Baroness Who?: New EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton will be responsible for overseeing the new democracy support strategy
The world’s biggest spender on democracy and development, the European Union has fashioned a new strategy for improving the coherence and effectiveness of its approaches to democracy support. It represents real progress, says our guest blogger Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, but the EU still has some way to go, not least in persuading member states to put ideals on a par with interests.
Democracy has been a guiding principle of the European Union from its inception to its enlargement. The recent launch of an Agenda for Action for supporting democracy worldwide confirms that the EU wants to reassert its commitment to democracy support, reflecting the conviction that as the biggest global donor of democracy assistance, the EU should project a stronger, more coherent voice.
The EU’s soft-power approach was largely overshadowed by the Bush administration’s democracy promotion policies. With Barack Obama assuming the U.S. presidency, the EU is eager to forge a common narrative and strategy, posing the EU’s democratization strategy as a viable alternative to previous U.S. hard-power politics.
Instigated by Sweden, the Council issued an ‘Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations’. The Agenda builds on a Joint Paper published in July by the European Commission and Javier Solana’s Council Secretariat.
The EU’s approach to democracy support has in the past been rather incoherent within its own institutions, between the EU and its member states, and amongst the member states themselves. The joint paper reviews EU’s instruments and tactics for democracy support and concludes with some sketchy recommendations on how to improve coherence and effectiveness at the EU level. The Agenda summarizes these recommendations.
While recognizing that the EU itself encompasses different forms of democracy, the Agenda states that it is not trying to redefine democracy or democratization, but is concerned to enhance coherence and effectiveness of democracy support within the framework of EU development policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy – implicitly recognizing member states’ crucial role given that CFSP issues usually require their unanimous support in the Council.
The Agenda takes a contextually-specific approach, stating that “the type and level of EU engagement as well as the best mix of instruments to be used will be determined by the context of each country”, including the nature of the partner country and its relations with donors and regional neighbors. The Agenda’s generalities help the EU to avoid specifying concrete measures which in turn helps secure member states’ approval since compliance with the policy is left to their own judgment.
It is important to recognize that placing democracy support alongside development cooperation is a critical step forward, underlining democracy’s particularity and accepting the need for a distinct approach. Additionally, it brings together Commission Directorate-Generals – the Commission’s major departments – that do not usually communicate or collaborate.
Any grand democratization strategy, however, risks running into the wall of EU consensus building, generating a lowest common denominator approach that does not compel member states to converge, or weakening the strategy’s purpose by only addressing the European institutional level.
Member states committed to promoting such a democracy strategy will be conscious of the limited chances for success. The EU’s top-down declarations of intent – so-called “invitations for action” – usually lack the pragmatism required to generate meaningful change.
Council conclusions are not legally binding, and even if they contribute “to the gradual shaping of EU external policy” in the long term, as the Joint Paper asserts, the Agenda’s statements are too general and uncontroversial to do so.
If the EU and its member states are serious about coherence (assuming a direct link between policy coherence and effectiveness), states need to roll up their sleeves and discuss concrete country- and regional-specific strategies. Grand strategies run the risk of getting caught in a debate on terminology – democracy support versus democracy building – without achieving their original goals. This is what happened to the latest ‘Agenda for Action.’
The much-stated commitment to partner countries’ ownership of the democracy agenda is only one part of the equation. It is certainly necessary for them to have a voice – although not every voice is welcome – and to express their present needs and demands. But coherence at donor level, at EU and member state levels, is equally urgent and not mentioned in the Agenda.
In addition, domestic interests all too often influence member states’ positions towards countries or regions, such as Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia. Member states’ interests and diplomatic considerations invariably trump EU policies.
Consequently, the EU needs to find alternatives for member states that find themselves having to choose between long-term democracy goals and short-term interests. A serious and thorough negotiation on member states’ positions on specific target countries would help the EU develop a stronger and more credible voice.
In short, the Council’s initiative to put democracy support on the table should be welcomed, despite the lack of concrete measures. But a coherent European strategy for democracy support is unlikely unless and until there is a genuine convergence of interests and transparency becomes the new lingua franca.
Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. This post is jointly published with the must-read, Brussels-based Global Europe blog.
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