The European Union has a “more cost-effective and sustainable” approach to democratization than the United States, argues Princeton University’s Andrew Moravcsik. He is interviewed on the impressive new Global Europe, an initiative of Ulrich Speck, formerly with RFE/RL.
“Rather than seeking to transform Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran into democracies using military force, Europe has helped transform 15-20 European neighbors into democracies using civilian instruments,” says Moravcsik, Director of Princeton’s EU Program and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
European capitulation to Russian energy blackmail, division and equivocation over Afghanistan, its weak neighborhood policy, and the threat of renewed failure in the Balkans have cast a shadow over claims that the EU is set to dominate 21st century global politics. But Moravcsik lauds Europe’s “civilian” power, aka soft power:
The EU is the world’s largest economy, trading throughout the globe, possesses a single currency that can challenge the dollar, sets regulatory standards, donates nearly half the world’s public and private foreign aid, dominates almost every multilateral organization and legal process, educates more foreign students, is diplomatically active throughout the globe, and embodies a set of values that pose an attractive political and social ideal. When countries set about to draft a constitution or adopt international legal norms, they tend to use European, not American or Asian, models.
But his claims appear stretched, when even the most ardent advocates of soft power believe the EU needs to invest more in hard power, while European analysts have noted that far from dominating multilateral organizations, the EU has failed to punch its weight in bodies like the United Nations and the OSCE.
The EU has failed to sway authoritarian powers like China or Russia and has “found itself outmaneuvered and outvoted” in the Human Rights Council, according to a new report from the European Council on Foreign Relations. The number of states fiercely opposed to the EU’s human rights positions at the UN has swollen to 40 this year from 19 in 2008, according to The EU and human rights at the UN: 2009 annual review, a sequel to last year’s report on the EU’s performance in human rights debates at the UN.
Henry Kissinger, amongst others, has complained that there is no telephone number on which to call the EU on critical foreign policy issues, but Moravcsik is dismissive of the contention that the EU lack’s foreign policy coordination is a drawback.
“Today, rather than seeking greater institutional centralization, European governments should encourage vanguard groups, flexible geometry and coalitions of the willing suited to specific issues, problems and conditions,” he claims.
Global Europe ’s valuable news section alerts us to the fact that the European Parliament will debate breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law including the case of Yevgeny Zhovtis, the murder of Russian human rights activists, and the case of Syrian dissident Muhammad Al Hassani.
Michael Allen’s close attention to and thoughtful critique of the argument I advanced in favor of European “civilian power” on the Global Europe website is much appreciated. But in challenging the argument, he misstates it and cites some less than totally convincing evidence. Three points.
First, my claim is not that Europe “dominates world politics,” as Allen says. Instead it is that the US and Europe are and will remain far more influential than people think–and than any other country. Why? Because per capita income, certain institutional capacities, and convergent interests, not aggregate population and GDP, are the real sources of global influence. This argument is directed against the near universal misperception that China, India and the “rest” are (with the US) the dominant powers. Nothing Allen says challenges this.
Second, Allen cites the case of increases in voting against UN human rights resolutions as good evidence of the EU’s weak civilian power. This seems a poor example. Studies have shown such symbolic resolutions–and purely legalistic human rights instruments in general–to be ineffective instruments of generating positive human rights change. Much more effective is economic leverage, and studies have similarly shown that EU enlargement, as well as human rights clauses in EU’s preferential trade agreements, have both had a positive impact on human rights performance. Money talks. Europe is influential where it matters.
Third, Allen notes that “even the most ardent advocates of soft power believe the EU needs to invest more in hard power.” True enough. In an ideal world where every country could spend unlimited resources on achieving unlimited sets of goals, it would be nice to have European governments build up their hard power–or, more to the point, rationalize their current defense and defense-industrial infrastructures. Unfortunately, European foreign policy is made in the real world, where politicians have limited political and financial capital. They must choose what is most important and focus on that. I doubt that a major push to rationalize European militaries would generate much additional global influence; it is hard to think of scenarios where this would really matter. Certainly not Iraq, Darfur or dealing with Russia–maybe not even Afghanistan. A major push to expand soft power–advancing enlargement, resolving the Cyprus problem, establishing a meaningful Southern strategy, coordinating energy policy, to name just a few things–would surely do much more. It’s all a matter of priorities on the margin.
Still, Allen’s insightful argument suggests that this is the sort of explicit debate about foreign policy priorities Europeans should be having.
[...] erwähnt, das Interview mit Andy Moravcsik über die “Quiet Superpower Europe” und die anschließende Debatte auf Democracy Digest. Erfrischende Alternative zu der andauernde US-Decline/US-Primacy Debatte (z.B. hier, hier, hier [...]
I couldn’t agree more with Andrew Moravcsik on his vouch against institutional centralization. In foreign policy, specifically, there are many issues where consensus would simply not work, and possibly not even be effective. Nevertheless, there are some spheres in foreign policy where the EU does act as a Union, and it is precisely there where many improvements can still be made. His optimism is certainly to be welcomed, especially since it is all too rare, but we cannot forget, first, that even though enlargement has been very positive, it is not absent of flaws. Enlargement “fatigue” is there for a reason, the Turkish question is not solved yet and there have been some drawbacks within recently welcomed members, e.g. Bulgaria. Second, although the neighborhood policy has a great potential, its Achilles heel is that it does not include the possibility of membership – much greater improvements could be made in terms of democratic changes, especially in the East, if there would be at least some kind of long term membership perspective. Third, even though preferential trade agreements all contain human rights clauses, as far as I know, these have never been enforced where countries did not comply. Money talks, certainly, but not necessarily the language of human rights, or not always. Europe is influential where it can, more than where it matters. This leads me to my final point. I’m not sure if in a world without US military power, and without NATO thereafter, Europe would still be able to afford not investing in further developing its military. In this world, the EU depends militarily on the US and energetically on Russia, albeit not only. And where energy “talks,” a greater military power would certainly give the EU an advantage.