The international community should abandon the irresistible illusion of Afghan democracy and adopt a more moderate, minimalist approach to stabilizing Afghanistan, argues Rory Stewart. Lacking the necessary knowledge, power and legitimacy to craft a sustainable democracy, the most feasible aspiration is a state that looks like its neighbors, he suggests.
Stabilization though an Iraq-style surge is not possible, he contends: there are no credible political parties, the Kabul government lacks Baghdad’s reach, strength and credibility, and Afghan tribes are not as coherent or politically-connected as their Iraqi Sunni counterparts.
Troop reductions and a shift from state-building need not entail total withdrawal: development agencies could continue to run projects addressing water, electricity, health, education, and other needs. But Stewart, Director of the Carr Center on Human Rights Policy at Harvard, is dismissive of a strategy that purports to include respect for sovereignty and local values yet promotes international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights:
This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Our approach is short-term; it has struggled to develop Afghan capacity, resolve regional issues or overcome civilian-military divisions; it has struggled to respect Afghan sovereignty or local values; it has failed to implement international standards of democracy, government and human rights; and it has failed to set clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it?
His recommendations run counter to the argument that counterterrorism and state-building are not mutually exclusive, and that a credible, sustainable strategy demands an effective and responsive regime in Kabul.
Accepting a benevolently authoritarian state would suffice should be rejected, writes Ashley Tellis, because it would undermine the minimal strategic reason for the international presence in Afghanistan, namely to ensure that it never again becomes a haven for terrorist groups:
Even if the nagging questions of whether benign dictatorships ever stay benign over the long term and whether the Afghan people would be satisfied with such a regime are disregarded, there is good reason to suspect that a nonrepresentative government would ultimately fail to deliver even on preserving domestic order. This would be particularly true in Afghanistan, which is a contentious society.
Christopher Hitchens insists that a Taliban restoration is unlikely and “the picture is not as absolutely dark as one might be led to expect”:
On my own ventures into the Afghan hinterland, I found that the Taliban also labored under one giant disadvantage from which the earlier mujahidin had not suffered: They had already been the government of Afghanistan and had not been loved for it. Countless people, especially women and city dwellers, had ugly memories of their cruel and stupid rule.
Mr. Stewart unfortunately shared the same pessimism in a Time magazine of last summer. While he may be consistent, it’s not helpful. Afghans expect – if not demand – a legitimate government. That government must (1) control the use of force within their borders and (2) adopt and enforce laws perceived as just by the majority of the people. Provide these two – along with progressive economic development – and the Afghans will support their government and reject the Taliban, as the majority did once before and still does. Mr. Tellis has it right. Without representative, democratic decision-making and transfer of power processes, the second part of the legitimacy equation will be in perpetual jeopardy, so leaving Afghanistan equally unstable. The conclusion is that there’s no other viable alternative, as difficult as it is going to be to achieve.