The Arab spring came as a golden moment for Islamists to establish political influence in the post-revolutionary political orders of Egypt and Tunisia. Two years later, however, the impact of non-Islamist currents on the political scene of both countries is growing, writes analyst Moataz el Fegiery.

Egypt’s transition to democracy is embattled. So far, the the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in power supports the idea that democracy can work against itself, to the degree that the democratically-elected Islamists and their allies seem to be seeking to undermine democratic institutions. Political developments over the past eight months suggest that the Islamists no longer enjoy overwhelming support in Egypt. A poll conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research in March 2013 showed that only 47 per cent of Egyptians thought President Morsi was ‘doing well’, compared to 78 per cent just after his first 100 days in power. Despite its sinking popularity, the MB still has significant organisational capabilities and has managed to strengthen its control over public institutions. The Brotherhood’s crumbling hegemony opens a window of opportunity for liberals and leftists (known in Egypt as the ‘civil’ political forces) to build on the Islamists’ failures and shift power relations to their favour.

Unlike their pre-revolutionary liberal peers, infamous for their lack of grassroots connections, organisational weakness and elitist discourses, new liberal and leftist parties that have flourished in the post-revolution era have been able to attract sympathisers from a wider range of Egyptian society. A March 2013 report by the RAND Corporation on ‘Voting patterns in post- Mubarak Egypt’ concludes that ‘Islamists achieved their high-water mark in the initial ballots after the January 25 Revolution, but the gap between them and their non-Islamist rivals has since narrowed’. Although many new liberal parties show great commitment toward the consolidation of democracy and human rights in Egypt, they also have to face many of the same structural limitations with which the political opposition under Mubarak had to deal. In order to succeed at this critical juncture of Egypt’s transition, the non-Islamist opposition must maintain their internal cohesion and develop new tactics to transform mounting street protests into organised, strategic political action.

Rise of civil forces

Young liberal and leftist activists were the driving force of Egypt’s revolution. Liberal and Islamist forces collaborated during the 18 days of the revolution to oust Mubarak. Since then, however, deep rifts between Islamist and non-Islamist forces along ideological and political lines have opened up.

The two years following the fall of Mubarak had provided the Muslim Brotherhood with an unprecedented opportunity to establish itself as a model for a ‘moderate’, legitimate and democratic brand of Islamist governance – but this opportunity has now largely faded. The second anniversary of the revolution in January 2013 was marked by massive demonstrations across Egypt, protesting against the political and economic failures of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. Egyptian human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) affirm that human rights conditions have immensely deteriorated under President Morsi. The constitution drafting process was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies, and the final text turned out to reflect narrow MB interests that undermine many fundamental human rights and serve to consolidate the Islamic nature of the state.

An elitist discourse and detachment from the grassroots have been among the long-standing criticisms towards liberal and leftist opposition parties. Before the revolution, registered liberal and leftist parties were seen by many as a tool to legitimate the Mubarak regime. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Islamists drew on their organisational and social mobilisation capacities established over the past 40 years to consolidate their political position, while the civil opposition was very fragmented and unable to exert major influence at key political junctures.

Today, the relationship between the old liberal opposition parties and the newly-emerged ‘civil’ parties still suffers from a lack of trust and unity. However, their shared interest in confronting the democratic setbacks brought about by successive military and Islamist rulers over the last two years has brought them together in a number of political coalitions across the non-Islamist political spectrum. In this sense, the creation of the National Salvation Front (NSF) in November 2012 represented a turning point for Egypt’s civil opposition. The NSF is currently the main umbrella for Egyptian liberal and leftist opposition parties.

Articulating political alternatives

If the MB’s political and economic failures create opportunities for non-Islamist forces to fill the legitimacy vacuum, the latter need to offer viable alternative proposals. Liberal and leftist parties advocate for a ‘civil state’ based on citizenship, democracy and social justice, but they differ amongst themselves in their interpretations of these values. Regarding the relationship between state and religion, civil political forces reject Islamists’ instrumental use of religion in politics and law. Although not all civil forces call for a separation between state and religion or the omission of the Shari‘a as the main source of legislation in the constitution, their understanding of the role of the Shari‘a in the state is clearly different from that of Islamists. Most civil forces are content to see the application of the Shari‘a only at a minimum level, as it was under Mubarak. Only few politicians call for a secular state, which is a rather unpopular idea in Egypt. Political Islam has left its imprint on Egyptian society since the 1970s and liberals and leftists are politically-constrained to openly challenge the constitutional provision on the Shari‘a. However, over the past decade a growing number of human rights defenders and secular intellectuals have begun to argue that such provision should be amended to ensure the state’s neutrality towards all religions and the respect for international human rights.

Liberal and leftist parties have different ideas on how to achieve social justice. Their economic views range from the neo-liberal perspective represented by the Al-Wafd Party to the extreme leftist opinions represented by the Socialist Popular Alliance. There is no unified vision among these parties on the minimum requirements of social justice. They have different views regarding state social subsidies, state-sponsored education, labour rights, minimum and maximum wages, and dependence on foreign loans. A minimum consensus on these pressing issues will be required, as Egyptians are keen to know how the political opposition would seek to improve the deteriorating Egyptian economy without further hurting their living standards. President Morsi and his government have failed to distance themselves from Mubarak’s crony capitalism.

In order to distinguish themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood, liberal and leftist parties need to base their political programmers not on general ideological premises but on concrete and realistic objectives. Although these programmers do address many of Egypt’s pressing issues, most parties fail to elaborate on how these issues can be handled within the current political and socio- economic conditions. For instance, the need for a comprehensive strategy for transitional justice and security reform is a pressing concern in Egypt today, but nothing indicates that non-Islamist parties have a clearer vision than that of the incumbent Islamist government on how to handle this problem. The NSF has announced that it is developing a detailed programme to ‘save Egypt’. In order to appeal to a broad range of constituencies, such a comprehensive joint programme must not only contain a roadmap for democratic transition, but it should also explain to ordinary people how the opposition would aim to improve Egypt’s deteriorating economic and social conditions.

Building Constituencies

Having been criticised for its lack of grassroots outreach for years, the non-Islamist opposition still lacks the capacity and connections with different social bases to transform popular demands into organised political action and votes. The NSF has managed on occasions to build on street protests to embarrass the regime, but mostly its management of protestors’ demands has been neither systematic nor effective. Once street protests calm down, the NSF loses momentum. One reason for this is that the NSF has so far failed efficiently to bring wide social sectors into its political vision and systematically use street protests as part of a larger political strategy. Young activists and emerging leaders, who have been fuelling the ongoing street protests, are not adequately represented in most liberal and leftist political parties, including in the newly-founded ones.

Young revolutionary forces have limited financial resources to develop their own political parties. Many of them have innovative political visions, but are unable to win seats in parliament without proper support. A systematic inclusion of young forces into the existing liberal and leftist parties, including in leadership positions, would prove a valuable asset. The older generation of politicians should be ready to change parties’ internal structures to meet the aspirations of the youth. The civil opposition’s electoral strongholds are currently above all the educated middle class in urban areas. It has often been stressed that in order to extend their appeal beyond this circle in future elections, liberal and leftist parties must build ties with voters in poor rural areas too. A systematic strategy to enlarge their social constituencies would also increase liberal and leftist parties’ fundraising prospects. Widespread accusations that Islamists receive funds from abroad notwithstanding, the success of the MB’s fundraising from a wide network of supporters is undeniable, and civil parties should seek to learn from them.

Re-launching flawed transition process

Aside from the need to strengthen their programmatic and organisational appeal, civil parties must develop a strategy on how to re- design the current transitional process, which they regard as flawed. The NSF announced that it will boycott the upcoming parliamentary election, on the grounds that it believes that it may worsen polarization and instability. Behind this argument stands the conviction that the current debate in Egypt should go beyond political disputes that can be settled in the ballot box, as there is no consensus in society regarding the basic rules on the nature and political organisation of the state.

The Brotherhood has managed to maintain its firm grip on state institutions, including local administrations. The distribution of districts in the new electoral law drafted by the Islamist-led Shura Council maximises the benefits of the Brotherhood. President Morsi has not established sufficient legal safeguards to ensure free and fair elections. The opposition, even if it managed to win enough votes to achieve a meaningful number of seats in an Islamist- majority parliament, would not be able to block or pass legislation, or amend the constitution. Its representation in parliament would only serve to decorate a flawed democratic process. Elections can become a means peacefully to settle conflicting political interests, but only in a political system that guarantees minimum standards regarding the separation of powers and the rights of minorities. The MB, by contrast, is aware that a victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections would renew its damaged legitimacy. The NFS’ decision to boycott the elections should be supplemented by other tactics, including using President Morsi’s declining reputation, as well as the current divide between the MB and some of its Islamist allies, in domestic and international campaigns to improve the conditions of political contestation in Egypt.

Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood’s legitimacy crisis sets the floor for non-Islamist political forces to fill the emerging vacuum. After the revolution, liberal and leftist parties have managed to expand their social constituency, but they still suffer from many of the
same problems that affected opposition parties before the revolution. The establishment of the NSF is seen as an attempt by the civil opposition to overcome fragmentation. However, the opposition has to work more to strengthen its organisational capacities and be able to offer concrete, convincing and viable political and social policy alternatives to those of the current government. Moreover, they need to develop clear stances on central popular concerns which have so far mainly been addressed by Islamist parties, such as community security, local services, and larger moral issues.

Remnants of the Mubarak regime continue to enjoy a remarkable social base, and many are politically-organised, especially since the presidential elections. Most former Mubarak loyalists have joined the Egyptian National Movement Party established in December 2012 by Ahmed Shafik, who was narrowly defeated by Morsi in the presidential elections. Although Shafik and his supporters also oppose the hegemony of the Muslim Brotherhood, current prospects for a political alliance between the remnants of the Mubarak regime and other revolutionary forces (similar to the process currently observed in Tunisia) are low. The lack of trust between both camps continues to divide the non-Islamist opposition. The postponement of parliamentary elections still allows some room for the NSF to pressure the regime to change the rules of political contestation.

If political conditions change and the opposition finally decides to run for parliament, unity among its candidates will be crucial. Cohesion within the NSF is currently the only way to strengthen the position of non-Islamists in the political process. Political understanding and electoral coalitions with other like-minded Islamist parties or members of the former Mubarak regime could also be an option. In either case, to emerge as a powerful electoral coalition, members of the NSF will inevitably need to make painful compromises on political and economic issues.

Moataz el Fegiery is an associate fellow at FRIDE, the Madrid-based think-tank. The above extract is taken from FRIDE’s  Policy Brief 155, which may be accessed here in full (PDF).

Photo: Qantara

Egypt’s ruling Muslim Brotherhood came under attack today for “normalizing” relations with corrupt elements of the former regime, as the non-Islamist opposition received “a gift from the heavens” from the courts and the US Ambassador to Cairo lamented the “high degree of political polarization” and called for “more dialogue and compromise” between the key political actors.

Under the Brotherhood-backed President Mohamed Morsi, the authorities have arrested and tortured the activists who sparked the revolution that brought them to power, says a leading analyst, while reaching a morally dubious accommodation with former regime elements.

“Under the banner of ‘conciliation and returning stolen funds,’ Morsi and his group decided to normalize relations with Mubarak’s regime….at the expense of the revolution, its principles and advocates who brought Morsi to power [and] the values and morals the Muslim Brotherhood is always flaunting,” writes Khalil Al-Anani, a leading expert on the Islamist group.

The authorities plan to release several of the former regime’s most corrupt officials, including former Information Minister Safwat Al-Sharif, former presidential chief of staff Zakaria Azmi, former prime minister Ahmed Nazif, and Ahmed Fathi Sorour who served as parliament speaker for more than 20 years. The Brotherhood stands to gain from the release of certain financial assets held by former regime insiders, says Anani (right), a Scholar of Middle East Politics at Durham University who was recently appointed Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI) in Washington, D.C.

Gift from the heavens

“A ruling by an Egyptian court blocking next month’s controversial parliamentary elections provides a way out of the country’s months-long political crisis,” according to reports:

The Administrative Court on Wednesday halted President Mohammad Mursi’s call for the four-stage vote that was due to begin on April 22. The court said that the Islamist president acted outside his jurisdiction by issuing the decree on elections without discussing it with the government as the new constitution dictates. The court also ordered the referral of a divisive poll law to the Supreme Constitutional Court for review.

“This is not a mere court ruling. It is a gift from the heavens,” said prominent opposition leader Amr Moussa.

The Muslim Brotherhood was apparently “unnerved” by the court decision.

“The ruling and its reasons mean that the Constitutional Court is doing a legislative job, which is not within its jurisdiction,” Essam Al Erian, a senior Brotherhood official, said in a tweet. “We are consulting with other political parties on how to deal with the ruling and its consequences.”

The US plans to sponsor an election observation mission to monitor the forthcoming elections, says Anne Patterson, the US envoy to Cairo, adding that she was concerned about the febrile political atmosphere.

“There is a high degree of political polarization, and thus a need for more dialogue and compromise,” she told Al-Ahram.

Following the prosecution of US-funded democracy assistance NGOs, the US has been focusing on supporting socio-economic projects and sponsoring interfaith dialogue in an attempt to reduce sectarian violence, she said.

“We have initiated entrepreneurship programmers in the Smart Village New Cairo, we work with NGOs that instigate initiatives such as the Angel Investors and Mentors Programme, promoting entrepreneurship and commercial activities,” she said. “We also plan to announce a big educational initiative for women and found science, technology and math departments in high schools.”

Egypt’s National Salvation Front (NSF) has criticized the Muslim Brotherhood-backed draft NGO law as more restrictive than laws under former President Hosni Mubarak, says the Project for Middle East Democracy:

The opposition bloc said the law “seeks to reproduce a police state by putting into law the role of security bodies in overseeing the work of civil society groups.” The bill stipulates that NGOs be vetted by a committee comprised in part of members of the security services and get official permission to receive foreign funding. According to the NSF’s statement, “This can allow these entities to refuse funding for rights groups that monitor elections or work to fight torture.” The NSF announced it would support an alternate bill drafted by a group of 50 civil society organizations.

The NSF has also formed an alliance with the Islamist, Salafist-dominated Al Nour party in an attempt to counter the Brotherhood’s growing power and attempt to monopolize or ‘Ikhwanize’ the country’s political institutions.

“The Salafists stand to gain. If elements of the secular opposition actually put time and money into their [campaign] infrastructure, they could make a dent,” said Tamara Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. “Whereas the secular opposition is seen as being old elites and the Brotherhood has the reputation of ‘Oh, they tried and failed,’ the Salafists have the advantage of being untested.”

But the non-Islamist opposition also stands to gain from the pact.

“[If] National Salvation Front and Nour participate in elections and do well, they have the potential to have a majority or super majority in parliament,” said Issandr El Amrani, an independent expert on Egypt who blogs at Arabist.net. “This would be unknown territory in Egypt: the president from one party and the prime minister from another.”

China, Russia and Egypt impose restrictive conditions on private philanthropy that helps cultivate civil society development, while democracies tend to enjoy more conducive arrangements, according to a new analysis.

In a 13 country pilot study, the Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity examined barriers to and incentives for philanthropic freedom – the ability of individuals and organizations (both profit and non-profit) to donate time and money to social causes. The researchers scored and compared countries on their ease of giving by collecting information on three main indicators: the ease of registering and operating civil society organizations (CSOs); domestic tax policies for deductions, credits, and exemptions; and the ease of sending and receiving cash and in-kind goods across borders.

Egypt is joined by Russia and China with the most restrictions on philanthropic activity due to the governments’ interference in civil society activities and cross-border flows.

“The analysis showed that of all financial flows to the developing world, some 80 percent are private and only 20 percent are official, the reverse of 40 years ago,” said Carol C. Adelman (left), the center’s Senior Fellow and Director.

“As international philanthropy increases, there is growing interest in how philanthropy can be encouraged for humanitarian causes, economic growth, and community development,” she told a meeting at the National Endowment for Democracy.

The report’s findings will be discussed at a Washington forum on Thursday May 16, featuring Tomicah Tillemann, Senior Advisor for Civil Society and Emerging Democracies, U.S. Department of State; Douglas Rutzen, President and CEO, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law; Yulya Spantchak, Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Center for Global Prosperity; and moderated by Dr. Adelman (details below).

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Philanthropy does not stand on its own, but is dependent on a vibrant civil society. Even a nation of the wealthiest donors cannot exhibit generosity without a civil society to help identify, organize, and implement activities that help people in need.

Furthermore, philanthropy’s role in creating civil society organizations (CSOs) and other sources of wealth and power outside of central government control helps democracies flourish by strengthening freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. This integral role of philanthropy in strengthening civil society can be best demonstrated by current political events in Egypt and Russia.

The post-revolutionary transition in Egypt has resulted in a governmental tightening of civil society rules. To ensure control of non-profit organizations’ activities, the Egyptian government has proposed restrictive legislation to prohibit philanthropic flows to organizations working in Egypt. Similarly, in Russia the government has enacted new regulations on cross-border financial flows to limit the activities of non-profit organizations. Thus, the existence of philanthropic freedom in a nation can strongly impact the health of that nation’s civil society and vice versa

Philanthropy is defined by the distinguished scholar, Dr. Helmut Anheier, as the “voluntary use of private assets for the benefit of public causes.” It can take on many forms such as individuals giving to non-profit organizations; diaspora communities funding relief and development projects; foundations and charities supporting community projects; corporations undertaking cause-related marketing campaigns; religious organizations’ missions to help orphanages in Africa; individuals using SMS to transfer funds to disaster victims, donating to overseas projects through internet websites; and, entirely new financial tools to transfer funds for social impact investing.

Countries with Low Barriers

The top scoring countries, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. all have low barriers to entry for civil society organizations. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. have all had long histories of active civil societies, and the non-profit sector in all countries continues to grow. Although the non-profit sector is rarely scandal free, generally the populations in these countries have trust in CSOs. While Japan has a shorter history with civil society, its laws governing the establishment and operations of CSOs are currently conducive for the sector to grow in the future.

Countries with Low to Medium Barriers

While the countries that scored the highest are all high income, some emerging economies scored well above a four on this indicator. Besides Australia, Mexico also provides an easy entry for civil society organizations to register, obtain status, and operate. In Brazil, South Africa and India, the right to associate is freely granted and setting up a nonprofit organization is relatively easy and inexpensive. Nevertheless, government bureaucracies can hinder the process by creating delays. Thus the laws on the books may not vary significantly from higher scoring countries, however, the implementation of the laws is hindered by inefficiencies, causing delays and impediments.

Countries with Medium Barriers

Of the 13 nations reviewed, Turkey has some significant barriers to civil society operations. Individuals are not allowed to act collectively, unless they register for legal status as an association. Some CSOs, depending on their activities, encounter more operating constraints than others. Furthermore, involuntary termination of CSOs is possible under a process that is not transparent.

In Russia, registering a CSO can be a highly bureaucratic and political process. Organizations may face restrictions on the types of communication technologies they can use, and organizations can be terminated involuntarily. Russia has recently implemented and proposed a number of new regulations regarding civil society operations. Newly proposed laws in 2012 have created stringent requirements for any nonprofit that receives funding from abroad.

Countries with Medium to High Barriers

The countries with the lowest scores on the Civil Society Regulation indicator have some of the highest barriers. China and Egypt both create heavy obstacles to registering a CSO. Organizations in these countries often choose to register as businesses or remain unregistered to avoid the complex and political process.

In China, while a CSO registered as a business is technically illegal and can be shut down, most continue to operate anyway. Interestingly, although the laws on the books for CSO registration are highly restrictive, the implementation of these regulations is inefficient, allowing for a larger space for CSOs off the books than what is available legally. Furthermore, some Chinese provinces are beginning to implement local laws that would ease registration barriers for CSOs.

Civil society in China is composed of grassroots NGOs which are private and more regulated than government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). NGOs that are active in sensitive activities, which are unclearly defined, can be shut down at the discretion of the government, while organizations that work on democracy-related issues are not allowed to operate in China. The process for receiving donations from abroad is highly bureaucratic, while GONGOs are exempt from the heavy regulation that non-governmental CSOs have to follow.

In Egypt, any incoming foreign funding must go through the Egyptian government, which can refuse the transfer of such funds without reason. In 2013, the Egyptian government proposed a new law which will further restrict foreign funding to Egyptian CSOs. Already the process to receive funding has increased to nearly 15 months. The law is especially burdensome for organizations working on human rights issues.

Registering a CSO in Egypt is met with many barriers and involves cumbersome procedures. Organizations with activities that are viewed as out of line with national unity are denied registration. Moreover, once an organization is registered, it is subject to rigid structural regulations, including instructions on how to hold meetings and select board members. The government is able to remove any members from the board of directors whom it does not see as qualified. Additionally, government representatives can attend the general assembly or board meetings of organizations. Egyptian CSOs can be involuntarily terminated for a number of reasons, many of which are at the discretion of the government.

Regardless of what form private giving and social investing take, the presence of philanthropic activities in a country is encouraged by fundamental liberties such as the ability of individuals and organizations to assemble, own property, and engage in free speech and voluntary transactions.

This brief extract is taken from a longer analysis available here.

Philanthropic Freedom: “If You Can’t Measure It, You Can’t Improve It.”

May 16, 2013, 12:00 – 1:30 PM - Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters

Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) invites you to a luncheon

Hudson Institute’s Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) is pleased to announce the publication of its pilot study on Philanthropic Freedom, the first time that ease of giving has been fully measured in 13 countries across the globe. The pilot study and each of the detailed country reports can be downloaded for free from www.hudson.org/philanthropicfreedom. The new study fills a major gap in development policy and philanthropic research by surveying barriers and incentives to philanthropic giving in three main areas: the ease of registering and operating civil society organizations (CSOs); domestic tax policies for individual and corporate deductions, credits, and exemptions; and, the ease of sending and receiving cash and in-kind goods across borders.

Like the World Bank’s Doing Business report and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report, this research is intended to help governments remove barriers and create incentives for growing philanthropy.

Please join a distinguished panel in a conversation on the key factors that encourage and inhibit philanthropy and the important policy implications of this pilot study. 

Panelists: 

Tomicah Tillemann, Senior Advisor for Civil Society and Emerging Democracies, U.S. Department of State

Douglas Rutzen, President and CEO, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law

Yulya Spantchak, Research Fellow and Deputy Director, Center for Global Prosperity

Moderator:Carol C. Adelman, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Global Prosperity

Advancing democracy is entirely consistent with the maintenance of US security and other strategic interests, a prominent foreign policy ‘realist’ contends.   

“I see no contradiction between encouraging democratic institutions abroad and preserving vital national-security interests. The two are complementary and mutually reinforcing,” says Zalmay Khalilzad (right).

“In the long run, a world in which states respect the dignity of their people can only be beneficial to America,” he writes for The National Interest, in a rebuttal of the journal’s recent article criticizing U.S. democracy programs as “ideological and revolutionary,” particularly those of the National Endowment for Democracy.  

“Of course, supporting civic organizations that seek our assistance is indeed regarded as controversial by authoritarians who seek to crush the aspirations of their own people,” notes Khalilzad, a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former US ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan and the United Nations.

But Jordan Michael Smith, the article’s author, “takes at face value the accusations of such authorities as the Kremlin-funded Russia Today, Iran’s former envoy to the United Nations, and Egypt’s justice minister, that NED and other democracy-assistance groups seek ‘to determine the governmental systems of other countries,’” he writes.

“Had he interviewed NED’s grantees (detailed in its freely available annual report), he would have found that NED supports independent democratic activists and NGOs that are politically diverse, pragmatic, and reformist. Often, their activities are in tension with the array of interests that the U.S. government pursues.”

While Smith and his fellow NI polemicist David Rieff blithely conflate democracy assistance with ‘color revolutions’, ‘regime change’ and various forms of coercive interventionism, another prominent foreign policy realist has drawn a clear distinction, confirming Khalilzad’s insistence on the compatibility of ideals and interests.

Brent Scowcroft, a former National Security Adviser, opposed the invasion of Iraq and has been dismissive of Wilsonian “evangelizers of democracy,” but  he remained supportive of democracy assistance as a foreign policy objective.

“We ought to make it our duty to help make the world friendlier for the growth of liberal regimes,” he told the New Yorker. “You encourage democracy over time, with assistance, and aid, the traditional way.”

While critical of U.S. policy makers “mesmerized by the ‘color’ revolutions, seeing them as democracy on the march,” he nevertheless conceded that “in a sense, they were. But those movements were also the aftereffects of countries emerging from the Soviet Union; states that are still trying to figure out who they are and where they belong. Of course America should help with that process [emphasis added].”

In short, democracy assistance is an alternative to externally-imposed regime change, not – as Smith, Rieff, et al, claim – a form of it.

Khalilzad reinforces the point with respect to the role of democracy assistance in potentially facilitating positive outcomes to the revolts of the Second Arab Awakening.

“The challenge in the Middle East is compounded by the rise of illiberal forces in several countries, including Egypt, that seek to restrict outside democracy assistance,” he writes.

“We will need to adapt but continue to support positive forces across the regions. But the alternative to innovative democracy assistance is not a new cold peace. More likely, it is an escalating cycle of violence that could force a far costlier intervention down the line.”

Writing for The National Interest has now published at least three articles over the past year questioning the merits of democracy assistance.

As for Smith’s characterization of the NED’s work as “controversial,” Khalilzad notes:

Controversial? In 2003, on the twentieth anniversary of NED’s founding, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution commending its work and pledging future support. The vote was 390-1. A not-for-profit organization that receives federal funding, the Endowment has been a line-item in the budget of every president, Democratic and Republican, year in and year out, since its inception thirty years ago.

RTWT

Zalmay Khalilzad is a member of the board of the National Endowment for Democracy and of The National Interest‘s advisory council.

“The Obama administration warned Friday that nations such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela are turning up pressure on human rights other activists, decrying what it described as a global crackdown on the ‘lifeblood of democratic societies,’” the Associated Press reports.

In assessing global human rights over the past year, five developments are particularly striking, according to the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012:

• Shrinking space for civil society activism around the world;
• the ongoing struggle by people in the Middle East for democratic change;
• steps toward emerging democracy and a tentative opening for civil society in Burma;
• the game-changing nature of information and communication technologies, in the face of increased suppression of traditional media and freedom of expression; and
• the continued marginalization of and violence against members of vulnerable groups.

The report states that “governments continued to repress or attack the means by which individuals can organize, assemble, or demand better performance from their rulers.”

But authoritarian regimes are not the only threat to human rights and democratic governance, the report notes.

“Our world is complex and increasingly influenced by non-state actors – brave civil society activists and advocates, but also violent extremists, transnational criminals, and other malevolent actors,” US Secretary of State John Kerry notes in what may appear to be prescient comments in the light of current events in Boston.

Russia’s crackdown on civil society is highlighted, notably recent measures designed to curtail the activities of foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations, as well as a broader array of restrictions, including “large increases in fines for unauthorized protests, a law recriminalizing libel, a law that limits Internet freedom by allowing authorities to block certain Web sites without a court order, and amendments to the criminal code that dramatically expand the definition of treason.”

Human rights advocates welcomed the thrust of the report (extracted below).

Human Rights First’s Robyn Lieberman applauded Kerry for making the case “that human rights are central to U.S. national security” and for his commitment to continue to engage with civil society.

“Civil society is the lifeblood of democratic societies,” the report states. “Countries succeed or fail based on the choices of their people and leaders — whether they sit in a government ministry, a corporate boardroom, an independent union or a cramped NGO office. When individuals have the ability to come together, air their views and put forward their own proposals, they challenge and support their governments in reaching higher standards of progress and prosperity.”

Shrinking space for civil society activism

Civil society is the lifeblood of democratic societies. Countries succeed or fail based on the choices of their people and leaders – whether they sit in a government ministry, a corporate boardroom, an independent union, or a cramped NGO office. When individuals have the ability to come together, air their views, and put forward their own proposals, they challenge and support their governments in reaching higher standards of progress and prosperity. Countries are stronger when the different elements of society work together for the common good and when a lively and critical debate informs government decision-making. Governments that welcome and foster civil society activism are more stable and resilient, and those societies are thriving; government crackdowns on civil society point to weakness and fragility on the part of those in power and are characteristic of societies where governments are stifling economic and social development. Unfortunately, some governments appear to be learning restrictive tactics from others and, in some cases, regional powers are setting a negative but persuasive example for neighboring governments.

Increased headwinds buffeted civil society in 2012, as governments continued to repress or attack the means by which individuals can organize, assemble, or demand better performance from their rulers. From Iran to Venezuela, crackdowns on civil society included new laws impeding or preventing freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion; heightened restrictions on organizations receiving funding from abroad; and the killing, harassment, and arrest of political, human rights, and labor activists.

Russia adopted a series of measures that curtailed the activities of NGOs and civil liberties. These measures included laws restricting NGOs – particularly those receiving international funding – and large increases in fines for unauthorized protests, a law recriminalizing libel, a law that limits Internet freedom by allowing authorities to block certain Web sites without a court order, and amendments to the criminal code that dramatically expand the definition of treason.

The Egyptian government took action against domestic and international NGOs at the end of 2011, with police raids against a number of prodemocracy and human rights groups, including the Washington-based National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute. The government charged citizens and foreign personnel with “running unlicensed organizations” and “receiving foreign funds without permission” and for several months imposed a travel ban on the expatriate NGO workers. Forty-three individuals remained on trial throughout 2012, in a process marked by delays, and the government continued to use an onerous registration process to prevent domestic and foreign NGOs from working in the country.

In Bangladesh, independent labor unions continued to face major obstacles to their ability to register and conduct organizational activities. Furthermore, a lack of government attention to safe workplace standards contributed in part to numerous deadly fires in garment factories, including the tragic Tazreen fire in December that killed 114 workers.

In China, the government imposed burdensome registration requirements that effectively prevented the formation of independent political, human rights, religious, spiritual, labor, and other organizations that the government believed might challenge its authority. The government increased efforts to silence political activists and public interest lawyers and employed extralegal measures including enforced disappearance, “soft detention,” and strict house arrest, to prevent the public voicing of independent opinions.

There are some hopeful signs, however. In Afghanistan, the revised Law on Social Organizations passed the lower house of parliament in December. Among other changes, the new law would remove existing barriers to the receipt of foreign funding for social organizations. In Mongolia, the draft law on Public Benefit Activities provides for a governmental foundation to support civil society. The government is also developing legislation on contracting out services to civil society organizations. If adopted, these laws will provide for new domestic funding sources for civil society and at the same time, ensure transparency and accountability in distributing public funding.

Ongoing struggle for democratic change in the Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East is in the midst of transformations every bit as profound and consequential as the changes which swept over Latin America, Europe, and Eurasia two decades ago. Progress across the region is uneven, and the challenges of this moment – two years into what will likely be a long and difficult evolution – are immense. Debates and divisions suppressed for decades are resurfacing. Institutions are being held accountable for the first time. Young people are impatient for reform and results. Citizens and governments are negotiating democratic rules of the road.

In the countries that gave rise to the Arab Awakening, 2012 witnessed a bumpy transition from protest to politics, brutal repression by regimes determined to crush popular will, and the inevitable challenges of turning democratic aspirations into reality. While there were encouraging democratic breakthroughs in some cases, other countries saw the erosion of protections for civil society, sexual violence against women, violence against and increased marginalization of members of religious minorities, and escalating human rights violations, especially in Syria. Each of the nations of the region will follow its own path, but those governments that do not respond to the aspirations of their own people will have difficulty maintaining the status quo.

In Syria, the Asad regime continued to brutalize its people. The government conducted frequent police and military operations against peaceful civilians, including attacks on funeral processions, breadlines, schools, places of worship, and hospitals, and continued to use indiscriminate, disproportionate, and deadly force to terrorize the Syrian population into submission. Sexual violence was widespread. According to the UN, as many as 70,000 people have died since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, and the number of deaths had increased from around 1,000 per month in the summer of 2011 to an average of more than 5,000 per month by July 2012.

In addition to supporting the Asad regime and terrorist organizations outside its borders, the Government of Iran continued to severely restrict the rights of its own citizens. The government committed acts of politically motivated violence and repression, targeting journalists, students, lawyers, artists, women, ethnic and religious activists, and members of their families. According to NGO reports, the government executed a total of 523 persons in 2012, many after trials that were secret or did not provide due process. Prosecutors often charged persons arrested for political and human rights-related activities with moharebeh, “enmity towards god,” a vague and overly broad charge that carries the death penalty. The government promulgated new and sweeping restrictions on women’s activities, education, and employment.

Bahrain remained at a crossroads at the end of 2012. The government took some steps to implement the recommendations in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. However, the most important recommendations addressing fundamental inequalities in Bahraini society were unfulfilled at year’s end, and sectarian tensions continued to rise.

In addition to the crackdowns on NGOs in Egypt, 2012 saw increasingly targeted sexual violence against women, the failure of security forces to protect Coptic Christians from several incidents of societal violence, impunity for many of the perpetrators, and increasing political polarization. The latter trend led to widespread protests for and against the president’s efforts to declare his actions temporarily above judicial review and to expedite enactment of a controversial new constitution, which was adopted in a hastily organized December referendum.

Encouragingly, 2012 saw Libyans and Egyptians participate in contested and credible elections for the first time in decades. Tunisia held on to many of the historic gains towards sustainable democracy made in 2011, and the National Constituent Assembly conducted an open and inclusive constitutional-drafting process. Libya’s newly elected government, meanwhile, struggled to assert control over local militias and extremist violence, which claimed the lives of four Americans, including the U.S. Ambassador, in Benghazi in September.

The sweeping change set off by the frustrations of a single Tunisian fruit vendor in late 2010 will play out in different ways over the coming decades. The transition to democracy in the region will not be linear, and there surely will be setbacks. But it is important to analyze these changes with a longer view of history and a steady commitment to work with the people of this region in their quest to build free, democratic, inclusive, and stable societies.

RTWT

Source: WINEP

“Gas-rich Qatar threw Egypt another unconditional financial lifeline on Wednesday as the Arab world’s most populous nation struggles to secure an IMF loan to ease its deepening economic crisis,” Reuters reports:

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani said that Qatar would provide an extra $3 bn on top of some $5 billion the Gulf state has already given Cairo, and would extend gas supplies to Egypt this summer as needed. He said that Qatar, the biggest financial backer of Egypt’s Islamist-led government, “did not ask for anything in return” for its aid.

The new financial injection could buy Egypt time as it seeks to avert social unrest over fuel shortages and food price increases during a long, hot summer in the run-up to parliamentary elections expected in October.

Qatar is one of the most active regional players in providing humanitarian assistance to win hearts and minds, says Stanford University’s Lina Khatib. But the little-state-that-could has also faced criticism for funding illiberal actors, including ultraconservative Salafist militants, during the Arab uprisings, while suppressing fundamental freedoms at home.

Nevertheless, the recent anti-Christian violence, which left six dead, has amplified calls for the military to reclaim power, notes a prominent analyst.

Public support for a military takeover accelerated after December 5, when the Brotherhood used organized violence against protesters outside the presidential palace, with one poll suggesting that 82 percent of Egyptians want the military back in power, says Eric Trager, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“Yet despite this pro-military mood swing, the generals are staying away from direct political involvement for the time being,” he writes for the Atlantic’s Democracy Report:

Rather than ruling, the military is focusing squarely on managing its narrow, mostly economic interests [between 15 and 40 percent of Egypt's economy]. In some cases, it is even using its vast resources to boost its image while the Brotherhood’s falters. This will help the military justify its return to power if Egypt’s current political chaos threatens its assets….. And despite occasional military statements warning that its “patience” with the Brotherhood is wearing thin, a top military leader told me that the military isn’t eager to run the country.

Reports that the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Prime Minister Hesham Qandil is planning to amend the constitution have added to secular-liberal concerns.

“He’s preparing amendments to be submitted to the next parliament and that’s not illegal,” said constitutional expert Raafat Fouda, adding that Qandil is using the same people who drafted the constitution or people with similar ideologies. “He should have used those who opposed the constitution for amendments because if the people he chose knew better, they would have produced a better constitution from the first place.”

Mohamed El Baradei, a leading opposition figure, has offered to negotiate a settlement to the political crisis with President Mohamed Morsi on three conditions: a “neutral and credible” cabinet, an independent prosecutor general and a panel to draft a new election law, the Project for Middle East Democracy reports.

Islamists have “hijacked” the revolution and Morsi’s policies lacked “rationalism”, Baradei said, adding that he feared a “collapse of the state.”

The regime’s crackdown on NGOs and proposed restrictions on foreign funding are also promoting concern about the country’s authoritarian drift.

“But why are foreign funds so nefarious when received by NGOs yet apparently uncontroversial when received by others?” asks a leading human rights advocate:

The Egyptian military receives billions of dollars in aid from the United States; does that make it a subversive organization? The Egyptian government is desperately seeking foreign funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); is that an act of treason? Egyptian businesses are clamoring for foreign direct investment and the spending of foreign tourists; are these acts of disloyalty?

Of course not, Human Rights Watch director Kenneth Roth writes for Foreign Policy:

So why is it any more wrongful for NGOs to solicit financial support from foreign friends? Bolstered by foreign funds, the army, the government, and the business community all seek to advance their political agendas; why should only NGOs be singled out for restriction? It leaves the impression that their real sin is not accepting foreign contributions but criticizing the government and ruling party.

The relative weakness of the democratic opposition one of the tragic surprises of the Arab revolts, Thomas Friedman writes in The New York Times, citing Marc Lynch, a Middle East expert at George Washington University:

Many of the more secular, more pro-Western Egyptian political elites who could lead new center-left parties, he said, had been “co-opted by the old regime” for its own semiofficial parties and therefore “were widely discredited in the eyes of the public.” That left youngsters who had never organized a party, or a grab bag of expatriates, former regime officials, Nasserites and liberal Islamists, whose only shared idea was that the old regime must go.

Nevertheless, since taking power, “the Brotherhood has presided over economic failure and political collapse,” said Lynch.

“They have lost the center, they are feuding with the Salafists, and they are now down to their core 25 percent of support. There is no way they should win a fair election, which is why the opposition should be running in — not boycotting — the next parliamentary elections.” The old line that you have to wait on elections until a moderate civil society can be built is a proven failure. “You can’t teach someone to be a great basketball player by showing them videos,” he said. “They have to play — and the opposition will not become effective until they compete and lose and win again.”

With the secular liberals in disarray, the military’s shopping/community-center facility in Suez centered on the Badr Hypermarket suggests that it may be playing a longer game.

“In providing discounted goods to the broader population, the military is adopting an outreach model that the Muslim Brotherhood perfected long ago,” says Trager:

Well, I asked, had President Morsi, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces under the new constitution, signed off on the use of public funds for building this military-run shopping complex? “He should!” the colonel responded. “If you’re the president, and there’s something in the people’s interest, should you sign off on it? If he’s smart, he’ll agree. If he doesn’t sign, he’s not smart.” (Other officers told me, off-the-record, that Morsi had not been notified of the facility’s construction, and expressed their view that the military had no obligation to alert him of this fact.)

“No matter what the military’s intentions are, however, the Suez project is boosting its image just as the Brotherhood’s is plummeting, and it’s feeding hopes for a military coup,” he notes, even if the armed forces “won’t provide the path towards stability any more than the increasingly autocratic Muslim Brotherhood .”

The Project for Middle East Democracy is a grantee of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The U.S. Embassy in Cairo has reportedly deleted a tweet about attacks on freedom of expression that prompted outrage from Egypt’s President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The embassy’s Twitter feed linked to a U.S. comedy show in which comedian Jon Stewart criticized the government’s crackdown on its critics.

“Without Bassem and all those journalists and bloggers and brave protesters who took to Tahrir Square to voice dissent, you, President Morsi, would not have been in a position to repress them,” Stewart said on Monday’s show [above].

“Egypt’s prosecution of comedian Bassem Youssef for allegedly insulting President Muhammad Morsi and denigrating Islam is the latest indication of the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government’s undemocratic disposition,” says a leading analyst.

“The move will likely deepen the non-Islamist opposition’s mistrust of the country’s political and judicial institutions, encouraging groups to continue seeking change through increasingly violent demonstrations rather than official political channels,” writes Eric Trager, the Next Generation fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The Brotherhood, notes Alison Pargeter in a new edition of her biography of the movement, “has shifted from semi-clandestine opponent to legitimate political power almost overnight.”

But it is using that power for illiberal purposes, say observers.

The Islamist government is also “on the verge of adopting laws that would cripple the country’s fragile new democratic order and drastically reduce the West’s ability to influence Egypt’s course,” says The Washington Post:

Foremost among these is legislation that would regulate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) — the building blocks of democracy. As in many other countries, Egypt’s independent human rights groups, legal aid societies, women’s groups and other organizations helped lay the groundwork for the 2011 revolution; now they are essential to ensuring that a free society takes root. Many of Egypt’s NGOs and nascent political parties have received funding or training from U.S. and European foundations, such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute and Freedom House.

The long awaited dream of ruling Egypt is becoming a nightmare for the Brothers, writes analystZvi Mazel.

The Islamists are using powers supposedly reserved for urgent legislation to push through laws organizing the next elections, limiting the right to strike and to demonstrate; and stringent regulations for NGOs, including a provision legalizing the Brotherhood itself, he notes.

“The problem is that the Brotherhood has since its inception refused to divulge the list of its members and the origin of its funds – two requirements for registering a movement,” Mazel writes.

The Brotherhood is also pushing to place its officials and supporters in key government positions, prompting anxiety among independent observers.

“The general concern,” explains Khaled Fahmy, head of history at the American University in Cairo, “is about the Ikhwanisation of the state.”

But dissatisfaction with the Islamists is prompting a backlash.

“Elections held in students’ union throughout the country saw Brotherhood candidates defeated by independent candidates,” notes Mazel, a fellow of The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and a former ambassador to Romania, Egypt and Sweden. “Worse, elections to the key Journalists’ Syndicate saw the victory of Diaa Rashwan, head of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic studies and bitter opponent of the Brotherhood.”

“The Egyptian Brotherhood was the mother of all Islamist movements,” says Shadi Hamid, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center:

Analysts argue that, before 2011, the Brotherhood’s appeal lay in its ability to transcend the dirty game of secular politics – both through its connection to ordinary Egyptians, and through its offer of a redeeming and untried alternative: Islamism. But … Islamism has lost some of this innocence since coming to power – dislocated from its social work, and tarnished by the failures of government.

“There was a time when you could have been part of the Muslim Brotherhood but you didn’t really care about politics,” says Hamid. “It was about teaching, it was about education, it was about social services. But now the Brotherhood is so much about politics that it has consumed the organization.”

So could power be the Brotherhood’s undoing? For Pargeter the answer is no – or at least, not yet:

“The movement can still rely upon a core base who will vote for them because of what they stand for as much as for what they do or achieve politically.” It is, she says, “likely to still be able to connect with people in a way that [its] non-Islamist political rivals cannot.”

 The right of NGOs to access funding is an integral part of the right to freedom of association, and without access to funds and resources, the daily work of NGOs is highly jeopardized, according to a new analysis.

In some countries, the consequences of restrictive laws and practices are debilitating, says a report from the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a joint program of the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH),

“Barriers to funding are often erected in the context of a pervasive climate of repression in which restrictive laws combined with smearing campaigns and judicial harassment against human rights defenders create a hostile environment towards their activities. These barriers to NGO funding represent one of the most serious institutional problems facing defenders today”, said FIDH president Souhayr Belhassen.

In Ethiopia, regulations on foreign funding forced NGOs to reduce their activities and dismiss part of their staff or stop human rights related activities. In the Russian Federation, NGOs receiving foreign funds face criminal liability if they fail to brand themselves as “foreign agents”. In Belarus, Ales Bialiatski, president of the “Viasna” Human Rights Centre, is serving a prison term for using foreign funding and his colleagues were evicted from their offices.

“We want to protect NGOs. This is now an urgent problem because there is a pattern emerging, a global backlash, attacking and identifying human rights defenders as illegitimate because of their international connections. This new argument against international support, specifically funding, restricts the actions of NGOs. This is unacceptable. With this year’s Report, we want to reframe the debate concerning universally recognized human rights work”, said OMCT Secretary General Gerald Staberock.

The report provides a global review of the violations of NGOs’ right to funding, illustrated by 35 country case studies. Governments’ primary intention in restricting funding is to silence human rights defenders, a move which not only violates universally recognized standards, but seriously impedes civil society efforts to promote and protect human rights.

FIDH is supported by the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group.

Authoritarian regimes around the world are exporting their worst practices and working together to repress their own citizens and undermine human rights standards internationally, writes Daniel Calingaert.  

This “authoritarian internationalism,” which has likely contributed to the decline in global freedom registered by Freedom House, is manifested in multiple ways:

The “China model”: China, with its combination of rapid economic growth and political repression, presents an appealing policy model for other authoritarian regimes. It offers a supposed alternative to democracy as a route to prosperity, and its vague ideological emphasis on national sovereignty and the guiding role of a permanent ruling party is easily transferrable to other regimes that seek to resist international pressure and crush political opposition……

Close ties between dictatorships: Authoritarian regimes have built extensive economic, military, and political ties with like-minded governments, both in their neighborhoods and further afield. Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, for example, provided $82 billion in grants and subsidies to more than 40 countries from 2005 to 2011….

Replicating worst practices: Authoritarian regimes tend to adopt the same kinds of restrictive laws and policies as their peers. Their laws on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for instance, often share features like ambiguous or onerous registration requirements, wide discretion for authorities to block NGO activities, and restrictions on foreign funding.

Technology exports: China has set the standard for sophisticated methods of control over the internet and actively exports technology for monitoring digital communications. …

Security service collaboration: While authoritarian regimes naturally try to avoid notice of cooperation between their security services, indications of such cooperation have surfaced. Cuban intelligence officials are reportedly working within Venezuelan government and military structures. …..

Military intervention: When heavy-handed police methods are insufficient to quell unrest, authoritarian regimes at times intervene militarily to save a fellow dictator. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent troops into Bahrain in March 2011 to help put down peaceful protests.

Challenging international norms: In an effort to blunt international criticism, authoritarian regimes seek to water down accepted international standards for human rights. ……

Undermining international institutions: Russia and like-minded Eurasian dictatorships have made concerted efforts to hamper the ability of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to issue hard-hitting observation reports on flawed elections.

Counter-organizations: At the same time, authoritarian regimes have built up their own regional organizations to provide a counterweight to existing international institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a prime example…. 

“The reach and vigor of authoritarian internationalism point to the need for democratic countries to bolster their own cooperation,” Calingaert concludes.

 “The world’s democracies cannot afford to let the authoritarian challenge go unanswered.”

This extract is taken from the Freedom House blog. RTWT.

Activist blogger Alaa Abdel-Fattah

With the detention of five pro-democracy activists, including a prominent blogger, for protests against the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s Islamist-led government is escalating tensions with its opposition critics, observers suggest.

The arrests follow a clear threat to the National Salvation Front and other opposition groups from President Mohammed Morsi, referring to “emergency measures if any of them makes even the smallest of moves that undermines Egypt or the Egyptians.”

“Their lives are worthless when it comes to the interests of Egypt and Egyptians,” said Morsi. “I am a president after a revolution, meaning that we can sacrifice a few so the country can move forward. It is absolutely no problem.”

“Egyptians are already on guard against the possibility that their first freely elected president may seek to become a new autocrat, and some said they feared that the arrest warrants were the first clear example that Mr. Morsi’s government was using law enforcement as a political tool to punish his critics,” The New York Times reports.  

One of the accused, activist blogger Alaa Abdel-Fattah (above) turned himself in to authorities today, “a day after the country’s prosecutor general ordered his arrest along with four others for allegedly instigating violence with comments posted on social media,” AP reports. “The charges stem from clashes between supporters and opponents of the country’s Islamist president last week that left 200 injured.” 

The arrests are an example of a political party using its influence in the state to settle political scores, said Abdel Fatah’s father and veteran human rights lawyer Ahmed Seif Al-Islam Abdel Fatah.

“President Mohamed Morsi appointed the prosecutor general personally and Morsi is a member and former leader of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is involved in this case. There is a clear conflict of interest,” he said.

Tensions

The tensions between the Brotherhood and the liberal-secular opposition are also evident in skirmishes over the Islamist organization’s legal status and its attempts to stifle civil society.

“An Egyptian court today postponed a ruling on whether President Mohamed Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood is illegal, agreeing to the Islamist group’s request for more time to present evidence in a case that has put it on the defensive,” Reuters reports:

Brought by anti-Brotherhood lawyers, the court case points to the deep antipathy some harbor towards a group that was formally dissolved in 1954 and forced to operate underground until President Hosni Mubarak was ousted two years ago. The impact of any ruling against the Brotherhood is likely to be more political than practical: analysts find it inconceivable that the state will take any measures against a group that is now at the heart of power.

The Islamist group last week tried to shield itself from any adverse ruling by registering as a non-governmental organization (NGO).

Draft ‘rammed through’

Ironically, the move follows a vote by the Islamist-led Shura Council (left) endorsing restrictive draft legislation curbing NGO activities.

The new law, drafted by the human development committee, which is dominated by the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, “was rammed through the council in only one hour,” Al-Ahram reports.

The law prohibits registered NGOs from obtaining foreign funding, either “from foreigners or Egyptians living abroad,” according to an explanatory memorandum.

The law defines NGOs as groups “not involved in profitable activities” that “aim to achieve humanitarian, developmental and/or economic objectives,” said committee chairman Abdel-Azim Mahmoud, a leading FJP member.

“The word ‘foreign’ includes NGOs subject to international agreements or that work in the field of civil society in general,” he said, adding that a proposed coordination committee under the auspices of the social affairs ministry “will also be in charge of scrutinizing the programs and funds of these foreign NGOs.”

Pro-democracy and civil rights groups criticized the draft as more punitive than the Mubarak-era restrictions on NGOs.

The government refused to submit an alternative proposal drafted by civil society groups, said human rights lawyer Malek Adly, describing the Shura Council vote as a warning that the law “could cripple” NGO activities.

The bill “adopts a very negative view of foreign NGOs,” said Sherif Mounir, a representative of the NGO Support Centre. “Obliging these NGOs to give detailed accounts of their sources of funding and donations is a very hard job; it is really aimed at scaring them away from Egypt,” he said.

“The draft would, in effect, nationalize civil society organizations by defining their funds as public money, create a new interagency committee with the authority to approve or veto foreign funding for local NGOs, raise registration costs for NGOs to prohibitive levels, impose stifling oversight restrictions and bring operations of ‘civil organizations’ and law firms engaged in human rights and democracy work under the same legal regime as other NGOs,” said Freedom House, the US-based rights watchdog.

“The law would also prohibit foreign organizations that receive any government funding from operating in Egypt, driving most if not all foreign NGOs out of the country,” it added.

Brotherhood conspiracy theories

But a leading Brotherhood official defended the law, on the grounds that foreign-funded NGOs played a role in promoting Mubarak-era corruption.

“The Americans gave Egypt $70 billion during the Mubarak era and then wonder ‘Why do they hate us?” said Essam El-Erian (left, with Morsi). “I would answer, because your money was used to spread corruption in this country.”

“We don’t have any objections to foreign NGOs doing business in Egypt, but they must know that their funding will be subject to stringent transparency and control measures,” he added.

The Brotherhood’s conspiracy theories are shared by some secular groups.

“Most foreign NGOs in Egypt are, in fact, espionage cells spying on Egypt for the US and Israel,” said Nagi El-Shehabi, a member of the liberal Generation Party. “I see this new law as crucial to Egypt for eliminating the spies who have infiltrated the country under the cover of foreign ‘NGOs’.”

But civil society officials accused the Islamist group of hypocrisy and lack of transparency for covering up its own foreign funding.

“The FJP’s NGO law does not put the financial activities of the Muslim Brotherhood under the scrutiny of the central auditing agency, because its officials allege that the group’s funding comes from member contributions, thus exempting them from any financial review,” said Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat (right), a board member of the General Federation of NGOs.

He said that “most of the funds of Muslim Brotherhood International are estimated at $200 billion, most of which are deposited in Qatari banks.”

There are at least five draft NGO laws currently in circulation and all but one prepared by a civil society coalition are restrictive, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law. The two drafts under serious consideration are sponsored by the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MoISA) and the other by the Freedom and Justice party.

The Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs finalized the draft law’s amendments in January, and they will be reviewed by the next House of Representatives, once it is elected, Egypt Independent reports.

The Islamist group’s registration as an NGO came shortly after the State Commissioners Board recommended that the Supreme Administrative Court reject the Brotherhood’s longstanding appeal against a 1954 decision by the ruling Revolutionary Command Council declaring the group illegal and ordering its dissolution, notes Egypt Source.

“Some analysts argue that the abrupt registration is in breach of the law 84/2002 that forbids NGOs from taking part in political activities, raising doubts about the transparency of the process,” it adds.

“It is regrettable that Social Affairs Minister Nagwa Khalil allowed herself to be manipulated by Brotherhood officials into giving the group an automatic license,” civil society activist El-Sadat told Ahram Online. “Anyway, the process of registering the Brotherhood is very vague; and they did it very quickly in the same autocratic way as former president Hosni Mubarak’s ruling party, in order not to be scrutinized by any institution and remain above the law.”

The FJP bill states that “some NGOs can obtain licenses as full-fledged institutions,” which gives the Islamists the right to engage in all business sectors and establish overseas branches, said El-Sadat (left), chairman of the liberal-oriented Reform and Development Party.

“It’s very dangerous for a group that mixes religion with politics – and works under an international organization aiming to convert all the world to Islam – to get a license,” he said.

“However, as an NGO, the Brotherhood will be subjected to certain restrictions,” as under the 2002 Law on NGOs such groups are “barred from dabbling in politics or having a religious basis,” writes analyst Ramadan A. Kader:

Moreover, the law obliges registered NGOs to disclose their finances. Since the 2011 revolt that deposed Mubarak, the mostly secular opposition has been calling for the powerful Brotherhood to go public with their finances and the sources of their financing.

Shortly after the anti-Mubarak revolt, the Brotherhood, banned for more than five decades, obtained a license for their first-ever political party: Freedom and Justice. The party, which was headed by Morsi before he became the head of state, secured nearly half the seats in the now-dissolved Parliament.

“How will this party fare, should the court disband the parent group, while the Brotherhood have become an NGO, technically barred from practicing politics?’ he asks.

The Brotherhood’s hardline stance on NGO regulation will come as little surprise to observers who recall the group’s support for the former regime’s crackdown on NGOs, imposing a travel ban on several foreign nationals, including U.S. citizens, as part of its prosecution of Egyptian and foreign activists, following security forces’ raids on seventeen pro-democracy NGOs.

The proposal to outlaw foreign-funded NGOs would immediately disable many Egyptian groups working on human rights, corruption and other democracy-related issues, including partners of Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, that were among the groups targeted in last year’s crackdown and which receive support from the Washington-based National Endowment for Democracy.