Sticks and Stones: ‘widening net’ of Russia’s NGO crackdown hits ecological, welfare groups

NYTimes

Russia’s Justice Ministry says the number of nongovernmental groups required to register as “foreign agents” could ultimately reach about 100, the CSM’s Fred Weir reports from Moscow:

The law, which Russian defenders insist is modeled on the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), requires groups that receive any amount of foreign funding and engage in any activities that authorities deem “political” to don that self-incriminating “foreign agent” badge and wear it prominently in all public materials and activities or face steep fines and, after three warnings, forced closure. But unlike FARA, whose regular reports to Congress almost exclusively contain the names of public relations firms, state corporations, paid lobbyists for foreign governments and actual non-diplomatic offices of foreign governments in the US, Russian authorities have cast their net over a wide variety of active civil society groups whose US analogues are almost completely absent from the FARA register.

“And that net appears to be widening,” says Weir, noting that the first NGOs to be targeted were explicitly political, including the independent election monitor Golos, Russia’s largest human rights group Memorial, and the association of Soldiers’ Mothers.

But some of the names now appearing on prosecutors’ lists “suggest that authorities are expanding their target lists and aiming in new directions,” including the “Aid to Children with Cystic Fibrosis” NGO in Istra, near Moscow and the Amur Ecological Foundation in Russia’s far east, he writes:

Another group headed to court is the Goldman-prize winning Baikal Environmental Wave, whose leader, Marina Rikhvanova, once persuaded Russian President Vladimir Putin to re-route a controversial oil pipeline away from the pristine ecological zone of Siberia’s Lake Baikal.

Reached by telephone in Irkutsk Monday, Ms. Rikhvanova said the group has just received official notice from the local prosecutor’s office that it must register as a “foreign agent” or face initial fines of 500,000 roubles (about $15,000) for the organization and 100,000 roubles (just over $3,000) for its leader.

“We’re not going to accept this label by registering,” says Rikhvanova. “We will protest, we will go to court. This is ridiculous. They searched us in the past, and found no foreign agents here. I assume prosecutors must have got fresh instructions to find some foreign agents, somehow, somewhere.”

The NGO “foreign agents” law – like the Kremlin’s reaction to the 2009 prison killing of Sergei Magnitsky and subsequent Magnitsky Act, and the closure of the Russian USAID program – is “aimed directly at insulting the United States and international public opinion,”  says analyst Vladimir Shlapentokh, adding that Russian officials are “even more indifferent to international opinion than their Soviet-era predecessors.”

“Throughout the 19th century and the 74 years of the USSR, Russian leaders displayed varying degrees of sensitivity to international public opinion, often suggesting that their officials avoid any behavior that might bring down on them the ire of the West,” he writes for Transitions Online. “Under President Putin, however, Kremlin attitudes to international public opinion have changed radically. He has put a stop to attempts to gain the support of Western public opinion, rejecting any public criticism of his regime and sanctioning any act that will support it.”

Robert Amsterdam reports:

Putin’s move to call snap elections in Moscow for the mayoral post is ‘a lesson in how he sustains an authoritarian system with the veneer of democracy’, according to the Wall Street Journal. …..  Opposition figure and anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny is to be nominated by the RPR-PARNAS party to run in the electionsThis piece looks at the Bolotnaya Square case against twelve protesters, presenting it as a means of intimidating others from protesting.  The New York Times has compiled videos of the actions of five protesters (above) that led to their arrests.  A Levada Center poll indicates that 41% of Russians consider Putin an ideal or ‘close to ideal’ leader.  

The current attack on the Levada Center as a supposed “foreign agent” NGO is intended as “a clear message to all sociologists and pollsters that Russia’s boss will not countenance any data that might cast doubt on the legitimacy of his leadership,” argues Shlapentokh,  a professor of sociology at Michigan State University who works on Soviet and Russian society and politics:

Indeed, the lack of free and fair elections or a strong ideology makes Putin’s ratings one of the few props available to the regime. The Kremlin has virtually said it will not allow a recurrence of the situation in May 2012, when social survey companies loyal to the government reported approximately 64 percent support for Putin among Muscovites, whereas the Levada Center figure was 20 percent.

Shlapentokh’s article originally appeared on OpenDemocracy.net.

 

 

Russia’s crackdown: EU’s principled pressure beats US pragmatism?

 

RFE/RL

Russian police today detained critics of President Vladimir Putin protesting against restrictions on freedom of assembly, Reuters reports:

Police seized opposition figure Eduard Limonov and several supporters who attempted to demonstrate on a central Moscow square without official permission to gather there. Some of the activists were hauled away minutes after they unfurled a black banner reading “Freedom of Assembly – Always and Everywhere!” and roughly shoved into police buses.

The arrests came a day after fifteen prominent economists issued an open letter warning the Kremlin that the “foreign agents” law targeting foreign-funded NGOs could undermine Russia’s economy.

“There has already been a period in our history when economic science and economic analysis was fully controlled by the state,” they wrote. “It is well known how it turned out for the Soviet economy.”

The recent “turn towards repression may not be a sign of Mr Putin’s strength, but rather of his fear and desperation,” the Economist suggests:

Some advisers say he is worried about instability and is doing as much as he can to eliminate anything or anyone that contributes to it. …What he does not see is that the biggest destabilizing factor of all was his own return to the Kremlin. In trying to hold the situation still, he destabilizes it further, forcing further repression.

Lacking a coherent ideology, the Kremlin is justifying itself by ratcheting up its confrontation with the West and its search for enemies within. It has partly succeeded: the number who believe that Russia has outside enemies has gone from 13% in 1989 to more than 70%, according to Levada. Nationalism, xenophobia and intolerance, once part of the political fringe, have become mainstream.

The highly-regarded Levada Center is the latest victim of the NGO law, after prosecutors informed the polling firm that it was a “political organization” because it “aimed at shaping public opinion on government policy” by publicizing its poll results.

“Every assault on civil society is a tragedy for Russia,” writes Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute:

Nongovernmental organizations are, first and foremost, schools of democracy, teaching personal responsibility, self-organization, peaceful dissent and compromise. Left in their rubble are stagnation, hatred and radicalism. Yet even among the myriad instances of this state-directed civil catastrophe in the making, the (likely fatal) assault on the Levada Center stands out.

“For a regime that seems determined to deny the country desperately needed institutional reforms because they involve democratization, the letter was a logical move. All manner of findings routinely reported by the Levada Center in the past few months have flat-out contradicted the official propaganda narrative,” writes Aron, the author of Roads to the Temple: Truth, Memory, Ideas and Ideals in the Making of the Russian Revolution, 1987-1991:

One in five Russians, the center found, were considering emigration, with the rate skyrocketing to 44 percent among 18- to 24-year-olds and 36 percent among those 25 to 39. A majority of Russians (57?percent) said that that the Magnitsky Act … was aimed at those who “misuse power and violate human rights,” or at the “meretricious and corrupt Russian bureaucracy,” or at the country’s leadership that covers up the misdeeds of “swindlers and embezzlers.” …. The final straw for the Kremlin may have been polling data on Putin’s approval rating: It was at the lowest level in 12 years, Levada reported in January. Less than two weeks ago, the center found that if the presidential election were held this month, only 29 percent were ready to vote for Putin.

“In the past the Kremlin has shown little tolerance for political challengers,” The Economist notes:

But as Kirill Rogov, an opposition observer, notes, it largely limited its control to politics, manipulating elections and marginalizing the opposition. …. But faced with mass protests by civil activists and ordinary citizens, not politicians, the Kremlin is trying to extend its control to other areas, including the internet and even entertainment magazines which carry protest banners.

“The Kremlin is trying to destroy the infrastructure of the protest movement,” says Mr Rogov.

The widening crackdown on dissent has left his opponents asking: “Who’s next?” Reuters reports:

Liberal economist Sergei Guriev’s flight from Russia under pressure from state investigators has deepened the sense of alarm as the Kremlin broadens a drive to stifle dissent and quell protests that began in December 2011. Curbs on demonstrations, criminal cases against protest leaders and tough new funding rules for non-governmental organizations smack of the repression that accompanied stagnation under Soviet ruler Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s, say critics.

Opponents say Putin is using strong-arm tactics to rebuild his authority, dented by the mass street protests, and note he has also sidelined aides who have fallen out of favor, including his political strategist Vladislav Surkov.

“Anyone dreaming of fighting (Putin) will be subject to the most severe measures,” said Sergei Aleksashenko, a former deputy finance minister.

Resistance by Russia’s elite would be crushed by a return of the communist-era choice – emigration or repression – he said, adding: “Everything will be built on his fears, manias and visions.”

Regime change?

The era of “managed democracy” is over, and Putin’s third presidency is fragile, beset by economic problems and relying more upon coercion than co-option, says a new report.

“The third Putin presidency faces falling popularity and widespread dissatisfaction manifesting itself in a broad but fragmented opposition to the Kremlin, and without the safety blanket of strong oil prices,” says Kadri Liik, author of Regime change in Russia, a publication from the European Council for Foreign Relations:

The most effective EU policies towards Russia will require more homework on energy security and anti-corruption initiatives. This would make EU members less vulnerable to Moscow divide-and-rule tactics.

The EU should not bargain domestic carte blanche on issues like human rights and democracy in exchange for cooperation on the Kremlin contributing to a realistic settlement over Syria and Iran.

Putin is ready to exploit European indecision and weakness on issues like granting visa-free travel. Europe must be strong, by combining resources to ensure representation at political court cases such as the trial of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

Europe is already taking a more principled, outspoken stance than the Obama administration’s pragmatic approach, and there are three reasons why it is right to do, says The Economist:

First, holding back criticism may not in fact make Mr Putin any more helpful. It is true that the Kremlin can lash out in retaliation in specific cases or against particular countries. But more broadly Russia, like the West, pursues what it sees as its own interests. So it will co-operate on international terrorism….But it will not over Syria…. Indeed, Mr Putin’s rule at home has become increasingly bound up with his confrontational attitude towards the West in Syria and elsewhere (see article).

The second reason is that criticism can count for more than sceptics believe. Mr Putin and his cronies are not suddenly going to embrace liberal democracy. But they are conscious of their image (and assets) abroad and they like to be judged by Western standards. Mr Putin values his country’s international standing. Russia will chair the G8 next year and he plans a summit in Sochi. He badly wants the Sochi winter Olympics to be a success. He may not change in response to foreign critics but he is not impervious to them. ….

How the West can win

The third and most important reason is that the West should defend its democratic values in order to lend support to the opposition to Mr Putin. Opponents of autocratic governments everywhere are disheartened if they see the West pulling its punches or even embracing dictatorships. … One day change will come to Russia—as it will to Syria. When that happens, among the losers will be those who appeased or backed the dictators.

A post-authoritarian Russia also appears to be on the mind of the ruling elite which is “angling to make itself viable in a future when Putin is no longer the undisputed master of the Kremlin,” writes RFE-RL’s Brian Whitmore. “We see a lot of these survivalist tactics,” New York University professor and longtime Kremlin-watcher Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian security services, said on last week’s Power Vertical Podcast.

“Nobody is ruling Putin out now. But the sense is that he is no longer salvageable. The gamble that was the castling has failed…. What is the point of expending political capital to get on within the Putin system, if in fact the Putin system might not last long and when he himself doesn’t seem to have any great vigor or vision?”

But any post-Putin transition is unlikely to be pain-free, observers suggest.

“The negative image of pro-Western reformers in the 1990s makes a pro-Western program of change all but impossible to sell,” says The Economist:

The absence of an alternative may give Mr Putin comfort, but as Russia’s history suggests, it is also a sign of political fragility. It was the presence of Boris Yeltsin in the political landscape that ensured a relatively peaceful transition of power after the Soviet collapse. The lack of such a figure now raises the risk of the unexpected.

“Contradictions and injustices within the society are growing and instead of trying to resolve them peacefully, the Kremlin uses force, which makes a peaceful transition of power unlikely,” says one businessman.

Putin ‘shows who’s boss’? Russian media delight in U.S. spy case reflects hard-line shift

Photo: RFERL

State-controlled media reveled in embarrassing the U.S. over an alleged attempt to recruit a Russian intelligence agent, highlighting the summoning of U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul (right) to the Russian Foreign Ministry to receive a formal protest.

“In the Russian elite there are influential groups who oppose America and waste no opportunity to spite the United States,” said political analyst Pavel Salin.

While both sides insist that the episode will not affect overall strategic interests, including the conflict in Syria, relations with Washington are “secondary to Vladimir Putin’s overriding goal of tightening his grip on power sufficiently to serve out his term until 2018 and then possibly seek a new six-year term,” Reuters’ Timothy Heritage writes from Moscow:

It is emblematic of a shift towards a more heavy-handed policy against opponents since Putin’s long-serving “grey cardinal”, Vladislav Surkov, was replaced in the Kremlin in late 2011 by the blunt and direct Vyacheslav Volodin. Under Volodin, a veteran political strategist who cut his teeth in the sometimes brutal election campaigns of the freewheeling 1990s as Russia emerged from seven decades of Soviet Communist rule, Putin has looked increasingly inwards.

Putin’s domestic preoccupation also reflects Kremlin concern that a forthcoming economic downturn will further undermine his sagging popularity and give a boost to the opposition.

“When Putin returned one year ago to the Kremlin for a historic third term, Russia could boast robust if unspectacular growth, a budget flush with cash from high oil prices and the world’s most profitable company,” AFP reports:

But in the space of just 12 months, growth has slipped to the extent that Russia risks entering recession, oil prices are suddenly trending downwards and the outlook has darkened for the state champion gas firm Gazprom. While Putin is not yet pushing the panic button, the Kremlin is all too aware of the importance of keeping the economic stability many Russians see as the greatest gain of his 13 year-rule at a time of protests and dynamic change in society.

With no serious political or economic reform, Putin’s first year back in the Kremlin was a “lost year,” said Nikolai Petrov, analyst at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow.

“We are going to get a long and serious crisis. And when the population feels it, there are going to be mass protests not just in Moscow and Saint Petersburg but the whole country,” he said.

The U.S. is also unlikely to let the alleged spy affair upset its continuing efforts to ‘reset’ relations with Russia, observers suggest.

“It is a reflection of the Obama administration’s eagerness to refresh the relationship,” writes analyst Donald N. Jensen, “that in a background briefing to journalists on the eve of [Secretary of State John] Kerry’s visit, a senior State Department official minimized the serious issues that derailed the now-defunct ‘reset’ by blaming tensions primarily on presidential politics in both countries last year rather than on deeper, more fundamental factors.”

Putin has a record of resorting to “vehement anti-Americanism,” notes a prominent analyst.

He has described democracy promotion in the Middle East as a new form of colonialism, writes  Nina Khrushcheva, who teaches international affairs at the New School University in New York City.

On Kerry’s recent visit to Moscow, the agenda included reaching consensus on Syria and anti-terrorist collaboration in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing.

But, says one prominent observer, “It is very unlikely Mr. Kerry found common ground on either subject.”

“The humanitarian catastrophe in Syria is of no concern to Mr. Putin, as is clear from the Kremlin’s support for the murderous Assad regime,” while its cooperation on the threat of jihadist terror “has been remarkably selective,” said Gary Kasparov, the leader of the Russian pro-democracy group United Civil Front.

“Secretary Kerry’s visit validated every Putin instinct,” he wrote in The Wall Street Journal:

The Russian president kept the American waiting in a hall for three hours—no doubt impressing Mr. Putin’s cronies. … Kerry was allowed to meet with a small group of Russian human-rights activists whose activities have been under assault as the Putin government cracks down ever harder on free speech and all forms of opposition.

But the meeting avoided mention of the two most significant developments in Russian human rights: the Magnitsky List and the dozens of protesters arrested at a political protest in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow a year ago. Mr. Putin is creating a new generation of political prisoners, with show trials unseen since Joseph Stalin, and Mr. Kerry goes to Russia to find common ground?

Democracy and rights ‘not high on US agenda?

“Islamist terror is a genuine threat that will continue to take Russian and American lives unless it is met with a strong response,” argued Kasparov, chairman of the U.S.-based Human Rights Foundation. “But having a shared enemy does not mean having shared values.”

“That the White House will step up its efforts at democracy promotion in these circumstances seems unlikely,” says Jensen, a Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:

Kerry reportedly assured activists that the White House was concerned about the Kremlin’s crackdown on nongovernmental organizations and said he had been up until 2AM discussing the situation with Lavrov. However, many activists were disappointed with the meeting and with Kerry’s attempt to mend fences with the Kremlin. “Russia is complicated, we all know.” Kerry said after the meeting, “but vital.” He refrained from publicly criticizing his Russian hosts and earlier had urged that the U.S. and Russia “keep our eye on our strategic interests.”

Leading rights, democracy appointed as Italy’s new Foreign Minister.

A prominent human rights and democracy advocate has been appointed as Italy’s new Foreign Minister.

Former European Commissioner Emma Bonino (right) joins the “grand coalition” government headed by the center left Democratic Party’s Enrico Letta as prime minister, but which also includes Silvio Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party.

The European Union should shift from a top-down technocratic approach to promoting democracy to help sustain transitions in the Arab world, Bonino said. The EU can support political reform through election-monitoring, political party assistance and programs on the rule of law and transitional justice through “an arm’s length equivalent of the National Endowment for Democracy to deliver tailored assistance,” she argued, alongside a group of other leading European commentators.

A flexible, politically autonomous funding instrument – a European Endowment for Democracy – would help ensure that democracy assistance is consistently and effectively delivered, a recent analysis contends.

Bonino also recently joined a group of eminent parliamentarians, intellectuals and democracy advocates to express international concern over Russia’s rights curbs., warning that Moscow risks becoming an international pariah as a result of a raft of recent curbs on freedom of association, assembly, and expression.

Post-Boston reset? Kremlin sees US as its ‘main opponent’

Russia’s only independent election monitoring group yesterday became the first nongovernmental group to fall afoul of the “foreign agents” law.

A Moscow court fined the Association in Defense of Voters’ Rights Golos (Voice) 300,000 rubles (almost US$10,000) for failing to register as a foreign agent — the first enforcement by Russian authorities of a much-disputed law.

Golos played a leading role in monitoring the 2011 parliament and 2012 presidential elections and exposing electoral fraud during the polls.

The group would appeal the decision in a higher court, its executive director Grigory Melkonyants told The Associated Press:

Golos was fined for receiving €50,000 ($65,470) in award money from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, which supports people persecuted because of their opinions. The organization claimed that it transferred the money back as soon as it reached its account.

Melkonyants (right) said Golos was amazed that the judge made the ruling after spending no more than 15 minutes away deliberating. “It seems that she knew in advance which decision she would come to no matter what evidence we showed in court,” he said.

The court judgment is “an alarming indicator for the future of civil society in Russia,” said Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

“Today’s ruling is a shot across the bow at Russian civil society and a terrible precedent,” said Rachel Denber, deputy Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, who attended the hearing. “Russian authorities should withdraw the case against Golos and welcome, rather than hinder NGO work.”

In a further sign of the Kremlin’s authoritarian assertiveness, Moscow has threatened Ireland’s Parliament against adopting a version of the US Magnitsky Law, which imposed a visa ban and financial penalties on Russian officials complicit in human rights abuses.

“Russia may halt negotiations on an agreement for cross-border adoptions if an Irish parliamentary committee approves a resolution critical of rights abuses,” The New York Times reports.

The systematic abuse of human rights under Vladi­mir Putin is being “overlooked amid the focus on the Boston bombings and the suspects’ links to Russia,” argues David J. KramerContending With Putin’s Russia: A Call for American Leadership:

In the latest edition of its annual human rights report, the State Department listed numerous examples of infringement of universal human rights, including “laws that impose harsh fines for unsanctioned meetings”; the practice of identifying nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, as “foreign agents” if they engage in “political activity” while receiving foreign funding; suspending the licenses of NGOs that have U.S. citizens as members or receive U.S. support and “pose a threat to Russian interests”; recriminalizing libel; the blocking of Web sites without a court order; and significantly expanding the definition of treason. “Skewed” elections in Putin’s favor and lack of due process in the courts were also noted.

But the Kremlin’s anti-Americanism may prove to be a major impediment to US-Russian cooperation on the Boston bombings, says a prominent analyst.

“The Russian services still see the U.S. as the ‘main opponent’ – a term often used by Vladimir Putin [the glavnyy protivnik in Russian] – that must be countered,” says the Brookings Institution’s Fiona Hill.

“The level of Russian operatives in the U.S. has not diminished with the end of the Cold War,” she notes:

The U.S. counter-intelligence services, including the FBI, still find themselves tied up in knots keeping tabs on Russian operatives in the United States. It was only three years ago that Anna Chapman and other Russian intelligence service “sleeper agents” were arrested—including a couple who lived in Boston–after a lengthy FBI investigation. All of these agents have gone back to Russia. Anna Chapman has become a prominent media figure. “Donald Heathfield,” the former Boston resident, works for Russia’s top oil company Rosneft under the name he assumed in the U.S.

That would appear to support the contention that “This is no time for business as usual,” as Kramer writes in The Washington Post:

Instead, Washington needs to emphasize the deterioration in Russia’s human rights situation by pushing back against the crackdown and focusing attention on the regime’s corrupt, authoritarian nature while using the Magnitsky Act whenever appropriate. Continued cooperation on Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and counterterrorism is important — but not at the expense of ignoring the internal situation in Russia.

RTWT

After Boston: will Russia get a ‘free pass on human rights’?

“The close cooperation between Moscow and Washington on the Boston bombing investigation raises new questions about the issue of human rights in Russia,” says analyst Amy Knight:

Will the US government now turn a blind eye to Russia’s increasingly brutal crackdown on its own democratic opposition because of overriding concerns about national security? Will the Kremlin wager that it can get away with its hardline approach now that, as a result of the Boston attacks, the Obama Administration needs its help in counter-terrorism efforts?

The trial of Russian anti-corruption blogger and opposition leader Aleksei Navalny (right) will provide a litmus test, says Knight, and also “determine the shape and nature of the regime for years to come,” according to journalist Evgenia Albats.

The Kremlin may fear that the trial will add more names to the Magnitsky List of Russian officials subject to sanctions for human rights violations, she writes in The New York Review of Books.

“But the new US-Russia security cooperation over the Boston attacks could also embolden the Kremlin, which has been pursuing a larger crackdown in recent months,” she notes:

Along with the prosecution of Navalny, who faces trumped-up criminal charges in several other cases as well, the attack on NGOs has intensified, with the Russian Prosecutor-General’s office announcing that it will investigate seven hundred such organizations that reportedly get financing from abroad. The offices of Memorial, of the election watchdog Golos and of other human rights groups have already been raided and in some cases hefty fines have been levied for minor violations. ….

It would be unfortunate, however, if Western governments ignore the growing consequences of this hard-line approach, which has discouraged foreign investment and may be weakening the regime. …

And of course official corruption continues to be a huge problem, with new scandals emerging on an almost daily basis. Transparency International, the global watchdog, estimated that the cost of corruption in Russia was $300 billion in 2012. According to the World Economic Forum report: “Russia is characterized by much higher levels of corruption than other countries with similar levels of development. While Russia is the sixth largest economy worldwide in GDP, corruption levels are higher than in countries such as Togo.”

“The Kremlin has tried to take the initiative from the opposition bloggers like Navalny, by initiating criminal cases against select officials,” writes Knight. “But corruption is so widespread in the government that any real attempt to tackle the problem could threaten the stability of the Putin regime.”

RTWT

Expand Magnitsky provisions to counter Russia’s corruption, says new report

In February 2013, photographer Misha Friedman released a series of powerful photographs entitled “Photo51—Is Corruption in Russia’s D.N.A.?” writes analyst Julia Pettengill. The photographs capture the visible consequences of corruption in the everyday lives of Russian citizens—from the traffic policemen collecting bribes to the major roads closed on a daily basis to allow dignitaries to drive through unimpeded by ordinary citizens.  

The photos underscore the way in which corruption is not only an economic problem, but a moral one, creating a society built on dishonesty and greed rather than transparency and dignity. While corruption is common to all countries, even democratic ones, it is clear that authoritarianism is both a product and enabler of corruption. 

According to the Transparency International “2012 Corruption Perceptions Index”, Russia ranks among the most corrupt developed countries in the world—133rd out of 176 countries surveyed, with the worst offenders at the bottom of the list. According to Sergei Ignatyev, head of the Central Bank, this has cost the country $49 billion in capital flight in 2012 alone. In the West, corruption in Russia is often treated as a fact as unchangeable as the Russian winter—an assessment that is all-too-often informed by a patronising perception of the country as somehow naturally incompatible with building a law-abiding society. Others prefer to conveniently ignore the problems created by this endemic corruption, on the grounds of self-interest, rationalising that the money to be made from the energy and commodities sectors far outweighs the long-term economic; legal; or moral elements of this problem.  

To view corruption as merely a problem for Russians is not only cynical, but also short-sighted. Ignoring this phenomenon enables the continuation of a system in which theft is not the exception, but the rule. In a globalised economy, and with the United Kingdom still struggling towards recovery, endemic corruption in one of the world’s rising economic powers is a problem for the system as a whole, distorting competition and undermining the integrity of the financial sector. 

While billions may be stolen in the Russian Federation, it does not usually remain in the country; it is swiftly transported through shell companies and accounts around the world, laundered in offshore entities as well as European Union countries such as Cyprus and Latvia, and legitimised through purchasing assets in global financial-centres such as London. Such funds can be rapidly put towards the purchase of reputational legitimacy via the financial and legal services of that country, or even the exercise of political influence. 

With the resurrection of the Magnitsky Affair and the unexplained death of the exiled Boris Berezovsky, Russian corruption is now, more than ever, an issue to be addressed by the  international community, according to a new analysis (extracted above).  

According to polls, corruption is one of the foremost causes of dissatisfaction amongst the Russian public and was one of the issues which inspired the mass protests of 2011-2012, says a report from the Henry Jackson Society, a UK-based bipartisan group. It is often tied, both directly and indirectly, to human rights abuses, by entrenching disrespect for individual rights in the political system. The scale of this domestic problem also has significant ramifications in a globalised economy as funds obtained through corruption are laundered and circulated throughout the world. 

The report, with a foreword by Dominic Raab MP, provides a timely reminder of the unique challenges facing Russia, a country burdened with endemic corruption at a critical stage of its economic and political development. It contains stark analysis regarding both the nature and the scale of this criminality – illustrated by the estimated $211.5 billion of illicit capital that left Russia between 1994 and 2011. 

Among the ideas raised by this report is that the U.K. Parliament should pass a similar version of the Sergei Magnitsky (right) Rule of Law Accountability Act, which was signed into law in the United States in December 2012. The law imposes visa bans and asset freezes on the individuals implicated in the imprisonment and death of Magnitsky, as well as any other Russian citizen credibly suspected of human rights abuses.

“Within Russia, the caustic effect of corruption can be seen in the dysfunctionality and human repression of the Russian political system,” said Alan Mendoza, Executive Director for the Henry Jackson Society.  

“Externally, its malign effects are felt through the dispersal of illicit funds around the world, poisoning other countries’ financial systems,” he adds. “The report will make a major contribution towards explaining how we in the West can halt this scourge from spreading.” 

 

CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FULL REPORT

Putin pushes NGO law – Soldiers’ Mothers branded as ‘foreign agents’

“Until prosecutors all over Russia set to work unmasking “foreign agents,” 80-year-old Raisa’s biggest worry was whether her tiny pension would ever allow her to get the false teeth she covets. Raisa — last name Golubyatnikova — cheerfully admits she’s in league with Vladimir Lazarev, 88, who hobbles with the help of a thin red cane across the gritty snow and ice that clings so stubbornly to this city east of Moscow,” The Washington Post’s Kathy Lally reports from Murom, Russia:

The two of them belong to the local chapter of Memorial, a volunteer organization formed in Moscow in the late 1980s, devoted to preventing a return to Stalinist terror. Their means are not so covert: remembering the victims of repression and promoting democracy and the rule of law. These are suspect ambitions in President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and a new law requires such non-governmental organizations to register as foreign agents if they get any financing from abroad.“If you get money from abroad,” said Alexander Cherkasov, a member of the Memorial board and director of its Human Rights Center, “it doesn’t mean you are following instructions.”Putin comes from the KGB world, he pointed out, where buying others is natural. “For 13 years he has repeatedly said those who pay write the music,” Cherkasov said. “We write our own music.”In a further sign of the crackdown, prosecutors in the city of Kostroma have formally branded the regional Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers NGO as a “foreign agent,” the Agora human rights group reported today:Kostroma Deputy Prosecutor Alexander Smirnov said the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers receives funding from the United States. Prosecutors said the committee’s reporting of alleged violations during the State Duma elections in December 2011 and the presidential elections in March 2012 was political activity.

Soldiers’ Mothers Committee Chair Irina Reznikova said the organization did not engage in politics during the elections, but its members reported violations as civic-minded private individuals. Furthermore, the reporting of violations in the elections occurred before the adoption of the law on NGOs, she said, adding it appears prosecutors have applied the law retroactively, contrary to the Constitution.

The committee, established in 1991 to protect the rights of soldiers and their families, could face a fine of up to 500,000 rubles ($15,900), RIA Novosti reports.

Memorial was one of thousands of NGOs subjected to raids earlier this month. The groups has heard nothing since, but the Justice Ministry is bringing charges against Golos, Russia’s only independent election monitor, for failing to register as a foreign agent.

“Although Golos was founded with U.S. help, its leaders said they have stopped accepting money from abroad,” Lally reports.

The US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul recently met with members of Russia’s Public Chamber to express concern over the unprecedented crackdown on civil society groups. Russian officials responded with claims that US funders of Russian NGOs were headed by spies and former military officials.

Russian prosecutors claim that some NGOs violate the Foreign Agents law, while the Foreign Ministry defended the NGO probes as lawful and criticized a US commitment to continue NGO funding as “direct instigating of certain non-governmental and public structures to violate legislation related to the work of non-governmental organizations in the Russian Federation.”

Up to 2,000 organizations were targeted with inspections and searches last month, said Pavel Chikov, head of the Agora NGO and a member of the presidential Human Rights Council.

 

 

 

 

‘Pared down’ Magnitsky list disappoints rights activists

The US Treasury State Department today published a list of 18 Russian officials subject to financial sanctions and visa travel bans because of their alleged human rights abuses.

But the pared down list disappointed rights advocates who noted the omission of several senior officials known to be complicit in human rights violations.

The sanctions are the result of the Sergei Magnitsky Act, passed by the US Congress and named for the tax lawyer arrested in 2008 after revealing that Russian officials had orchestrated a tax refund fraud to transfer $230m of state funds to a criminal syndicate. He died in jail after being assaulted and denied medical treatment.

“Persons on this list are banned from receiving or holding visas to enter the United States,” said the State Department. ‘Their property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and transactions in such property or interests in property are prohibited.

The list includes tax officials and police officers who imprisoned Magnitsky after he accused them of corruption, including Interior Ministry investigators Pavel Karpov and Oleg Silchenko; Judge Aleksei Krivoruchko who endorsed the extension of Magnitsky’s pretrial detention; and two Chechens – Letscha Bogatirov, who is reputed to have killed the dissident Umar Israilov in Austria in 2009, and Kazbek Dukuzov, a suspect in the 2004 murder of “Forbes” editor Paul Klebnikov (right).

Magnitsky’s former client, London-based investor William Browder, who has campaigned to bring those responsible in his death to justice, claimed that one of those tax officials, Olga Stepanova, has bought luxury real estate in Moscow, Dubai and Montenegro and wired money through her husband’s bank accounts worth $39 million,” AP reports.

The list suggested that “the US presidential administration decided not to take the path of aggravating a political crisis with Moscow,”said Alexei Pushkov, a senior Russian legislator.  

A senior State Department official denied that political or diplomatic considerations were a factor in drafting the list.

“I’ve learned not to try to take action based on what you think the Russian reaction might be. It’s better to do what’s in the law and what’s right and what reflects American interests and American values on human rights, and then you let the chips fall where they may,” the official said. “We played this one straight. We haven’t tried to game it.”

But analysts and rights activists were surprised that “senior officials from Putin’s entourage who had been expected to be included were left off, including Russia’s top police official Alexander Bastrykin,” the BBC reports:

Some 250 names had originally been put forward by US politicians. The final list includes people from Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, 16 of them linked to the Magnitsky case. The others are officials deemed to have participated in recent Kremlin moves to restrict Russians’ political rights.

“The list disappointed lawmakers and human rights activists who pressed the administration to apply the new law aggressively,” The New York Times reports:

Human rights activists said that the law should be applied beyond Mr. Magnitsky’s case to cover a wide array of infamous episodes. Among those who should be on any list of human rights violators in Russia, they argued, were Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya, who has been accused of widespread abuses, and Aleksandr I. Bastrykin, the head of the country’s investigative committee, who was reported to have taken a journalist to a forest and threatened his life after a critical article was published.

Representative James McGovern, a Massachusetts Democrat who helped pass the law, named for Mr. Magnitsky, had sent the administration a list of 280 Russians compiled by Mr. Magnitsky’s family for possible sanctions, including senior officials like Yuri Y. Chaika, the country’s general prosecutor. …..But the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control required a higher degree of evidence, because it will have to justify depriving people of financial assets if challenged in court. Some human rights activists said Congress may have to re-examine the question and rewrite the law to make sure it covers a wider range of figures.

“While the list is timid and features more significant omissions than names, I was assured by administration officials today that the investigation is ongoing and further additions will be made to the list as new evidence comes to light,” McGovern said. “The fact that a name is not on the list does not mean that person is innocent.”

The publication of the list will severely strain US-Russian relations, said President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman.

“The appearance of any lists will doubtless have a very negative effect on bilateral Russian-American relations,” Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

Human rights advocates took solace from the fact that the Magnitsky Act establishes an annual mechanism for gauging Russia’s human rights violations and applying sanctions to officials responsible for abuses.

“The key now is to keep this as an ongoing process by which more names can be added,” said David J. Kramer, the executive director of Freedom House.

 

The Kremlin’s World and Putin’s Doctrine

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s updated Foreign Policy Concept document reveals much about the Vladimir Putin’s emerging foreign policy doctrine and confirms that the Obama’s administration’s “reset” policy is effectively defunct, says a leading analyst.

“Russia’s new foreign-policy doctrine is rooted in the Soviet and czarist past [and] .. ..  reveals the choices made by Putin’s Russia: an expanded sphere of influence; rapprochement with Beijing; and alienation from the West,” The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen writes in The New York Times:

The Putin Doctrine calls soft power “an integral component of modern international politics.” Astonishingly, it casts soft power as a tool of the Russian government’s commitment to “universal democratic values” and “human rights” — Moscow style….However, the Magnitsky affair, the anti-opposition crackdown, the incarceration of protesters and of the Yukos founder Mikhail Khodorkovsky……fly in the face of such “soft power” exercises, especially when the Kremlin insists on labeling challenges from domestic opponents as “foreign agent activities.”

The Foreign Policy Concept reflects Russia’s deep resentment of any criticism of what it considers its “internal affairs.” The document warns of the “destructive and unlawful use of ‘soft power’ and human rights concepts” by other countries to put “political pressure on sovereign regimes” and interfere “in internal affairs.” These are clear references to the alleged U.S. support of the Arab upheavals, U.S. democracy promotion and the Magnitsky Act.

“The public version of Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept reveals much. Doubtless, the classified version would be even more fascinating,” writes Cohen.

Washington should huddle with European nations to formulate a realistic cooperation agenda with Russia. The agenda should include promotion of economic freedom, business ties, transparency, good governance and the rule of law, as well as cooperation in medicine, science and space.

RTWT