The global democratic regression has stalled and some of the world’s most authoritarian regions have registered significant gains over the past year, but “the overall pace of democratic change remained stagnant” during 2012, according to a new survey.

The democracy score declined for 40 countries, increased in 54 and stayed the same in 73 of the 167 countries covered in The Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index for 2012.

Most regions saw a similar average democracy score for 2012 as in 2011, with the exception of the Middle East and North Africa where the average score grew by more than a point, from 3.62 to 3.73. Three MENA states – Egypt, Libya, and Morocco – changed status from authoritarian to hybrid regimes, while Libya registered the biggest increase of any country.  Yet the region remains one of the least democratic, with 12 of 20 countries still under authoritarian rule.

“Global backsliding in democracy had been evident for some time and strengthened in the wake of the 2008-09 global economic crisis,” the report notes. “Between 2006 and 2008 there was stagnation of democracy; between 2008 and 2010 there was regression across the world.” 

But while the regression has been arrested, democrats can boast few major gains.

“In 2012 global democracy was at a standstill in the sense that there was neither significant progress nor regression in levels of democracy worldwide,” said Laza Kekic, the report’s principal editor.

Eight countries experienced a change in regime type, says the EIU, with six registering an upgrade and two a regression. 

Hong Kong, Malawi and Senegal improved from hybrid regimes to flawed democracies; Libya, Morocco and Burundi moved from authoritarian to hybrid status; but Mali and Sri Lanka regressed from flawed democracies to hybrid regimes. 

“Although almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies …the number of ‘full democracies’ is low, at only 25 countries; 54 countries are rated as ‘flawed democracies’”, the report states. “Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 51 are authoritarian and 37 are considered to be ‘hybrid regimes’”.  

The EIU Democracy Index map 2012. Greener colours represent more democratic countries; clearly authoritarian in dark red.

Stagnation of democracy 

Key recent developments, according to the report, include:

• The unprecedented rise of movements for democratic change across the Arab world led many to expect a new wave of democratization. But it has become apparent that democracy in the region remains a highly uncertain prospect.
• 2012 was characterized by sovereign debt crises and weak political leadership in the developed world.
• Popular confidence in political institutions continues to decline in many European countries.
• The US and the UK remain at the bottom end of the full democracy category. US democracy has been adversely affected by a deepening of the polarization of the political scene and political brinkmanship and paralysis. The UK is beset by a deep institutional crisis.
• In Eastern Europe democracy declined in 10 countries in 2012. Had it not been for the significant improvement in the score for Georgia, the regional average score for Eastern Europe would have declined in 2012 compared with 2011.
• Rampant crime in some countries—in particular, violence and drug-trafficking—continues to have a negative impact on democracy in Latin America. 

The Index analyzes 165 independent countries and two territories to measure the status of democracy, using five criteria: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.

The most democratic countries are in Scandinavia, with Norway, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark in the top four places, and New Zealand joining them in the top five.

But the report highlights “significant erosion in democracy” in Western Europe: Greece, Portugal, Italy and France have dropped out of the category of full democracies, while 15 of 21 states experienced a decline in their overall score, in large part due to effects of the economic crisis.

“The main reason for the decline in democracy scores in 2011 in the region was the erosion in sovereignty and democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis,” says the report:

Most dramatically, in two countries (Greece and Italy) democratically elected politicians were replaced by technocrats at the head of governments. Policy in some countries is no longer being set by national legislatures and elected politicians, but is effectively set by official creditors, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF.         

Despite the overall stagnation, the report highlights grounds for optimism.

Even though the democratic prospects of the Arab awakening remain uncertain, the region’s revolts demonstrate the likely fate of “long-serving, geriatric leaders” in the face of “young and restless populations,” the report suggests. Similarly, in states like Zimbabwe and Cuba, authoritarian rule appears unsustainable.

“The longer ageing autocrats hang on to power, the more out-of-touch and corrupt their regimes tend to become,” the EIU notes, “and the more of an anachronism and an affront they become to their peoples.”

RTWT

“The most damning part of a new documentary about Beatrice Mtetwa, a lawyer who’s spent decades fighting human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, comes from the mouth of President Robert Mugabe’s former minister of information,” writes The Washington Post’s Melinda Henneberger:

“All countries are ruled by men and women,” Jonathan Moyo tells filmmaker Lorie Conway, “and the law becomes what they say it is.”

Mtetwa agrees, in a way: “Unlike a lot of other dictators, Robert Mugabe doesn’t just go out and do what he wants,” she says in the film, ‘Beatrice Mtetwa and the Rule of Law.’ “He first goes to parliament and passes a law and says it’s now legal to punch somebody in the nose.”

For the same three decades that Mugabe has been doing that with such impunity, Mtetwa has been trying to use the constitution to defend people such as peace activist Jestina Mukoko, who was detained and tortured for 89 days in ’08.

Featured on yesterday’s blog, Mtetwa intervened when security forces recently assaulted and arrested activists from Women of Zimbabwe Arise,* ransacked the offices of the Zimbabwe Peace Project, and charged the group’s director, Jestina Mukoko (right), with operating an illegal organization and smuggling radios into the country.

Mtetwa is a “mysterious and powerful a force for good,” writes The Post’s Henneberger:

….the oldest daughter of a man with six wives and more than 50 children, she managed to seize on the encouragement of one teacher who told her she had some potential, and never let go…..Mtetwa turned all the hardship in her own life into a gift to those who’ve needed defending.

“In my entire life, I had to deal with imposing, difficult males, starting with my father,” she says in the movie. “Despite him being physical when we didn’t agree, I never actually stopped challenging him.”

When I asked whether she feared not being allowed back in the country after her trip to Washington, she didn’t really say: “Legally, I haven’t done anything wrong, but who cares about the law?” The answer, of course, is that she does: “This has to be done,” she says of her work, in the last line of the movie. “Somebody’s got to do it, and why shouldn’t it be you?”

RTWT

*A grantee of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

The failure of Zimbabwe’s unity government to push through security sector reforms may prevent a smooth transition of power as the country prepares for elections later this year, according to a new report.

A genuine democratic transition is unlikely without implementation of the proposed reforms to depoliticize the security forces, currently dominated by elements loyal to President Robert Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party, as outlined in the Global Political Agreement, says the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, a Harare-based think-tank.

Speaking at the launch of the report – “Security sector factor in Zimbabwe’s political and electoral affairs” – ZDI director Pedzisai Ruhanya called on the Southern African Development Community and the African Union to fulfill their obligations as guarantors of the power-sharing deal to rein in security chiefs ahead of the elections.

Ruhanya urged the ‘securocrats’ to refuse to be used as political pawns by Zanu-PF and to refrain from partisan politics in accordance with an agreed code of conduct, VOA reports, although he conceded that this was unlikely since the military and police derive considerable economic benefits from Zanu-PF patronage.

ZDI was officially launched in Harare in March at a function presided over by Beatrice Mtetwa, Zimbabwe’s leading human rights lawyer and veteran democracy activist. The security forces’ defiance of a high court ruling ordering the release of Mtetwa last month highlights the need for democratic reform of state institutions, say observers.

“I think it shows that we are vindicated in setting out what needs to be done,” said Irene Petras, of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. “Political parties themselves need to look what is happening and see that these things need to be addressed because if we go into the election period with this kind of a police force, with these unreformed institutions, then we are likely to have problems in that election too.”

The failure of young democracies in so many regions of the world has had enormous consequences, writes Joshua Kurlantzick. Most obviously, the renewed strength of authoritarian rule means that billions of people continue to live under repressive or pseudo-democratic hybrid regimes, deprived of the freedoms most in the West take for granted. But external actors can regain the initiative, he argues in this extract from his new book*, by adopting new approaches to democracy assistance.

Outside actors can have the greatest impact on democratization at three critical points in the process. First, when countries are still under authoritarian rule, outside actors can play a significant role through rhetorical criticism, funding of prodemocracy dissident groups inside the country, or just publicly providing a different model of governance to authoritarianism, one that average citizens of an autocratic state can see. This role was played in the 1980s when the United States and Western Europe increased their rhetorical condemnation of Soviet bloc rulers, boosted their support for broadcasts into the Eastern bloc, provided exchange programs for intellectuals, and helped promote labor rights and other civil society.

Once a developing nation has begun to make a transition to democracy, outside actors have their second chance to make a significant impact. In the early years of the transition, when countries normally are more aid-dependent, political culture and institutions are still in flux, and the possibility of a regression to authoritarianism remains, major donors can play a dual role: they can continue using aid money and rhetoric to demand that the countries do not regress to authoritarian rule, while simultaneously offering critical expertise in areas like developing civil society, fighting corruption, and holding and monitoring elections. With democracies so nascent, this expertise is more likely to be needed and absorbed than later on when countries like Tunisia would develop their own cadres of experts, and when politicians, labor leaders, and journalists might be more resistant to training programs from foreign nations. 

Meanwhile, leading democracies can be using aid money and bully pulpits to try to ensure that elements from the previous authoritarian regimes do not return to power: Washington can warn the military in places like Thailand not to launch coups, link aid to benchmarks of democratization, and work with developing nations to create reasonable systems of accountability for former authoritarian leaders.  Of course, the United States, which is widely unpopular today in countries such as Egypt, needs to be cautious—if its pressure on developing nations to stick to a democratic transition becomes counterproductive, then it may be better to stay quiet, at least for a time.

Finally, as developing countries’ democracies become more stable and mature, donors can play a third role. By this point, as in Indonesia, the Philippines, or South Africa today, the process of democratization is unlikely to be reversed, and is less dependent on aid as a percentage of its national budget. At this point developed democracies can help solidify these nations’ democracies by recognizing progress and including them in international institutions like the G-20 and other groups, citing them as examples of democratic change, and working alongside local democracy promotion specialists from these countries on the ground, as equal partners by, for example, calling on democracies like Indonesia or South Africa to send experts—in elections, budgeting, media, or other topics—to developing countries at an earlier stage of democratic development.

Focus Spending on Best Prospects

Democracy assistance should focus more clearly on countries where efforts can make the largest impact with limited dollars. This is not an easy trade-off, and any decision to ignore potential democratic change somewhere will be open to criticism. But it is a necessary selectiveness in an era of diminished resources and significant existing global threats including terrorism and nuclear proliferation, both of which much be addressed as well, at significant cost.  The United States should be consistent in rhetorically upholding democracy and human rights, but focus democracy assistance on a certain spectrum of countries where democratic consolidation seems most feasible, assistance can make a greater difference, and aid can be packaged with multilateral assistance from other donors.

          Leading democracies can identify the nations ripest for democracy promotion assistance by examining them on a range of indicators, such as those used by Freedom House or the Economist Intelligence Unit, to rank countries that have begun transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. These indicators can be compiled and combined with historical data to analyze which nations have the best chances of consolidating democratic transitions. Countries that are above a certain level of income, that have only modest economic inequality, and that have some experience with inclusive government are most likely to complete a successful transition to democracy.

          By evaluating nations eligible for democracy assistance using these criteria, policy makers also will be better equipped to decide whether to prioritize democracy promotion when it potentially conflicts with U.S. strategic interests. These criteria for evaluating potential democratic success stories thus will help create a kind of sliding scale. On one end of the scale are countries such as North Korea where, judging from historical data and current criteria, the likelihood of successful democratization is very low. Given the unlikelihood of democratic change anytime soon, U.S. policy toward countries like these should revolve around critical strategic interests, hard-hearted though that may be. On the other end of the spectrum are nations, like Thailand, that fulfill many of the conditions that, historically, have proven essential to successful democratization. In these cases, it may make sense for Washington to prioritize democracy promotion, even when it conflicts with strategic interests.

          The balance of democracy promotion and strategic interests will prove the most difficult in the middle ground of countries on this sliding scale—a country like Egypt, which fulfills only some of the criteria that historically have suggested a successful transition to democracy, but where the ruling regime, not yet truly democratic, also has been historically a close partner on many high-priority strategic issues. Should the White House throw all the weight of its office behind democratic change in Egypt, given that a democratic transition is hardly assured, and the strategic issues are so weighty? It is beyond the scope of this book to provide answers to every such conundrum. But at least by having the kind of established, quantifiable criteria of democracy’s chance of success that we have examined here, American officials can make informed judgments on when to make decisions that could threaten the United States’ strategic interests.

Move Beyond ‘Big Men’

          U.S. administrations too often tend to associate reform with one supposedly groundbreaking leader in a developing nation. In rare cases, such a leader exists, someone like Nelson Mandela, who not only is truly dedicated to reform but also possesses such moral authority and total control of his political party and allies that he or she really can push a country through transition. More often, even a truly reform-minded “big man” like Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono requires many factors to go in his favor to push his country successfully toward democracy, and can be hindered by recalcitrant leaders from the old regime, endemic poverty, a restive army, or many other factors.  In worse cases, like Nigeria’s Olesegun Obasanjo or Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade, once in power “big man” leaders who initially look like reformers, perhaps because they spent years in opposition fighting authoritarian rulers, turn out to be as corrupt or autocratic as those they replaced.

          Administrations must avoid the temptation to personalize reform, and to confuse supporting change and institutions in a country like Nigeria or Indonesia with supporting one leader. At the least, this personalization can allow such a leader to kill quality foreign-funded programs, from civil society building to anticorruption initiatives, which might go against his or her interests.  This “big man” theory of democracy promotion also leads U.S. diplomats to ignore a wide range of opinion leaders in an emerging country. Failing to make contacts with many other potential democrats thus leaves the United States unprepared if the favored reformer loses an election.

Respect Poll Winners—If They Play Fair

          Leading democracies will have to make a habit of respecting the winners of elections, as long as they adhere to certain guidelines of a democratic society, such as not using victory to then legitimize authoritarian rule. If the winners of democratic elections show, in good faith, commitment to democratic norms and values, the United States and other leading democracies should not isolate or remove them. This commitment will probably mean dealing with political parties that win elections and contain noxious beliefs within their party platforms. But such problematic parties have gained power in many countries, without destroying those nations’ political systems; for example, in Austria the far-right Freedom Party gained a good deal of power in the mid- and late 2000s, while in India elements of the Bharitya Janata Party, which ran the government between 1998 and 2004, were implicated in anti-Muslim pogroms that left thousands dead. And over time, as has occurred in countries like Indonesia and India, extreme parties’ participation in the political system tends to moderate views as they seek to gain larger numbers of voters.

          However, if elections are clearly flawed, or simply preempted by a democratic reversal such as a coup, the United States needs to be willing to take a stronger stand. In 2006, for example, following the coup in Thailand, the United States did not cancel joint military exercises with the Thai military, a sign of de facto acceptance of the coup. Many Thai officers—and military in other parts of Southeast Asia—interpreted the U.S. reaction as a potential signal that the Washington does not condemn military takeovers.

Elections Are Only Step One

          Effectively promoting lasting democracy will require investing in far more than national elections, even ones held freely and fairly. Donors should consider pushing aid-recipient developing nations to adopt some of the decentralization strategies used by Indonesia over the past decade. By decentralizing political and economic power, Indonesia devolved control from the capital, involved more citizens in the political process, and reduced threats of separatism. By funding and helping monitor Indonesian-style village, local, city, and provincial elections as well as national elections, donors would be contributing to the inclusion of larger numbers of citizens in developing nations in the democratic process.

          Donors also should recalibrate funding so that larger percentages of assistance go less toward organizing and holding national elections, and more toward building institutions: constitutional courts, anticorruption commissions, an informed populace, a vibrant civil society, a reduced role for the army, and, possibly, a more fragmented political system. To shift funding toward these foundations of democracy, donors could modify budgeting from renewal annually to every two or three years, a change some Scandinavian nations already have made. Moving toward funding over a longer cycle would allow projects on the ground to develop closer relations among local partners, set long-term objectives, and have the time to truly assess whether projects are succeeding. 

          Donor nations should expand exchange programs for opinion leaders from emerging democracies, in part by relaxing visa restrictions religious leaders, civil society leaders, and politicians from developing nations. Diplomats and officials from donor nations could make greater efforts to link civil society in developing nations not only to officials but also to civil society organizations, serving as a kind of bridge.

Get Better at Judging

          Going beyond electoralism also would include conditioning a growing amount of foreign assistance on criteria similar to those of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Historical data show that this is the right approach—that the foundations for a more participatory and inclusive government make democracy’s success more likely. In a comprehensive study of developing nations, international political economists Hilton Root and Bruce Bueno Mesquita found that those that were the most inclusive—defined by government openness and citizens’ ability to organize and compete on a national level, among other criteria – are more likely to promote frequent government turnover, a sign of democratic consolidation.

Flexible Programming

          Of all the complaints about U.S. democracy promotion offered by aid recipients, the one that comes up most often is the rigidity of democracy assistance programs, which tend to be put into place, with little flexibility, in various countries. They are done in this one-size-fits-all way, notes the Carnegie Endowment ‘s Thomas Carothers, primarily because developing one consistent plan is easier when working with Beltway contractors, easier to present to appropriators who then get familiar with the structure of aid programs, and easier for people working in the field to learn.

          However, this type of plan usually does not work. For example, many plans that were based on projects developed in the late 1990s for supporting local and national governance, as well as civil society, in the Balkans were then brought, with few changes, to Afghanistan—even though Afghan society bore little resemblance to the areas where USAID and other agencies had worked in the Balkans.  Nevertheless, USAID and other aid organizations transplanted programs developed in places far more prepared for democratization directly to rural Afghanistan. 

          Democracy assistance programs must become more attuned to local conditions. Like companies thinking about entering a new market, USAID and its contractors should use a small amount of funding to conduct extensive surveys of countries in which they are planning to launch programs, asking questions about the labor and media environments, and the political culture, and meeting with other donors to avoid program duplication. Currently, donor group meetings are often are not held until after the major donors already have planned and launched projects.

Work with Multilateral Actors

          Stronger democracy promotion also should include boosting cooperation with multilateral efforts to promote civil society and to improve the quality of democracy, such as the United Nations Democracy Fund. Some 85 percent of UN Democracy Fund monies are allocated for nongovernmental organizations. The fund was launched in 2006 but remains underfunded and poorly utilized; it could be drastically expanded and, with greater American support, made into a powerful tool of aid to civil society in emerging democracies.

Other multilateral democracy organizations also tend to be poorly funded and relatively unknown, such as: the Bali Democracy Forum, a group that brings together primarily Asian democracies to discuss ways to foster democracy in the region; the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental group of democracies from all regions of the world that mostly serves to share information on how to improve the quality of democracy; and several others. Although the United States participates in many of these organizations, it tends to play a minimal role. But with only modest financial assistance (less than $5–$10 million annually) and perhaps higher-level U.S. participation, some of these organizations could play a larger regional role in promoting democracy.

Enlist Emerging Giants

          Many of the emerging democracies, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, have thus far been reluctant to engage in democracy promotion, or even to stand up for democracy and human rights at international forums like the United Nations. Besides their Cold War histories, which made them adherents of absolute sovereignty, many of these emerging giants still do not see the gains they would accrue by promoting democracy. But what have these emerging giants gotten from defense of sovereignty and support for autocratic regimes like Zimbabwe, Sudan, Libya, and Myanmar? American officials, and activists in the emerging giants themselves, must work harder to convince these new powers that, no matter how they defend sovereignty, China still always will have an advantage over them in making business deals and strategic alliances with autocratic nations.

          India, South Africa, Brazil, or other emerging democratic powers could establish themselves as models of democratic rule for other developing nations—and thus reap the strategic benefits of being seen as a model when other nations solidify their democracies.

          Turkey already is reaping this benefit of being seen as a democratic model, despite recent concerns that its government has jailed growing numbers of journalists who disagree with Ankara’s policies. As nations in the Arab-Muslim world throw off their tyrants, and then look for models of democratic consolidation that promote secular and liberal rule, the “Turkey model”—Turkey’s successful evolution from a shaky, army-dominated nation to a solid and vibrant democracy—frequently tops the list.

Show Humility

          Even while reviving aggressive advocacy for democracy and human rights, established democracies need to become more humble. Humility means accepting, and trying to remedy, the crisis of governance in established Western democracies, which has not only damaged support in Western nations for democracy but also has made it harder to promote democracy abroad. While the United States and other Western nations struggle with their own governance problems, leaders, and officials should not avoid talking about current troubles.

And, while talking about American exceptionalism on the presidential campaign trail may be a political imperative, admitting that even developed democracies face governance challenges—and can resolve these challenges through public discussion, nonviolent protest, political campaigns, and elections—should hardly degrade the “brand” of American democracy. These gestures demonstrate to foreign audiences that the United States recognizes that, while there are certain core democratic values and norms, there are different approaches to making democracy work.

* Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government.

The United Nations has signed an accord with the Democratic Republic of Congo aimed at combatting rape and sexual violence by armed militias in the strife-torn eastern region.

The accord, seen by AFP on Tuesday, was signed by DRC Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo and the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura (left).

The agreement “underlines the necessity of neutralizing armed groups and initiating an effective process of reform to the security sector” particularly in the eastern regions of North and South Kivu, and Oriental province.

“As an African woman from a post-conflict country – Sierra Leone – I recognize the many challenges the Congo is currently facing,” said Bangura, a former Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.

“Conflict-related sexual violence is among the most urgent of these, and one which requires the leadership, ownership, and responsibility of the Government of this country,” she said at a meeting in the capital, Kinshasa, with British Foreign Secretary William Hague and representatives of civil society to address the problem of impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence.

Bangura was one of four African democracy activists from Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe to receive the NED’s 2006 Democracy Award.

“Africa has been witness to more protracted conflicts than any region of the world,” said NED’s then-chairman Vin Weber. “The individuals NED honors this year have demonstrated enormous personal courage and optimism, facing down brutal regimes and working in some of the most harrowing circumstances imaginable. If democracy continues to advance in Africa, it will be due to the dedication of activists like these.”

Prof Njabulo Ndebele, the late Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Dr Alex Boraine at Idasa’s 20th birthday celebrations in Johannesburg, September 2007. Credit: BDLive

The Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) will close after 27 years due to lack of financial assistance, it announced today. Formed in 1987 during the apartheid era as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa, it shifted focus after the seminal 1994 elections to supporting democratic development and changed its name to the Institute for Democracy in Africa.

“We have been privileged to play our part in many of the critical political events of the past two decades, to contribute to the increasing peace and prosperity of many countries in Africa, and to the deepening of democracy in South Africa and elsewhere,” said executive director Paul Graham.  

Formed during the anti-apartheid struggle, the group’s strength was its adaptability,” said a prominent analyst.  

“Its history and development have been closely tied to the evolution of democracy in South Africa – it has worked under the apartheid regime, states of emergency, a transitional government and democratically elected parliaments,”  said Mail and Guardian journalist Moira Levy.  

“But while it has changed focus and reshaped its strategy many times over the years, it has always seen itself as a critical ally of democracy,” she notes. “Idasa has engaged in projects and activities covering the widest spectrum of democratic transition and consolidation, not only within the borders of South Africa but also in a growing number of other African nations.” 

Thus ends a significant chapter in the history of Africa’s democratic movement, says Dave Peterson, Senior Director of the National Endowment for Democracy’s Africa Program:

NED was present at almost the very creation of IDASA, remaining a close friend throughout the institute’s existence, and also nourishing its Goree Institute.   

The late Frederick van Zyl Slabbert and Alex Borraine (above) galvanized the anti-apartheid movement when they left parliament, held talks with the exiled opposition African National Congress in Senegal, and launched IDASA in 1986. The group grew to become one of South Africa’s most influential NGOs, serving as an interlocutor between conservatives and radicals, Afrikaaners and blacks, elites and the grassroots, and between South Africa and the international community.  

IDASA promoted democracy unabashedly, and explored the many complex policy alternatives confronting South Africa, while adhering firmly to principles of human rights and justice.  The group had a major impact on the constitutional negotiations and the truth and reconciliation process, as well as the struggles of civil society.   

I will long retain memories of the political electricity at certain IDASA forums; the adventures in conflict mediation conducted  by the Durban office, which NED supported for many years; shaking hands with Nelson Mandela at an IDASA workshop; and the spirit of excitement, talent, commitment and energy to shape the future that drove the IDASA staff.  Eventually IDASA’s efforts expanded throughout Africa (including Zimbabwe). 

I have no doubt that the organization changed the course of history in both South Africa and the continent for the better. 

“Zimbabwe’s new constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority in Saturday’s referendum, according to the country’s electoral commission,” the BBC reports:

The document, which will limit future presidents to two five-year terms, was backed by more than three million votes – nearly 95% of those who voted. It was supported by the countries’ two main political parties who have been in a power-sharing government since 2009. The constitution’s approval paves the way for elections later in the year.

The weekend’s vote was free and fair, according to international observers.

“Based on its overall findings, the mission is of the view that there existed a substantially conducive and peaceful environment in which the referendum was conducted,” said Prince Gudiza Dlamini, the head of a Southern African Development Community observation mission. “The Zimbabweans were accorded the opportunity to freely express their will in voting for a referendum outcome of their choice.”

But human rights groups fear a crackdown on civil society groups is a disturbing indicator that the forthcoming election campaign is likely to be violent.

“The government needs to stop this police abuse of power and hold those responsible to account,” Human Rights Watch’s Tiseke Kasambala said in a statement.

“Zimbabwe’s authorities cannot expect to create a rights-respecting environment ahead of elections in the context of repression, harassment, and intimidation of civil society activists.”

Zimbabwean security forces’ defiance of a high court ruling ordering the release of a celebrated human rights lawyer, Beatrice Mtetwa, highlights the need for democratic reform of state institutions.

“I think it shows that we are vindicated in setting out what needs to be done,” said Irene Petras, of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. “Political parties themselves need to look what is happening and see that these things need to be addressed because if we go into the election period with this kind of a police force, with these unreformed institutions, then we are likely to have problems in that election too.”

 “They have defied that court order, and did not implement what they were told to do,” said Kumbirai Mafunda, spokesman for the group.

“Human rights lawyers will not be intimidated, will not bow,” said Precious Chakasikwa, vice chairwoman of the organization. “For every Beatrice Mtetwa that these state agents and institutions put behind bars and attempt to embarrass, humiliate and punish without lawful cause, there are 10 other human rights lawyers waiting to take up the mantle.”

Ms. Mtetwa was arrested at the home of Thabani Mpofu, a top adviser to Morgan Tsvangirai, Zimbabwe’s prime minister and the leader of the M.D.C., whose house was raided by plainclothes police officers on Sunday morning, witnesses said. The arrests follow months of harsh crackdowns on opposition politicians and civic groups in Zimbabwe ahead of a presidential election that is expected to be held this year. …

Ms. Mtetwa’s arrest on Sunday particularly troubled activists. Though she has been at the forefront in defending human rights groups, some activists said, she has always acted as a lawyer defending her clients, not as an activist herself.

“There is a very clear, broad campaign going on,” said Frances Lovemore of the Counseling Services Unit, an organization that provides medical and mental health services to victims of political violence.

“This whole attack on the civil society is part of their campaign to delegitimize all the organizations providing any information to people about human rights abuses,” she said.

Security forces last month beat and arrested activists from Women of Zimbabwe Arise, and ransacked the offices of the Zimbabwe Peace Project, and charged the group’s director, Jestina Mukoko (right), with operating an illegal organization and smuggling radios into the country.

The crackdown signals maneuvering within ZANU-PF to succeed Robert Mugabe, analysts suggest.

“He doesn’t have as much control over the party as five years ago,” said Trevor Maisiri, an analyst for Southern Africa at International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank. “Warlords within his party and the youth are driving the violence—it’s not coming from one center.”

After years of misrule and unrest, Zimbabwe is at a critical juncture. The stakes are high in the presidential election. Mr. Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980 and is now 89, failed to win outright in 2008, and many here worry that he will use the country’s police and security forces to keep opposition supporters away from the polls to avoid defeat.

“Already the telltale signs are there,” said Douglas Mwonzora, the senior M.D.C. official on the constitution-drafting commission. “Unless the international community takes full responsibility and discharges its full duty to ensure the regime of Mugabe is brought into check, we will see a repeat of 2008.”

The security factions within ZANU-PF will never allow opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to win an election, say observers.

“It is civil society suffering now, but after the referendum the same state machinery will be turned on Tsvangirai,” said Munyaradzi Gwisai, a law lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.

As Lydia Polgreen writes in the New York Times:

In the new Constitution, the president’s power to rule by decree is curtailed, and the document bolsters the bill of rights by banning cruel punishments and torture. But critics say the draft retains many of the president’s powers and does not do enough to increase oversight.

“This will create one monster who will determine the future of this country,” said Job Sikhala, leader of a breakaway faction of the Movement for Democratic Change known as M.D.C.-99, who urged people to vote against the new Constitution. “Is that what we fought for?”

Lovemore Madhuku, a leader of the National Constitutional Assembly, a civic group that urged people to vote against the Constitution, said the document represented a compromise between political enemies, not an expression of how Zimbabwe’s people wish to be governed.

“A democratic constitution must come from a democratic process that must be dominated by the wishes of the people,” Mr. Madhuku said. “Almost every Zimbabwean accepts that the process was not a good process.”

Several of the NGOs cited above are grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

Credit: National Democratic Institute

Cuba and its allies tried to block a UN speech today by the daughter of leading dissident Oswaldo Paya (right).  With the support of China, Russia, Belarus, Pakistan and Nicaragua, Cuban officials demanded that Rosa Maria Paya (below, left) should not be allowed to address the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where she presented a petition (extract below), calling for a UN inquiry into her father’s suspicious death. But “following a strong intervention in her defense by the US delegate, Paya was allowed to continue,” according to reports.

“They say that my father died in a car accident, but we have confirmed … that they were actually crashed into and run off the road by another vehicle,” she told reporters in Geneva:

Cuban authorities said that my father and Harold Cepero, a youth activist, died in a traffic accident. But after interviewing the survivors, we confirmed that their deaths were not accidental.  

[Interruption by Cuba on point of order: “The speaker is a mercenary… she’s not speaking about an urgent situation...” The objection is echoed by points of order exercised by China, Russia, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Belarus. USA takes the floor to defend the rights of all NGOs to speak. Council president gives her back the floor.] 

Thank you, Mr. President. The driver of the car told the Washington Post that they were intentionally rammed from behind. The text messages from the survivors on the day of the event confirm this.

The Cuban government’s state security calls my family home in Havana to say: We’re going to kill you. They are the same death threats that were made to my father. The physical integrity of all members of my family is the responsibility of the Cuban government.

“Mounting and credible allegations that the Cuban government may have been complicit in the murder of its most prominent critic … cannot go ignored by the international community,” read the petition, signed by 46 politicians, parliamentarians and human rights activists from around the world.

The appeal, signed by former presidents of Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay, and 43 other public figures, including foreign ministers, parliamentarians and human rights activists, was organized by UN Watch, a Geneva-based rights group.

“Rosa Maria Paya is a very brave woman who clearly inherited a lot from her father,” said Hillel Neuer, the group’s executive director. “This is the first time we’ve brought a Cuban dissident to speak at the UN who’s not in exile, but who rather has to go back to Havana and assume all the risks that come with taking on a police state in which one still lives. I hope she’ll be safe.”

“The fact that a parade of serial rights abusers rallied behind Cuba to silence a human rights hero only underscored the true nature of Havana’s repressive regime,” added Neuer.

Appeal for International Inquiry into the Death of Oswaldo Paya12 March 2013

An open letter to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, and Ambassadors of all Member States

Excellencies,

We urge you to support our demand for an international and independent investigation into the alleged murder of Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá, a world-renowned figure and recipient of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize, who died in a car crash in Bayamo, Cuba, on July 22, 2012, together with fellow activist Harold Cepero.

In dramatic new testimony by the driver of the car, Ángel Carromero describes, in a Washington Post interview dated 6 March 2013, how their vehicle was followed, harassed and ultimately rammed from behind by a car bearing government license plates. Mr. Carromero further alleges that, following the crash, he was drugged, mistreated and coerced by Cuban authorities into making a false confession.

The new revelations corroborate the claims made by the families of the victims and other witnesses, as well as the report by Spain’s ABC news agency about text messages sent contemporaneous with the incident from the mobile phones of Mr. Carromero and another passenger, Aron Modig, indicating that their car was chased and then hit, causing the crash.

Significantly, according to the family of Oswaldo Payá, state security agents had repeatedly threatened to kill him.

Mounting and credible allegations that the Cuban government may have been complicit in the murder of its most prominent critic, a leading figure in the human rights world, cannot go ignored by the international community.

The families of the victims, and the people of Cuba, have a right to know the truth, and they have a right to justice. This can only happen with the creation of an international and independent inquiry. We therefore respectfully urge you to support our call.

Sincerely,

Armando Calderon Sol, former President of El Salvador

Luis Alberto Lacalle, former President of Uruguay

Alejandro Toledo, former President of Peru

Edward McMillan-Scott, Vice-President of European Parliament

Markus Meckel, , former Foreign Minister of Germany

Zbigniew Romaszewski, former Speaker of Polish Senate, a founder of the Solidarity movement

Stanislav Shushkevich, former president of Supreme Soviet of Belarus, a current opposition leader in Belarus

Arnold Vaatz MP, Deputy Leader CDU, Germany

Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson, former Foreign Minister of Iceland

Mantas Adomênas MP, Lithuania

Laura Alonso MP, Argentina

Mbarka Bouaida, former MP, Morocco

Philip Claeys MEP

Michael Danby MP, Australia

Mátyás Eörsi, Secretary-General of Parliamentary Forum for Democracy, former MP, Hungary

David Kilgour, former MP, Canada

Adam Lipinski MP, former State Secretary of Poland

Martin Palouš, former Ambassador, Czech Republic

Marija Aušrin? Pavilioniene MP, Lithuania

Marco Perduca, Italian Senator, co-vicepresident of Nonviolent Radical Party

Janelle Saffin MP, Australia

Egidijus Vareikis MP, Lithuania

Renate Wohlwend MP, Lichtenstein

Emanuelis Zingeris MP, Lithuania, President of Parliamentary Forum for Democracy

Hillel Neuer, Executive Director, United Nations Watch

John Suarez, International Secretary, Cuban Democratic Directorate

Carl Gershman, President, National Endowment for Democracy

Ken Wollack, President, National Democratic Institute

Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Yang Jianli, President, Initiatives for China

Carlos E. Ponce, General Coordinator, Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy

Faisal Fulad, Secretary General, Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society

Art Kaufman, Senior Director, World Movement for Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy

Alessandro Pettenuzzo, European Union of Public Relations

Lehlohonolo Chefa, Executive Director, Policy Analysis and Research Institute of Lesotho

Anki Flores, Former Secretary-General of the Antiracism Information Service, Geneva

Shauna Leven, Director, René Cassin organization

Bhawani Shanker Kusum, Executive Director, Gram Bharati Samiti, India

Duy Hoang, Spokesperson, Viet Tan

Dickson Ntwiga, Executive Director, Solidarity House International Foundation

Nazanin Afshin-Jam, President, Stop Child Executions

Atamao B T Kane, President, Southpanafrican International

Okay Machisa, Zimbabwe Human Rights Association

Obinna Egbuka, President, Youth Enhancement Organization

International Multiracial Shared Cultural Organization

Zofia Romaszewska, one of the founders of Solidarity movement, Poland

“There’s an addictive thing about freedom,” says Jenni Williams (far left) of Women and Men of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA):

When we organize our protests and we defy all the unjust laws that are in place and we are in the street holding our placards and marching, we feel like complete, whole citizens and that freedom that we make and demand is so contagious and that makes us feel whole. It makes us feel relevant. Our children see us marching and they realize that freedom is what you demand, what you make of it.

She appeared with her WOZA colleague Magodonga Mahlangu (above, right) on today’s National Public Radio’s Tell Me More program.

“What keeps me going and what keeps us all as women going is that, for once in our lives in the history of Zimbabwe, we managed to create a platform where we  speak with one voice, looking at the needs of a woman, an ordinary person, without looking at which political party we come from,” said Mahlangu. “It’s in our hands. We feel that we’ve empowered ourselves to speak with one voice as women of the nation.”

NGOs face a hostile climate in Zimbabwe today, they told the UN’s Kimberley Curtis:

Robert Mugabe’s ZANU PF party conference ended with a resolution to “enforce deregistration of errant NGOs deviating from their mandate.” The result has been a growing crackdown on civil society organizations, particularly those involved in human rights. Last week police arrested the director of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Okay Machisa on charges of fraud and forgery.

“Four years after violent elections in 2008 led to a power sharing government, Zimbabwe is finally preparing for a referendum on a draft constitution and national elections should be held by the end of the year,” writes Curtis:

This could mark a turning point for Zimbabwe. Unfortunately there are indications – growing political violence, ongoing corruption, lack of substantive reforms – that it could instead serve as a repeat of 2008. In such a polarized political climate, the role of civil society becomes critical.

WOZA and Zimrights are grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

Hat tip: Jeffrey T. Smith, Africa Advocacy Officer for the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights.  

Newly emerging popular movements for reform were the driving force behind the Middle East’s major gains in democratic rights last year, according to Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House’s annual report. But other regions experienced setbacks due to growing authoritarian resilience and resourcefulness.

“Our findings point to the growing sophistication of modern authoritarians,” said Arch Puddington, Freedom House vice president for research. “They are flexible; they distort and abuse the legal framework; they are adept at the techniques of modern propaganda.”

“But especially since the Arab Spring, they are nervous, which accounts for their intensified persecution of popular movements for change,” he said.

The dramatic increase in freedom in Libya was the most surprising finding of the survey, he told a meeting at the National Endowment for Democracy.

Authoritarian regimes moved to weaken “the elements of democratic governance that pose the most serious threats to repressive and corrupt rule: independent civil society groups, a free press, and the rule of law,” the report said.

While authoritarians have gone on the offensive, the report notes, the United States and other democracies have yet to demonstrate comparable assertiveness and leadership in defending or advancing democracy.

“Leaders of democratic countries should confer directly with leading regime critics and activists and speak out on behalf of the targets of persecution,” according to Puddington and Freedom House president David J. Kramer. “But by far the most important point is for world leaders, Obama in particular, to declare their determination to support people who aspire to democracy — anywhere.”

The U.S. administration has an “uneven” record on democratic solidarity, they write for Foreign Policy:

A program of support for civic movements would be one aspect of a comprehensive effort by the major democracies to reassert global leadership. But even by itself, support for civil society would have the practical benefit of directing attention

to those who are committed to making freedom a reality in the world’s dark corners. And it would send a critical message to the agents of repression that, no matter what our various domestic woes, the spread of freedom is still very much on the agenda. 

The findings for Freedom in the World 2013 reflect a complex picture for the state of global freedom, according to Puddington and Jennifer Dunham, research analyst for Freedom in the World:

On one hand, the number of countries ranked in the Free category increased to 90, an impressive share of the world’s 195 sovereign states. At the same time, more countries, 27, suffered significant setbacks in their freedom indicators than showed notable gains, 16, marking the seventh consecutive year in which declines outnumbered improvements.

Ordinarily, Freedom in the World scores for individual countries move up or down in small increments. For example, over the past decade, Russia has declined from Partly Free status to a well-earned slot in the Not Free category. But its fall was not sudden or precipitous. The bottom-level scores for Freedom in the World range from 0 to 100, and in most years Russia suffered declines of between 1 and 4 points. Only the cumulative impact of those annual declines has made Russia one of the lowest-scoring countries among the world’s major powers. In any particular year, a country that registers a gain or decline of between 3 and 5 points can be said to have undergone a fairly large change.

Yet for the year 2012, several countries registered across-the-board gains or declines that break the pattern of incremental changes. Mali’s decline of 48 points is possibly the most severe one-year drop in the history of the report. Reductions for Guinea-Bissau and the Maldives were also sizeable. On the other side of the ledger, Libya’s gain of 26 points ranks among the most substantial one-year improvements in the report’s history.

The following table shows several of the important declines and gains for political rights and civil liberties over the past year.

While the number of countries ranked as Free for 2012 was 90, a gain of 3 over the previous year, 27 countries showed significant declines, compared with 16 that showed notable gains. This is the seventh consecutive year that Freedom in the World has shown more declines than gains worldwide. Furthermore, the report data reflected a stepped-up campaign of persecution by dictators that specifically targeted civil society organizations and independent media.

Among the most striking gains for freedom was that of Libya, which advanced from Not Free to Partly Free and registered one of the most substantial one-year numerical improvements in the report’s nearly 40-year history. Burma and a number of African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Lesotho, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, also saw major advances.

Noteworthy declines were recorded for Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

The Middle East showed ambiguous results for the year. In addition to major gains for Libya, and Tunisia’s retention of sharp improvements from 2011, Egypt experienced relatively modest progress. The country held a flawed but competitive presidential election and direct military rule came to an end, yet the elected parliament was dissolved and President Morsi pushed through a new constitution under deeply problematic circumstances.

Moreover, the gains for the Arab Spring countries triggered a reaction, sometimes violent, by authoritarian leaders elsewhere in the Middle East, with resulting setbacks for freedom in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates.

The report’s findings were especially grim for Eurasian countries. Russia took a decided turn for the worse after Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. Having already marginalized the formal political opposition, he enacted a series of laws meant to squelch a burgeoning societal opposition. The measures imposed severe new penalties on unauthorized demonstrations, restricted the ability of civic groups to raise funds and conduct their work, and placed new controls on the internet.

Key global findings: The number of electoral democracies stood at 117, the same as for 2011. Two countries, Georgia and Libya, achieved electoral democracy status, while two were dropped from the category, Mali and the Maldives.

Four countries moved from Partly Free to Free: Lesotho, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Tonga. Three countries rose from Not Free to Partly Free: Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, and Libya. Mali fell two tiers, from Free to Not Free, and Guinea-Bissau dropped from Partly Free to Not Free.

Some notable trends highlighted in the report include increased Muslim-on-Muslim violence, which reaching horrifying levels in Pakistan and remained a serious problem in Iraq and elsewhere; a serious decline in civil liberties in Turkey; and among the Persian Gulf states, a steady and disturbing decline in democratic institutions and an increase in repressive policies.

Worst of the Worst: Of the 47 countries designated as Not Free, nine have been given the survey’s lowest possible rating of 7 for both political rights and civil liberties: Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Two territories, Tibet and Western Sahara, were also ranked among the worst of the worst.

An additional 5 countries and 1 territory received scores that were slightly above those of the worst-ranked countries, with ratings of 6, 7 or 7, 6 for political rights and civil liberties: Belarus, Chad, China, Cuba, Laos, and South Ossetia.

To view the complete findings, click here.