The Obama administration has apparently conceded that prospects for building democracy in Afghanistan are slight, at least for the foreseeable future, even though Afghan democrats and civil society groups will continue their laudable efforts. But now commentators are asking whether it is worthwhile or even feasible for the U.S. to engage in nation-building or even maintain a presence for strategic security reasons.
“Neither course, staying or leaving, is politically easy or strategically safe,” writes Stephen Biddle, in the latest issue of The American Interest. Domestic political considerations will be a determining factor in resolving this strategic dilemma, says Biddle, senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations:
If the United States pulls out, the Karzai government falls, the Taliban establishes an Afghan state haven, Pakistan collapses and a Pakistani nuclear weapon falls into bin Laden’s hands, then a decision to walk away from Afghanistan would be seen as one of the greatest foreign policy blunders of the modern era. Unlikely as this chain of events may be, to withdraw from Afghanistan while success is still possible is to accept this gamble voluntarily.
It’s not the goals that require more modesty, but rather a more realistic expectation of the time needed to achieve them.
First, settling for less than a functioning democracy in Afghanistan is acceptable, provided one is willing to risk the total loss of those democratic gains made thus far. Accountable government, issue-based political parties and social movements, a pluralist society, and other key components of a democracy are largely dependent on one another. A chain’s as strong as its weakest link.
Second, as IRI’s recent poll (issued this week) indicates, 71% believe that securing basic human rights is either an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ use of foreign assistance, and 45% fell the same about strengthening democracy (albeit after the resolution of issues of security and social services). 74% registered for the upcoming presidential elections, and those who didn’t generally failed to do so out of security concerns, and not because of disillusionment with the political process. (These numbers reflect my impressions from the past three weeks spent traveling around Afghanistan’s east and central highlands.)
Finally, one should note that by some accounts, the anti-Soviet mujahideen numbered well over 100,000 in the mid-80’s. The Taliban, comparatively, are currently clocking in the low teens of thousands – not a number indicative of sweeping support for their form of governance.
By my estimate, the US and the international community needn’t start “conceding” on Afghanistan’s democratic goals. They’re achievable as much as the majority of Afghans desire them, which they do. The questions are rather about commitment, cooperation, and execution.