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Credit: CIPE
Two years on from Tunisia’s Jasmine revolution that sparked the Arab Spring, has sectarianism overtaken democracy as the driving force of the region’s popular upsurge?
“Tribal, regional, and sectarian factionalism made political progress in Yemen agonizingly slow, as did tribal and regional divides in Libya,” says F. Gregory Gause, a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings’ Doha Center.
On November 23, 2011, Yemen’s revolution subsided with an agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), enacting a two-year transitional government led by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, writes Samaa Al Hamdani.
According to this agreement, a national dialogue is scheduled to take place by the end of February or the beginning of March to decide the formation of the new government and its constitution, she writes for the Fikra Forum.
However, the transition appears to be dawdling, causing many Yemenis to lose faith. Delays can be attributed to Yemen’s complex ethnic and tribal affiliations and interests, a deteriorating security situation, and Hadi’s meticulous oversight, with a careful intent to avoid aggressive backlash and to maintain the nation’s stability. Nevertheless, the national dialogue is progressing, the success of which will be critical in determining the future stability of the country.
All Yemenis, regardless of their political opinions, must be represented in this dialogue; otherwise, the dialogue will fail and the country will be paralyzed. So far, the Southern Hirak has not released their party list and independent applicants from the South are hesitant to apply, seemingly discouraged to join. Recently, in a first step toward transitional and restorative justice, Hadi assigned two committees to address land disputes and forcible job expulsions that occurred in Yemen’s southern provinces of following the 1994 civil war. If this effort fails, the southerners will continue to feel persecuted and will demand secession.
Following President Hadi’s decree, many wonder what will happen to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, former leader of the First Armored Division. Mohsen, though demoted, remains an influential military figure, and may participate as an advisor to the tribal members of the dialogue. Meanwhile, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh is still considered the president of the General People’s Congress (GPC) party, though he is sick and needs medical treatment. The national dialogue technical committee did not specify any restrictions against Saleh’s attendance, but if Saleh decides to attend, the majority of participants will withdraw, ruining any real chance of dialogue. {This extract is taken from a longer post at Fikra Forum: RTWT. Sama’a Al-Hamdani writes on the blog Yemeniaty.com. You can follow her on Twitter @Yemeniaty)
Yemen’s Tawakul Karman is confident that change is unfolding, the Los Angeles Times reports:
Karman’s transformation from a rebel in the Arab world’s poorest country to a polished Nobel laureate remains unfinished. One newspaper ventured that she would “mature” into the role. Karman appears earnest, and possesses a keen ability to summon sound bites against injustice. She stopped wearing a face veil years ago, saying it hid her from her message. She and others became an example as more young women peeled away the fabric of custom. Today, her days are spent updating her website and traveling with a small entourage that meets at her headquarters, Women Journalists Without Chains. She speaks of stemming government corruption, restructuring military and intelligence services and writing a new constitution to speak to the ideals of the young.
Hat tip: CIPE’s Yemen blog.
Women Journalists Without Chains is a grantee of the National Endowment for Democracy. CIPE is one of the NED’s four core institutes.
