developing and meeting Iraq program fundraising goals, including preparing grant proposals, budgets, quarterly reports and evaluations. For the full job description and to apply online, please go here. Email personnel@iri.org with any questions (no phone calls, please).

International Republican Institute
IRI has vacancies for the above plus various other full-time positions. If you are interested in employment opportunities, please click on the links above to read the job description for available positions. Please e-mail your resumé to personnel@iri.org and reference the specific opportunity you are interested in. IRI does not accept unsolicited resumés.

Center for International Enterprise, Program Assistant, Latin America and the Caribbean
This position is responsible for providing program and administrative support to the Latin America and Caribbean division of CIPE. The successful candidate will create and maintain a variety of program, financial, correspondence and contract files, both in paper form and electronically; process and track payment requests, grant modifications, documents for signature, narrative and financial reports, etc.; prepare routine correspondence and mailings; assist in writing and compiling quarterly reports, proposals and budgets.; perform clerical duties, as needed; handle international travel arrangements and local meeting logistics. To apply, please send a resumé or CV, cover letter, writing sample and salary history to jobs@cipe.org. Attn: Latin America PA No phone calls. Full details here.

Resident Advisor, ABA Rule of Law Initiative, Algeria
The ABA Rule of Law Initiative, MENA Division seeks a Resident Advisor to implement a judicial reform program in Algiers, Algeria. This is a staff position, beginning in 2007. The Resident Advisor will be the ABA's primary representative in-country, and works in coordination with the ABA's regional programs and representatives. A J.D. or equivalent law degree required, with a minimum of 5 years of relevant experience, including experience designing and implementing rule of law programs and supervising and managing staff. Previous experience or background in the region strongly preferred. Excellent written and oral communication skills in English required, with proficient Arabic and/or French preferred. Previous international rule of law program development and implementation experience desired. To apply, send cover letter, resumé and 3 references to jobs@staff.abanet.org. Applications will be considered on a rolling basis as received, and will be accepted until the position is filled. Only short-listed candidates will be contacted. For more information go here.

Resident Advisor, Oman (Muscat)
The ABA Rule of Law Initiative, MENA Division seeks a resident advisor for programs in Oman. Applicants should have a JD or equivalent degree and at least 7 years of legal experience. Periodic and frequent travel within the region is required. Overseas rule of law development experience and proven success in meeting deliverables strongly preferred. Substantive expertise needed for the following areas: legal education (curriculum reform, teacher training) and judicial reform. The Oman Resident Advisor will report to DC headquarters and work in close cooperation with partners to develop and implement programming. In addition to Arabic language skills and familiarity with regional legal systems, prior office, personnel and financial management experience is a plus. To apply, please send resumé, cover letter and three references to jobs@staff.abanet.org. Only short listed candidates will be contacted. For more information go here.

Senior Program Manager, ABA Rule of Law Initiative
The ABA Rule of Law Initiative seeks a Senior Program Manager to work in the DC headquarters office. The D.C.-based Senior Program Manager works with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Regional Program Director, and In Country Program Director(s) and Resident Advisors in all aspects of developing and implementing international technical legal assistance projects and activities in his/her portfolio, and other related projects as they arise, serving as the principal DC-based manager for these programs. The Senior Program Manager may oversee the work of field directors, program managers, program officers and administrative staff as needed, and participates in the MENA division senior management team. To apply, please send CV, cover letter and three references to jobs@staff.abanet.org. Applications will be considered on a rolling basis until position is filled. Only short-listed candidates will be contacted. All applicants must possess proper work authorization that does not require employer sponsorship. For more information please visit the website here.

Graduate Democracy Fellowship, The Carter Center Democracy Program
The Carter Center Democracy Program is seeking candidates for a graduate democracy fellowship beginning mid- to late-January 2008. Ideal applicants would be advanced Ph.D. candidates or recent graduates, with a background in political science and an emphasis on democratic development and election observation. Courses taken or research conducted should be focused on means of assessing the quality of democracy and elections. Election observation experience, as well as a good working knowledge of organizations that work in this field, is strongly preferred. Candidates should be available to work at The Carter Center's offices in Atlanta, GA for the duration of the assistantship. The duration of the fellowship would be six months, but potentially renewable for an additional 6-12 months (maximum term of 18 months), contingent upon funding and satisfactory performance. The fellowship offers a total stipend of $15,000 per 6 month term. Applicants should send a CV, three letters of reference, and a writing sample with their application letter to Ms. Avery Davis-Roberts, 453 Freedom Parkway, Atlanta, GA, 30307. Tel 404-420-3807, fax 404-420-5196 or aodavis@emory.edu. The deadline for applications is January 1, 2008.

Senior Electoral Cycle Specialist, IFES Democracy at Large, Washington, DC
IFES is an international, nonprofit organization that supports the building of democratic societies. IFES provides targeted professional/technical assistance to strengthen transitional democracies. IFES is seeking a Senior Electoral Cycle Specialist to serve as a professional/technical expert on electoral cycle processes (to include elections). The Senior Electoral Cycle Specialist will provide services related to electoral cycle process by developing and/or reviewing project proposals and implementation plans, writing and editing technical and project reports and papers, participating in public briefings, program outreach activities, conferences, and other meetings. The candidate should have considerable experience in democracy development and the electoral cycle including electoral administration. Applications will be accepted online only, through the IFES website. To apply visit the IFES careers website here. Then follow the instructions on how to upload your resumé and answer prescreening questions.

Senior Technical Advisor - Uzbekistan
Freedom House seeks a Senior Technical Advisor for its field office in Uzbekistan. S/he will take the lead role in directing and implementing the organization's program with Uzbekistan's human rights community, will be responsible for program development and implementation, financial management, staff supervision, public relations, serving as a legal advisor, providing technical assistance and training, and other duties as assigned. The Senior Technical Advisor - Human Rights will coordinate with the Country Director for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on regional programming aspects and shared office management. Please send cover letter and resumé by email or fax to: Jeffrey Mosser Human Resources Director humanresources@freedomhouse.org, Fax: (202) 822-3893. Applications will be accepted until the position is filled. Interested candidates must submit a cover letter, resumé , and salary requirements. If any candidate does not have all required information, he or she will not be considered. Candidates are also requested to state where they viewed the job advertisement in their applications.

Policy Analyst - South Asia/Senior Policy Analyst - Muslim World Countries
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is seeking a Senior Policy Analyst for Muslim World Countries focus and a Policy Analyst for South Asia focus.

The senior policy analyst must have substantial experience in U.S. foreign policy, international human rights, and/or religious freedom, particularly with respect to countries of the Muslim world. Responsibilities include monitoring developments in U.S. foreign policy and conditions for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief around the globe; researching and drafting reports analyzing conditions for religious freedom; assessing U.S. policy with regard to promoting respect for human rights, including religious freedom; developing policy recommendations for the U.S. government to promote religious freedom abroad; and monitoring the implementation of those recommendations. Please send, fax or email cover letter and resumé to Deputy Director for Policy, USCIRF, 800 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite 790, Washington, DC 20002; fax: 202-523-5020; dsimms@uscirf.gov.

The policy analyst, South Asia, should have regional experience in South Asian affairs, particularly political and social developments. Candidate should also have a good knowledge of U.S. foreign policy toward South Asian countries as well as human rights, including religious freedom, concerns. Responsibilities include monitoring developments in the countries of South Asia, including with respect to conditions for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief; monitoring and assessing U.S. foreign policy toward South Asia; researching and drafting reports analyzing conditions for religious freedom and related human rights in the relevant countries; developing policy recommendations for the U.S. government to promote religious freedom in South Asia; and monitoring the implementation of those recommendations. Please send, fax or email cover letter and resumé to Deputy Director for Policy, USCIRF, 800 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite 790, Washington, DC 20002; fax: 202-523-5020; dsimms@uscirf.gov.

Senior Program Officer-Open Dialogue for Human Rights Reform in Uzbekistan
The Institute for New Democracies, Inc, is looking for a Senior Program Officer to post in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The Senior Program Officer will support all areas of program implementation, management, operations and administration for IND programs managed and administered from the Uzbekistan office. He/she will assist IND Country Director in assuming the responsibility for program implementation, financial management, public relations, and training. This will include, but is not limited to such areas as program development, supervision of staff, monitoring the program and overseeing daily operations. Further details available from Margarita Assenova IND@ind-dc.org Fax: (202) 315-3525.

EVENTS

December 13, Congress and China: Cooperation or Conflict?, 9:00-10:00am. Center for National Policy. The two co-chairs of the House U.S.-China Working Group, Congressman Rick Larsen and NED board member Congressman Mark Kirk take a hard look at America's complex strategic relationship with China. Click here to RSVP. Venue: Room 2105, Rayburn House Office Building. A light breakfast will be served.

December 13, Crisis in Pakistan: Prospects for Democracy and Rule of Law, featuring Hina Jilani, UN Special Envoy for Human Rights Defenders. Congressional Human Rights Caucus (CHRC). 3:00 to 4:30 p.m., Room: 2255 Rayburn, Capitol Hill, Washington, DC. Ms. Jilani is one of Pakistan's leading attorneys and co-founded with her sister, Asma Jahangir, Pakistan's first all-female legal practice in 1980. Ms. Jahangir, who also serves as United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, was recently placed under house arrest and subsequently released. Ms. Jilani is a co-founder of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission.

December 17, Can Democracy Survive Globalization? Taiwan represents one of the greatest paradoxes for democracy in contemporary global politics -- praised for its struggle for self-government and democracy, but not fully recognized by the international community, and always in danger of losing ground. Chinese threats against Taiwanese democracy further heighten the precariousness of regional security, prosperity, and peace. The Formosa Foundation and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, in conjunction with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, present an international conference on Taiwan's unique democratic predicament in the face of globalization. Speakers include former Senator Bob Dole (keynote address), former Ambassador James Lilley, Dr.Wen-cheng Lin from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy/New York University, Professor Dr. Lung-chu Chen, Chairman of the Taiwan New Century Foundation, Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, James Mann (John Hopkins University), and Randall Schriver (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia). The conference will be held from 9:00 AM to 4:15 PM, inside the Jack Morton Auditorium of the George Washington University, at 805, 21st Street, NW, Washington, DC. For detailed schedule and agenda, please go here. The conference is free to the public. Advanced reservation is required, by emailing to gsigur@gwu.edu with your name, affiliation, email address and which panels you wish to attend.

Wed 9th January, Uzbekistan - repression and lack of democracy in Central Asia. Speakers: Craig Murray (former British Ambassador in Uzbekistan), Natalia Antelava (BBC Central Asia correspondent – via phone link), Shahida Tulaganova (Uzbek journalist) and Michael Andersen (Journalist and filmmaker). Others – TBC. Moderated by James Nixey (Chatham House). Venue: 13 Norfolk Place, London W2 1QJ. Following the murder of outspoken Uzbek journalist Alisher Saipov, speakers will discuss this Central Asian country which has won notoriety for its human rights abuses and repression. Saipov, editor of the only remaining publication critical of his government, was shot dead recently in the Kyrgyz city of Osh near the border with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's lack of democracy, repression and human rights abuses have stood out for many years. Yet only recently the European Union suspended sanctions against the country. 7.30pm Entry fee: £7.00. Full details here.

21st January, Film Screening: Faith Without Fear. Followed by Q&A with presenter, writer and journalist Irshad Manji. Manji, a Senior Fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy is the best selling author of The Trouble with Islam Today: A Muslim's Call for Reform in her Faith. In her recent documentary Faith Without Fear, she takes a journey to reconcile her faith in Allah with her love of freedom and asks: How can Muslims change for the 21st century? Her journey takes her from the conservative Islam of Yemen, where she meets Osama bin Laden's former bodyguard, to Spain where different cultures and religions flourished under Muslim civilisation. She seeks to reconcile her liberal approach to Islam with her more conservative mother and challenges conventional views on Islam. Location: 13 Norfolk Place, London, W2 1QJ 7.30pm Price: £5.00 Full details here.

January 24, 2008. Payne Lecture Series: Can the Poor Afford Democracy? A Presidential Perspective Speaker: Alejandro Toledo - Payne Distinguished Visiting Lecturer, CDDRL Visiting Scholar, and Former President of Peru. Dr. Alejandro Toledo was democratically elected President of Peru from July 2001-July 2006. Born in a small and remote village in the Peruvian Andes, 12,000 feet above sea level, he is one of sixteen brothers and sisters from a family of extreme poverty. At the age of six, he worked as a street shoe shiner and simultaneously sold newspapers and lotteries to supplement the family income. Thanks to an accidental access to education, Dr. Toledo was able to go from extreme poverty to the most prestigious academic centers of the world, later becoming one of the most prominent democratic leaders of Latin America. He is the first Peruvian president of indigenous descent to be democratically elected in five hundred years. He received a BA from San Francisco University in Economics and Business Administration. From Stanford University, he received a MA in Economics of Human Resources, a MA in Economics, and a PhD in Economics of Human Resources. Venue: Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, 616 Serra Street, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. 4:30 PM - 6:00 PM Open to the public. No RSVP required.